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ABSTRACT 
A DIRTY DILEMMA: DETERMINANTS OF ELECTRONIC WASTE IMPORTATION 
Jamila N. Glover 
Old Dominion University, 2017 
Director: Jesse T. Richman 
 
During the 1970s-1980s waste, specifically toxic waste from manufacturing, became a 
globally traded commodity. By the late 1980s, waste trade became a global political and 
environmental topic because many believed that developed countries were ‘dumping’ 
hazardous material on less developed nations despite knowing that less developed countries 
often lack adequate infrastructure to dispose of waste in an environmentally responsible 
manner, prompting international regulatory responses.  
This study focuses on the fastest growing category of traded toxic waste – electronic 
waste. In 2014, approximately 41.8 million tons of electronic waste was generated globally.1   
During this same period 1.6 million tons were traded in the global economy.  Electronic waste is 
particularly intriguing because of its mix of toxic dangers and high value opportunities. Unlike 
other hazardous waste, electronic waste is composed of toxic materials such as lead, mercury, 
cadmium and brominated retardants that can adversely affect human health and the 
environment and valuable recyclables such as iron, copper, gold, silver, and rare earth metals. 
Scholars debate whether the domestic political structure, international environmental 
agreements or economic factor is the primary determinant that induce states to import 
hazardous waste.  The aim of this study is to provide insight to this puzzling question.    
The study creates a Waste Trade Framework that is a compilation of political, economic 
and environmental determinants.  The framework is then tested using partial least squares-
structural equation modeling.  The study finds that when developed and developing countries 
                                               
1 C.P. Baldé, Wang, F., Kuehr, R., Huisman, J, "The Global E-Waste Monitor," (Bonn, Germany 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
are evaluated jointly, the economic factor has the largest impact on electronic waste import 
volume.  When developed and developing countries are modeled independently, electronic 
waste import volume in both country types is most influenced by the political economic factor 
(the interaction of politics and the economy). 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: A DIRTY DILEMMA 
 
During the 1970s-1980s waste, specifically toxic waste, became a globally traded 
commodity.  Manufacturing firms, primarily in developed nations, sought to discard hazardous 
by-product waste.  Other nations accepted the waste as a method to increase state revenue.  
By the late 1980s, waste trade became a global political and environmental topic because many 
believed that developed countries were ‘dumping’ hazardous material on less developed nations 
despite knowing that less developed countries often lack adequate infrastructure to dispose of 
waste in an environmentally responsible manner.  In 1989 the Basel Convention was 
established in response to the growing concern.  The Convention aims to reduce the generation 
of hazardous waste and to protect the environment and human and animal heath from 
hazardous waste.1  Notably, it does restrict waste trade but rather set guidelines for both the 
transboundary movement and disposal practices of hazardous waste.  This in combination with 
the demand for waste disposal services led to the growth of the waste trade industry.  As a 
result, hazardous waste became a global commodity, the buying and selling of a product or 
service in the capitalist market for profit.2   
 
 
CHANGE IN HAZARDOUS WASTE  
As globalization continues the types of hazardous waste changes.  The digital revolution 
notably transitioned society from analogue technology to digital technology.  Improvements in 
technology enable manufacturing firms to produce and distribute consumer goods globally at a 
                                               
1 Basel Convention, "Convention Overview," Accessed June, 2016, 
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1271/Default.aspx. 
 
2 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 161.   
 
 
 
 
 
2 
lower cost.  At the same time, the ‘digital revolution’ spurred the production of electronic 
consumer goods.  Typewriters and adding machines have been replaced with personal laptops 
and tablets.  Landline phones and film cameras have been replaced with cellular phones and 
Smartphones.  Appliances have been updated with smart features.  Smart Refrigerators allow 
you to see what is inside without opening the door.  Stove-tops have Wi-Fi cook ability with 
virtual LED flames.3  All these products have toxic components and are considered electronic 
waste once discarded.4  Electronic waste is now considered the fastest growing waste stream5 
and is a significant portion of 21st century toxic waste. 
In 2014, approximately 41.8 million tons of electronic waste was generated globally.6  
Interestingly, the widespread use of electronic goods is profound in both developed and 
developing countries.  Consumers in developed countries have more disposable income to 
purchase electronic products.  On average customers in developed nations replace larger 
electronic products every five years; smaller electronics such as smart phones are replaced 
more often.7  Electronic waste in the European Union increases 3-5% annually, about three 
times faster than other municipal waste streams.8  Rwanda produces between 10,000 and 
15,000 tons of e-waste annually and expects an annual growth rate of 6%.9  The Rwandan 
government states that the increase is attributed to economic development and to the nation’s 
initiative to improve information and communication technologies that require the use of tools 
                                               
3 Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) allows a user to connect an electronic device to an internet connection. LED (light emitting diode) 
 
4 Although a formal definition of e-waste has not been established, most agree that it consists of products that have an electronic 
plug or have electrical components. Rolf Widmer et al., "Global Perspectives on E-Waste," Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review 25, no. 5 (2005): 438-39. 
 
5 Ludgren (2012), Balde et al. (2014), Cucchiella et al. (2015), Wang et al. (2016). 
 
6 Baldé. 
 
7 Chris  Ely, "The Life Expectancy of Electronics " Consumer Technology Association, 
https://www.cta.tech/News/Blog/Articles/2014/September/The-Life-Expectancy-of-Electronics.aspx. 
 
8 Tina Wakolbinger et al., "When and for Whom Would E-Waste Be a Treasure Trove? Insights from a Network Equilibrium Model of 
E-Waste Flows," International Journal of Production Economics 154 (2014): 263. 
 
9 Paul Ploumis, "Rwanda Announces Opening of Newly Built E-Waste Recycling Facility," Shanghai Metals Market 
https://news.metal.com/newscontent/100721639/rwanda-announces-opening-of-newly-built-e-waste-recycling-facility. 
 
 
 
 
3 
such as laptops and mobile phones.  These changes have also facilitated the demand for newer 
products.10  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the development of electronic waste generation and electronic 
waste trade.  It is estimated that global e-waste production will be nearly 50 million tons in 
2018.11  The rapid and continual growth of e-waste has created a dirty dilemma in which nation-
states, both developed and developing, generate more e-waste than they are either willing or 
able to dispose of domestically.  Transforming e-waste into a global commodity, a good that can 
be bought and sold, in the international system may serve as solution to the dilemma.  
 
 
ELECTRONIC WASTE AND ELECTRONIC WASTE TRADE  
According to the United Nations Commodity Trade Database, electronic waste (e-waste) 
can include “electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and 
reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories 
of such articles, waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric accumulators; 
spent primary cells, spent primary batteries and spent electric accumulators; electrical parts of 
machinery or apparatus.”12  Circa 1997, e-waste trade experienced a sharp decline after the 
Basel Ban Amendment, prohibiting developed countries from sending toxic waste to developing 
countries was ratified in 1995.  During the early 2000s e-waste trade was relatively flat.  Around 
2006, e-waste trade begins to gain momentum.  Although, e-waste consists of more than 
                                               
10 Ministry of Trade and Industry, "National E-Waste Management Policy for Rwanda," ed. Ministry of Trade and Industry (Kigali, 
Rwanda 2015), 2. 
 
11 Baldé,  24. 
 
12 United Nations, "United Nations Comtrade Database," Accessed June 2016, https://comtrade.un.org/. Commodity HS 854810 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
personal computing devices it is worth mentioning that after the launch of the iPhone in 200713 
e-waste trade has increased year over year (Figure 1.2).14  
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Causal Loop Diagram of key drivers of electronic waste generation and trade 
 
 
  
                                               
13 Apple and the iPhone are credited with being the leader in the market and catapulting global consumer use of hand held devices.  
The initial launch of the iPhone sold over 100 million units in only 74 days in the United States.  By 2008 it was available for sell in 
21 countries. In 2010 there were 85 million IOS users. Time Magazine, "8 Years of the Iphone: An Interactive Timeline," Time 
Magazine http://time.com/2934526/apple-iphone-timeline/. 
 
14 United Nations.  Commodity HS 854810 import volume data 1996-2014. 
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Fig. 1.2 Global Electronic Waste Import Volume 
 
 
Beyond the growth of electronic waste trade, it is important and interesting in two ways.  
First, it operates paradoxically to international trade theories. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) international trade theory posits that a country produces and exports goods in which it 
has a comparative advantage. It also assumes that importers buy a product and/or service from 
the exporters.  Exporters gain revenue as importers not only pay the purchase price for the 
goods but also pay an importation tariff.  However, electronic waste trade does not align with 
this behavior.  First, some countries import waste despite not having a comparative advantage 
in waste management, processing and disposal.  Additionally, in waste trade, exporters 
generally pay a fee to importers because the exporter is paying for ‘disposal services’.  Thus, 
importers of electronic waste are revenue earners.   
The structural dichotomy of electronic waste is another interesting aspect of e-waste 
trade18 and is also presumably a reason why e-waste trade does not follow traditional trade 
conventions.  Like other hazardous material, electronic waste contains toxic components, lead, 
mercury, cadmium and brominated retardants, that can adversely affect human health and the 
                                               
18  Robinson (2009) provides an overview of the production, structure and environmental impacts of e-waste.  
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6 
environment.19  People are exposed to these toxins via the water stream, air pollution, soil 
contamination and by physically handling the product.  Studies show that over exposure to 
these materials can lead to irreversible cognitive deficits and impair motor skills particularly in 
children.20  At the same time, electronic waste is composed of iron, copper, gold, silver and 
other rare earth metals, 21 which makes it optimal for urban mining.22  These metals, now 
considered technology metals, are essential to the production of electronic consumer devices 
and advanced weaponry systems.23  Consequently, the value of these components play a role 
in electronic waste trade.   
From 2006 to 2008 the value of e-waste rose 139% from $232 million (USD) to $556 
(USD).  In 2008 the Basel Convention formally acknowledged e-waste as a valuable commodity 
by shifting its perspective of viewing it as value less waste to a resource that provides economic 
benefits.24  Achim Steiner, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment 
Programme UNEP comments that, 
“Today, the protection of vulnerable countries remains as important as ever. At the same 
time, if the Convention is to retain its relevance in the 21st century it is necessary to 
identify a practical approach that provides protection to countries that need it, while at 
the same time supporting the realization of the economic incentives and benefits of 
environmentally sound recycling and resource recovery operations in those countries 
that are in a position to do so.”25 
 
                                               
19 Balde et al. (2014) 
 
20 Chen et al. (2011), Luo et al. (2011).  
 
21Michelle Heacock et al., "E-Waste and Harm to Vulnerable Populations: A Growing Global Problem," Environmental Health 
Perspectives (Online) 124, no. 5 (2016): 550.  
 
22 Urban mining in the context of this paper refers to the extraction and recovery of coveted metals from obsolete products for 
profitability purposes. Urban mining can also be considered a form of electronic waste recycling.  Literature discussing urban mining 
include works by Balde et al. (2014), Krook and Bass (2013), Johansson et al. (2013), Brunner (2010).  
 
23 Technology Metals Research, "What Are Technology Metals?," Accessed May 7, 2017, http://www.techmetalsresearch.com/what-
are-technology-metals/. 
 
24 Secretariat of the  Basel Convention, "Our Sustainable Future: The Role of the Basel Convention," (Geneva, Switzerland: 
UNEP/SBC, International Environment House I, 2008), 3. 
 
25 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, "Basel Convention Bulletin," (Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP/SBC, International Environment 
House I, 2011), 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
In 2010 revenue from global hazardous waste management services was $20.2 billion 
dollars USD (4 percent of all global environmental services revenue).26  During this period, the 
value of electronic waste traded was $657 million.27  By 2015, imported electronic waste was 
valued at approximately $1.2 billion USD, a 651% increase since 1996 (Figure 1. 3).28  
Consequently, electronic waste trade has evolved into a form of reverse logistics, where 
products are purposely imported for reuse, remanufacturing, recycling or disposal.29 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 Value of Global Imported Electronic Waste 
 
 
Interestingly, after the Basel Convention shifted its view from waste to resource, the 
value/ton of electronic waste increased substantially in developed countries as compared to 
developing countries (Figure 1.4). 
                                               
26 United States International Trade Commission, "Environmental and Related Services," ed. United States International Trade 
Commission (Washington, DC 20436 2013), x. Environmental services include water and wastewater services, solid and hazardous 
waste services, and remediation services. 
 
27 United Nations. Commodity HS 854810 import value data 1996-2014. 
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Rahman and Subramanian (2012) discusses how factors within the causal loop diagram influence computer recycling operations.  
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Fig. 1.4 Value/Ton of Global Imported Electronic Waste 
 
 
It is important to note that like other traded goods, the market plays a critical role in the 
value of e-waste.  To a degree, the value of electronic waste is influenced by those who control 
the market.  E-waste trade can be described as a global oligopoly in which a few countries 
control and import most of the world’s electronic waste most likely because they have a 
comparative advantage in extracting the metals.  The top 15 importers are predominately 
developed countries and account for 89% of global import e-waste volume (Table 1A).  
Consequently, these nations can impact the value of e-waste and alter the supply of the 
extracted components.  In turn, this affects the resale price of the metal and ultimately the cost 
of new electronic equipment.  An example of this occurred around 2010 - 2011 when the cost of 
technology metals increased substantially.  Although, the prices leveled off it reminded 
companies that they rely heavily on China which sources most of the material.30  
Even without price/market manipulation, the value of e-waste can also be affected by the 
general supply and demand of the technology metals.  
                                               
30 Ian  Hardy, "Could You Cope with Smartphone Rationing?," BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40248405. 
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  “The problem with the technology metals is that [the] supply of them, or more 
specifically [the] maximum rates of production of them, is critically dependent mostly upon our 
production of base metals. In the case of the rare-earth metals, mined as a group, the key 
supply issue is the complex metallurgy of the separation of the individual rare earths from each 
other.”31 
Nonetheless, importing electronic waste is beneficial in two significant ways, opportunity 
for revenue and job creation.  States earn revenue not only from being paid by other nations to 
accept the commodity but they also reap financial benefits from the components that can be 
extracted, repurposed and resold.  Also, job growth in waste management facilities has resulted 
from the massive and rapid growth of e-waste and the increase in global sustainable 
development and green economies initiatives.  Recycling facilities in Brazil, China and the 
United States, [the world’s top e-waste importers] employ roughly 12 million people.32  Beyond 
this, “recycling is likely to grow steadily and form a vital component of greener waste 
management systems, which will provide decent employment.”33   
However, the repositioning of hazardous waste to a resource, the increasing value of e-
waste, and its rapidly growing stream lead to two sub-debates.  First, a controversial discourse 
on the flow of e-waste (who imports e-waste and from whom) and perhaps more interesting, the 
dispute over what constitutes a comparative advantage in importing waste. 
 
 
WASTE TRADE PATTERN DEBATE  
Academic interest in analyzing the phenomenon of waste trade leads to divergent 
theories.  Proponents of the pollution haven hypothesis/north south divide theory posit that 
                                               
31 Technology Metals Research. 
 
32 United Nations Environment Programme, "Waste: Investing in Energy and Resource Efficiency " in Towards a Green Economy 
Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 2011), 292. 
 
33 Ibid. 
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asymmetries in the world distribution of income cause less developed countries to enact lax 
environmental laws in hopes of increasing national revenue.  Therefore, the flow of waste is 
from developed countries (presumably with more stringent regulations) to less developed 
countries (inclined to have lax regulations).34  
Along similar lines, the race to the bottom theory conjectures that some states’ economic 
growth strategy is based primarily on specializing in ‘dirty’ industries.35  Dirty industries are 
characterized as having high emissions and pollutants that are detrimental to the environment 
and harmful to human and animal life.  Scholars argue that hazardous waste management 
should also be included in the spectrum of dirty industries because of its harmful environmental 
effects.36 
Alternatively, scholars argue that the flow of waste is to developed nation-states. 37  
These scholars posit that economically advanced nations have a comparative advantage in 
innovation and technology that leads them to efficiently and effectively properly dispose of 
waste while maintaining strict environmental regulations.  Therefore, the flow of waste can be 
exported from both developed and developing countries to a developed nation.  
Additional studies indicate that the flow of waste is not from rich to poor countries but 
flows from developed to developed countries.  This is large in part due to multilateral trade and 
environmental agreements.  Lastly, others surmise that e-waste is traded regionally.38  
 
 
  
                                               
34 Literature on the pollution haven hypothesis indicating that the flow of waste is from rich to poor countries include Clapp (1994, 
2001), French (2000), Kellenberg (2009, 2010), Lucier and Gareau (2015). 
 
35 Cristina A. Lucier and Brian J. Gareau, "From Waste to Resources? Interrogating 'Race to the Bottom' in the Global 
Environmental Governance of the Hazardous Waste Trade," Journal of World-Systems Research 21, no. 2 (2015): 499. 
36 Jennifer Clapp, "What the Pollution Havens Debate Overlooks," Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 2 (2002): 13. 
 
37 Studies illustrating that advanced countries are more prone to import waste include O'Neill (2000), Jacott et al. (2001), Ederington 
et al. (2005), Baggs (2009). 
 
38 Regional waste trade is discussed in Lepawsky & McNabb (2010), Clapp (2010), and Lepawsky (2014). 
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Table 1.1 Debate about the Flow of Hazardous Waste Trade  
    Num. Argument Theory Relevant Literature 
1 
Less advanced 
countries import waste 
primarily from advanced 
countries.  
Pollution Haven Hypothesis 
North/South Divide 
Race to the Bottom  
Clapp (1994, 2001), French 
(2000), Ladou and Lovegrove 
(2008), Kellenberg (2009, 
2010), Lucier and Gareau 
(2015)  
2 
Advanced countries 
import a substantial 
amount of waste.  
Economic Gravity Model 
Economic HOS Model  
New Endogenous Growth 
Theory 
O'Neill (2000), Jacott et al.  
(2001), Ederington et al. (2005), 
Baggs (2009)   
3 Waste is imported/ traded regionally.  
Economic Gravity Model  
New Economic Geography 
Theory 
Lepawsky & McNabb (2010), 
Clapp (2010), Lepawsky 
(2014,2015) 
 
Note: Bolded literature focuses on electronic waste.  
 
 
Over the last two decades developed nations have consistently imported more electronic 
waste volume than developing countries (Figure 1.5).39  These statistics contradict the popular 
belief that developing countries import more waste than developed countries.  More so, because 
both developing and developed nations import e-waste it is unclear as to what variables induce 
a nation-state to import electronic waste. 
 
 
                                               
39 Electronic waste is represented by UN Commodity HS 854810. UN Commodity HS 854810 is defined as electrical machinery and 
equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts 
and accessories of such articles // Waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric accumulators; spent primary 
cells, spent primary batteries and spent electric accumulators; electrical parts of machinery or apparatus, not specified or included 
elsewhere in this Chapter.  
 
UN Commodity HS 854810 import volume data 1996-2015. 
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Fig. 1.5 Global Import Volume Developed versus Developing Country 
 
 
PURPOSE AND CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH 
Data and previous studies indicate that both developed and less developed countries 
are active participants in global waste trade.  Therefore, rather than adding to the abundance of 
literature that analyzes the differences between bilateral trading partners, the aim of this study is 
to provide insight to a more pragmatic question, what drives a country to import electronic 
waste.  Beyond this, the research explores (i.) What factor(s) have the largest impact on 
electronic waste import volume (ii.) Do the factors’ effect size on electronic waste import volume 
differ between developed and developing countries? (iii.) Did the factors effect on electronic 
waste import volume change after Basel repositioned its view on waste?   
Most experts agree that economic, political and environmental variables impact waste 
trade.  However, a comprehensive model does not exist and consequently has not been used in 
prior studies.  Additionally, many studies tend to be myopic.  They include one or two of the 
factors.  Also, current research tests the individual variables effect on waste volume.  However, 
the economic, political and environmental factors consist of more than a single variable.  The 
project creates an inclusive conceptual model that is a consists of multiple variables per factor.  
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The model is then tested using the partial least squares-structural equation modeling method 
(PLS-SEM).  This method provides evidence as to what variables are important to the factor 
while simultaneously testing the impact of the factors on electronic waste trade import volume. 
Furthermore, it is largely assumed that differences between developed and less 
developed states economic status, political structure and environmental regulations influence a 
country’s level of participation in global trade.  Nonetheless, few waste trade studies test and 
compare differences between country types.  The study identifies if developed and less 
developed countries e-waste volume are driven by different factors.  In doing so, it contributes to 
the debate on theories of why both advanced and less advanced countries import a substantial 
amount of e-waste. 
Lastly, this study is innovative in two ways.  To my knowledge, it is the first study to 
create a comprehensive model and use it to analyze waste trade.  In doing so, it is the first 
project to simultaneously explore the multiple theories that scholars cite as drivers of waste 
importation.  This study is also groundbreaking in that it identifies the importance of variables 
that current research does not address.  Most importantly, the culmination of these advantages 
produces a research study that is a robust analysis of drivers of electronic waste importation 
that is absent from current literature.  
 
 
 
 
14
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: DOWN IN THE DUMPS 
 
In studying nation-state behavior in relation to hazardous waste trade practices, scholars 
have documented links between the economic condition of a country, its domestic regulations 
and environmental initiatives and policies.  However, there is little consensus on what factor has 
the largest effect on hazardous waste import volume.  Additionally, there is discord on whether 
these factors perform differently in developed as compared to less developed countries.     
There are generally five perspectives that explain what factors influence waste trade 
importation practices.  Neoclassical economics focuses on economic variables, such as capital 
abundance and size of the economy.  It also contends that “government policies can do little to 
accelerate long term growth”.1  Under this theory, a country’s economic state influences waste 
import volume and is not greatly affected by the political factor.   
The domestic institutional approach is paradoxical to the neoclassical economic theory.  
The domestic institutional approach asserts that the national regulatory structure of a nation is 
the primary determinant that promotes or prohibits a state’s ability to import hazardous waste.  It 
does not account for the economic state of a nation.  
The new endogenous growth theory recognizes the intersection of politics and the 
economy. It asserts that the use of government policies impacts long-term economic 
development.2  Following this theory, waste import volume is affected by both a country’s 
political structure and economic position. 
Neoliberal international institutionalism argues that international institutions and 
international and regional environmental treaties influence state behavior.  Therefore, waste 
import volume is affected by a nation-states participation in international agreements.  Lastly, 
                                               
1 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001), 110. 
 
2 Ibid., 113-14. 
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global environmental political theory argues that environmental concerns are addressed by the 
interaction between state and nonstate actors at the domestic and international levels.3  
Therefore, the amount of waste a country imports is impacted by the domestic regulatory 
structure and environmental agreements.  
The following section examines the current debates and theoretical gaps on factors that 
impact waste trade importation practices.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Theories Explaining Waste Importation  
Num. Argument Associated Theory Relevant Literature  
1 
Economic variables mostly 
influence waste importation.  
Neoclassical Economics Montgomery (1992, 1995), 
Sigman (1996), Levinson (1999), 
Antweiler et al. (2001), Albers 
(2015) 
    
2 
National regulatory framework 
is the primary influencer to 
waste importation.  
Domestic Institutionalism O'Neill (2000), Carrigan and 
Coglianese (2011), Rahman 
and Subramanian (2012) 
    
3 
Economic variables and the 
regulatory framework 
influence waste importation. 
New Endogenous 
Growth Theory 
Clapp (1994, 2001), Baggs 
(2009), Kellenberg (2012), 
Estrada-Ayub & Kahhat (2014) 
    
4 
Environmental agreements 
and international institutions 
influence waste importation. 
Neoliberal International 
Institutionalism  
de Zeeuw (2008, 2015), 
Kellenberg (2012, 2014, 2015), 
Lepawsky (2015), Khan (2016) 
5 
 
International environmental 
agreements and the domestic 
regulatory framework 
influence waste importation.  
 
Environmental Political 
Theory  
 
Maxianova (2008), Marcoux & 
Urpelainen (2012), Jing (2014), 
Lucier & Gareau (2015) 
 
Note: Bolded literature focuses on electronic waste. 
  
                                               
3 Pamela S. Chasek, David L.  Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 6th ed., Dilemmas in World Politics 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2014), 37. 
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ECONOMIC EXPLANATION 
The neoclassical economic view argues that nation-states focus on capital accumulation 
via capital and labor.  Along similar lines, scholars contend that waste import flows largely 
depend on capital abundance.4  Therefore, state level economic variables such as gross 
domestic product (GDP) - the economy size, the wealth of a nation, GDP/capita, government 
debt, disposal costs and the country’s openness to trade are key determinants that partially 
explain waste trade.  However, there is not a consensus on the role each determinant has when 
a country evaluates whether to import hazardous waste.  For example, the importance of GDP 
might vary between developed and developing states.   
Baggs’s (2009) research, one of the first statistical studies on waste trade, evaluates 
determinants that influence hazardous waste trade patterns.  She examines the relationship 
between GDP and hazardous waste import volume.  The results indicate that as a country’s 
GDP increases, trade in hazardous waste also increases.  Higashida and Managi’s (2014) study 
on determinants of trade in recyclable wastes produce similar findings.5  The results of their 
research demonstrate that as a country’s economy grows the amount of imported waste 
increases.   
Contrarily, because importing waste is a source of revenue, countries with low GDP, less 
developed countries, import waste as a means of economic development.  Lepawsky’s (2009) 
study of e-scrap on the grey market indicates that as a country’s GDP decreases the likelihood 
that it imports e-waste increases.6  This finding aligns with sentiments expressed by proponents 
of the North-South divide/Race to the Bottom Theory that claim less advanced countries 
                                               
4 Adam B. Jaffe et al., "Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell 
Us?," Journal of Economic Literature 33, no. 1 (1995); Werner Antweiler, Brian R. Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor, "Is Free Trade 
Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001). 
 
 
5 Keisaku Higashida and Shunsuke Managi, "Determinants of Trade in Recyclable Wastes: Evidence from Commodity-Based Trade 
of Waste and Scrap," Environment & Development Economics 19, no. 2 (2014): 265. 
 
6 Josh Lepawsky, "Tracking E-Scrap on the Grey Market," Resource Recycling 28, no. 12 (2009). 
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(nations in the south) are often poor and riddled with debt which induces them to invest in dirty 
industries (hazardous waste importation).7  Consequently, it is logical to expect a positive 
correlation between debt and waste import volume.  However, interestingly, Lepawksy and 
McNabb (2010) found no evidence of a significant relationship between net trade balance and 
debt service ratio.  Additionally, the study did not find a significant relationship between net 
trade balance and public debt as a percentage of GDP.8   
GDP is also considered in electronic waste because it affects disposal costs.  Some 
studies assert that waste disposal cost is one of the most critical variables a country evaluates 
when deciding if and how much hazardous waste to import.  Waste disposal costs reflect a 
complex system comprised of transportation costs, disposal fees (landfill or incinerator costs) 
and separation (labor) costs.  Separation costs are the cost of disassembling and sorting 
recycled materials and storing them by material type.  Transportation cost is the amount paid for 
the movement of waste from the point of entry to the point of treatment or landfill.9  On a high 
level, the profitability of importing waste is the import value (revenue) of waste plus the value of 
re-saleable components minus disposal cost.  
 
Net Profit = import value (revenue) + revenue of re-saleable components - disposal cost  
Disposal cost = transportation costs + disposal fees (landfill or incinerator costs) + labor 
costs - Tax Incentives and Subsidies10 
 
                                               
7 Jennifer Clapp, "The Toxic Waste Trade with Less-Industrialised Countries: Economic Linkages and Political Alliances," Third 
World Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1994): 506. 
 
8 Josh Lepawsky and Chris McNabb, "Mapping International Flows of Electronic Waste," Canadian Geographer 54, no. 2 (2010): 
188. 
 
9 Delta Institute, "Waste Managment: Unrealized Environmental and Economic Benefits for Chicagoland," (Chicago, IL Delta 
Institute 2014), 9. 
 
10 Van Passel et al. (2013) discuss how the profitability of urban mining waste is dependent on governments creating incentives for 
private actors. Sigman (1996) and Levinson (1999) discuss the impact of tax incentives on hazardous waste disposal. 
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High capital costs associated with the development and operation of landfills may affect 
the ability to provide waste management services.11  Therefore, a widely accepted principle is 
that hazardous waste flows to less developed countries where disposal costs are presumably 
lower than costs in developed countries.  Four major items facilitate lower disposal cost in less 
developed countries.  First, labor costs are lower stemming mainly from lower wages and low 
environmental, health and labor standards.12  Secondly, operational costs of disposal facilities 
are likely lower because of minimal or no capital equipment expenditures.  This in turns limits 
maintenance costs on machines.  Lastly, as countries compete for investment, governments are 
liable to provide tax incentives and subsidies for corporations.13  The culmination of these 
factors decreases total disposal cost and yields a favorable cost-benefit analysis for developing 
nations to import waste.14  
However, the results of a cost-benefit analysis can also be positive for developed 
countries.  Firms in developed countries have sufficient capital to invest in technology and 
procure advanced machinery.  These capabilities lead to two major benefits, lower production 
costs15 and improved sorting precision.  Efficiencies in sorting decreases labor hours while 
simultaneously increasing volume of waste processed.  This in turn, increases revenue.  
Additionally, enhanced sorting precision increases the likelihood that more precious metals are 
extracted from the waste.16  Consequently, developed countries can operate disposal and 
                                               
11 United States International Trade Commission,  xv. 
 
12 Jan Albers, "The International Trade in Hazardous Wastes and Its Economic Background," in Responsibility and Liability in the 
Context of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes by Sea, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs (Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2015), 27. Derek Kellenberg, "Trading Wastes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, no. 1 
(2012): 71. 
 
13 Arik Levinson, "Nimby Taxes Matter: The Case of State Hazardous Waste Disposal Taxes," Journal of Public Economics 74, no. 1 
(1999). 
 
14 It is more likely that illegal dumping occurs in developing nations to circumvent disposal fees.  
 
15 INSEAD Cornell University, and WIPO "The Global Innovation Index 2015," in Effective Innovation Policies for Development, ed. 
Bruno Lanvin Soumitra Dutta, and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent ( Geneva, Switzerland2015), 81. 
 
16 Wakolbinger et al.,  265. 
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recycling facilities more efficiently and cost effectively which yields a higher profitability margin 
than what developing countries can obtain.  
Baggs (2009) evaluates capital/worker to assess the relationship between capital 
abundance (the ability to buy technical equipment to maximize productivity) and hazardous 
waste volume.  For importing nations, capital/worker is positive and significant indicating that as 
capital/worker increases, import volume increases as well. Kellenberg (2012) extends on 
Baggs’s study.  However, rather than focusing only on hazardous waste, he evaluates all waste 
import volume.  In assessing capital/labor, the coefficient is positive but insignificant.17 The 
results of these studies suggest capital abundance may impact import volume by increasing 
efficiency.     
Kellenberg (2012) conceptualizes GDP/capita as a proxy for recycling productivity 
because it is highly correlated with recycling wages.  The results illustrate that GDP/capita in 
relation to import volume has an inverse relationship.  The more efficient at recycling an 
exporting country is in relation to the importing country the less likely it is to export waste.  
These findings suggest that although richer countries might have higher labor costs, as 
compared to developed countries, their productivity increases.  This makes enables advanced 
economy countries to achieve economies of scale resulting in a favorable cost-benefit analysis 
to import waste.  
Along similar lines, GDP/capita is also associated with influencing import volume.  
Scholars believe that as citizens become richer, environmental awareness increases and 
regulations become more stringent.  These changes should lead to less waste importation.18   
Results from Baggs’s (2009) study align with this purview.  Her findings illustrate that 
GDP/capita for exporting nations is positive and GDP/capita for importing nations is negative.  
                                               
17 Kellenberg,  79. 
 
18 GDP/capita has been operationalized as a measure of environmental regulatory stringency. This is demonstrated in Dasgupta 
and Wheeler (1997), Mani and Wheeler (1998), Dasgupta (2002), Cole (2004), Kellenberg (2009), Baggs (2009), Higashida and 
Managi (2014). 
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Baggs interprets these results to mean that as a country becomes richer it is likely to import less 
waste and export more.  Alternatively, as a country becomes poorer the more likely it is to 
become a net waste importer. Lepawsky and McNabb’s (2010) conclusions are congruent to 
Baggs’s.  They discover a statistically significant inverse relationship between GDP/capita and 
volume, as a country’s GDP/capita decreases the likelihood of it being a net importer of e-waste 
increases.  
In contrast, Higashida and Managi’s (2014) evaluation of recyclable waste yields 
opposing results.  Their findings indicate that GDP/capita is positive for both importing and 
exporting countries.  As countries become richer per capita they both import and export more 
waste.  Notably, the coefficients for the importing countries are not significant, an indication that 
environmental awareness can be effective.19   
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE  
Existing research suggests that economic variables are important in waste importation 
for both developed and developing countries.  However, conflicting results in the way economic 
variables influence waste importation is a critical weakness of using the economic perspective 
as the primary determinant to explain what induces states to import hazardous waste.  
Some studies indicate that as GDP increases states import more waste.  Contrarily, 
other studies show that as GDP decreases a state becomes a net importer of waste.  In 
addition, the findings of GDP/capita’s impact on import volume also vary between studies.  
Some studies find that as GDP/capita increases waste importation decreases.  Paradoxically, 
other studies indicate that as GDP/capita rises waste importation increases.  Notably, the 
                                               
19 Higashida and Managi,  265. 
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contradictory results can be attributed to the various types of waste studied.  The typology of 
waste can be identified relative to its value and hazard level.   
 
 
Table 2.2 Typology of Waste  
  
 High Hazard  Low Hazard  
High Value E-waste Metals 
Low Value  Medical waste/ Chemical waste  Municipal Solid Waste   
 
 
One perspective is that as GDP/capita increases citizens demand stricter regulations.  
Under this condition a state might be confined to import low hazard waste.  Alternatively, lower 
GDP/capita might induce states to accept high value waste despite hazard levels. Baggs (2009) 
evaluates all hazardous waste which is a combination of both high and low value and hazard. 
Lepawsky (2009) focuses on e-waste scrap which is primarily high value and high hazard.  
Kellenberg (2012) reviews all waste because “sometimes waste is not demarcated as 
hazardous even though it is.”  Along similar lines, Higashida and Managi’s (2014) study on 
recyclable waste includes several commodity codes.  Applying this approach to e-waste 
research is beneficial because the dichotomy of e-waste (a hazardous and recyclable 
commodity) enables countries to report inbound shipments of e-waste under non-hazardous 
commodity codes (i.e. copper waste and scrap- 740400, nickel waste and scrap-750300 or 
aluminum waste and scrap- 760200).  In turn, the countries circumvent regulations associated 
with importing hazardous waste.  
The impact of disposal costs on waste importation is another area of divergence in the 
waste trade literature.  Disposal costs are a significant component in calculating whether the 
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financial gains of importing waste outweigh the associated environmental risks and costs.  
O’Neill contends that the broad differences between how the multiple actors are involved in 
waste trade makes it nearly impossible to calculate the costs and benefits of importing waste.20  
Admittedly, conducting a cost-benefit analysis is difficult.  However, studies demonstrate that 
the non-state and state actors collaborate because it is in their best interest to do so.21  After all, 
the state determines the regulations, environmental and tax regulations that private waste 
management actors must adhere to which affects their profitability.22  
Additionally, the emphasis placed on disposal cost and cost-benefit assessments might 
be futile in that a nation-state will import waste only if it is beneficial to do so.23  Montgomery 
(1992) and Albers (2015) contend that both developing and developed countries import waste 
because the financial incentives are worth the risk.24   
Capital/worker presents challenges to understanding how capital intensity influences 
waste importation.  Waste trade studies use general capital/labor, which includes all industries.  
Although capital/labor is a reasonable proxy, it is not a precise measurement.  Capital/labor in a 
country could be high because the country has lucrative industries, other than waste disposal 
services, that increases capital.   
Another issue is that current studies use the general population.  This too can yield 
misleading results.  More so, some of the countries that import a significant proportion of global 
waste, such as China and India, also have large populations.  Consequently, their capital/labor 
will always be lower.  A better measure is to evaluate the capital/worker within the waste 
                                               
20 Kate O'Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation, ed. Sheldon and Kraft 
Kamieniecki, Michael E., 1st ed., American and Comparative Environmental Policy (Cambridge, Massachussetts: MIT Press, 2000), 
187. 
 
21 Van Passel, et al. (2013) outlines the methodological cost-benefit process in assessing the economics of urban mining.  The 
process considers technology, regulation and the market.  
 
22 Studies that discuss the role of business in policymaking include works by Bernhagen (2007, 2008).   
 
23 Mark A. Montgomery, "Want Not, Waste Not a Realist Theory of the International Trade in Hazardous Waste" (University of 
California 1992). 
 
24 Ibid. Albers. 
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disposal and recycling industry.  Notably, this information would be difficult to obtain however; it 
would provide a more accurate representation of how capital plays a role in waste importation. 
Waste trade studies that focus on economic parameters suffer from omitted variable 
bias.  Neoclassical economist attributes economic growth to the endowment of its production 
factors (availability of capital, labor and land).  This perspective does not consider technology’s 
influence on economic growth.  However, technology and innovation are endogenous to 
economic growth because they are a conscious result of an individual or firm’s investment of 
capital in labor and equipment.25  The Global Innovation Index states, “the competitiveness of 
both companies and countries depends on their ability to innovate and move in the direction of 
frontier technology and knowledge.”26  When studies do consider technology, the focus is 
primarily on developed countries innovation and research and development initiatives.  
Innovation is predominately associated with developed nations because they possess sufficient 
capital and the academic/industry framework to support research and development.  However, 
innovation and technology are not limited to advanced countries.  “[Developing countries] have 
realized that technology adoption alone is no longer sufficient to maintain a high-growth 
scenario; rather, investment in innovation is now crucial to spur further catch-up.”27   
Equally important is the omission of the impact trade openness has on waste import 
volume.  Baggs (2009) indicates that the more open a country is to trade the more likely it is 
import waste.  However, very few studies evaluate openness to trade as a key variable when 
evaluating waste trade volumes.   
Proponents of the race to the bottom theory assert that developing countries import 
waste not only to earn revenue but also to participate in the global economy.  These countries 
are believed to not have other valuable, tradeable commodities and therefore import waste to 
                                               
25 Gilpin, 113. 
 
26 Cornell University,  81. 
 
27 Ibid., xviii. 
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improve their economic and political positions in the global market. 28  To assess this claim, 
waste trade studies should incorporate a country’s percent of world trade or the percent of 
export of goods and services.  
 
 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE EXPLANATION  
The domestic institutional approach contends that evaluating the national regulatory 
structure and regulatory style of the importing nation is the best method to evaluate a country’s 
level of waste importation.  The premise of the theory is that how policies are “formulated, 
enacted and implemented” are key to assessing state and private actors’ behavior in regard to 
importation practices. 29  This approach posits that the domestic regulatory structure is either 
centralized decentralized.  The regulatory structure is defined as being either centralized or 
diffused. In a centralized structure, a single government agency holds all authority for the 
management and regulation of the waste management industry.  Conversely, in a diffused 
(decentralized) structure regulatory responsibility is at the national and local level.  Three 
dimensions are evaluated in determining the regulatory structure. First, the ownership structure 
of the waste management industry- meaning the extent of private versus public ownership and 
the level of competition amongst firms.  Next, the degree to which the government is centralized 
versus decentralized.  This relates to the division of regulatory responsibilities between national 
and local government agencies.  Lastly, the regulatory structure includes whether the state is 
federal or unitary.  Federal systems consist of multiple local authorities with environmental 
                                               
28 Krasner (1976) asserts that GDP, income per capita and % of world trade are key measures of a country's political and economic 
power.  
 
29 O'Neill, 55. 
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regulatory responsibility.  Alternatively, in unitary systems political authority is held by the central 
government.30  
The regulatory style of a nation is dependent on the style of policy making and how 
policies are implemented.  Access to policy making describes the relationship of business, 
society and interest groups in relation to the government in policy making.  Closed regulatory 
styles is characterized with government officials working with business interests in policy 
formation while broader societal interests are excluded.  Open systems are characterized with 
no single group having privilege in policy planning.  Policy implementation can be either rigid or 
flexible.  Rigid systems are likely to have strict national standards.  On the other hand, flexible 
systems apply standards on a case basis.31   
O’Neill contends that a country is more likely to import waste under three conditions. 
First, states with a decentralized regulatory framework in which regulatory responsibilities are 
divided among different agencies at both the national and local levels, are more likely to import 
waste. Secondly, a closed environmental policy system fosters waste importation.  Closed 
systems promote collaboration between government officials and business interests.  
Additionally, closed systems exclude other societal groups such as environmentalists from 
policymaking.  Finally, countries that are flexible in terms of policy implementation are more 
likely to import waste.  Firms that are privy to flexible environmental regulations are under less 
strict regulations and can assume more risk because the government is less likely to monitor 
and control the movement of hazardous risk.32  O’Neill posits that nations whose waste disposal 
industry is privately owned and highly competitive are more likely to have a decentralized 
regulatory structure and are likely to import more waste.33  
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LIMITATIONS OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
A shortcoming of the domestic institutional approach is that it embeds the structure of 
the waste management industry, the extent to which the industry in privately versus publicly 
owned, as component within a nation’s regulatory structure.  Embedding the waste 
management structure in the regulatory framework conjectures that the extent to which the 
industry is publicly or privately-owned influences the regulatory structure.  However, this can be 
perceived as overreaching.  It is reasonable to assume that the structure of the waste 
management industry, the amount of competition and extent of private versus public firms in the 
market, has no or minimal influence on changing the regulatory structure of country because a 
government can decide to change the amount of ownership it has in the waste management 
industry and not change the level at which environmental and waste disposal regulations are 
made.  Equally, a government can decide to change the level at which these regulations are 
made even though the waste management industry has not changed.  This scenario can occur 
as nongovernmental organizations and international institutions play an active role in shaping 
international trade agreements that ultimately alter and/or influence national regulatory 
practices.   
A weakness of the domestic institutional approach is that it omits variables that impact 
the domestic regulatory style and structure of a state.  First, the domestic institutional approach 
contends that it is not necessary to evaluate international environmental agreements (IEAs), 
specifically the Basel convention, among trade between developed partners because waste 
trade agreements tend to follow other trade agreements that are based on military or security 
alliances and former colonial ties.34  Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2005) findings support 
O’Neill’s position that most trade takes place among developed countries that share similarly 
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high levels of environmental stringency.35  However, similarities among trading partners is not a 
sufficient reason to disregard IEAs.  Excluding international environmental agreements is 
erroneous in that it ignores the influence they have on the national regulatory structure of 
importing nation-states.  Putnam (1988) suggests that domestic and international politics are 
entangled in a “two-level game.”  The author explains that nation-state leaders participate in 
two-level games often simultaneously; one game between the domestic leader and the state, 
the other game between the domestic leader and the international community.  The difficulty of 
two-level games is that the leader must negotiate a win-set that satisfies domestic and 
international goals and responsibilities.36  Because of this entanglement, it is likely that some 
states adhere to international agreements to participate in the global economy.  For example, a 
growing number of international trade organizations such as the WTO (World Trade 
Organization) and UN Development Programme (United Nations) include environmental 
governance parameters that all states must adhere to.  Alternatively, some nations might desire 
to alter domestic environmental regulations but lack the political might to change domestic 
regulations without the influence of powerful global actors.  Lastly, eliminating international 
agreements undermines the utility of multilateral initiatives in domestic and international politics 
in waste trade.  Multilateral action “leads to enhanced environmental efficacy of individual 
national responses and minimizes distortions in competitiveness that arise from disparate 
national policies.”37   
Another limitation of the domestic institutional approach is that it fails to consider how 
corruption might affect both how policies are created and implemented at the state level.  A 
caveat is that because her O’Neill focuses on democratic countries, it can be inferred that 
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corruption between politicians and waste management industry leaders does not exist or has a 
negligible effect on policies in developed countries.  Literature offers evidence that support this 
presumption.  Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) conclude that big governments in rich countries do not 
have a high level of corruption.38  Saha and Gounder (2013) indicate that a strong negative 
correlation between income and corruption exists across countries; higher income reduces 
corruption.39  Ali and Isse (2003) assert that government regulations tend to increase the size of 
bureaucracies and in turn, large bureaucracies increase the opportunity for corruption.40  
Following this logic, developed countries tend to have large governments and therefore are 
susceptible to corruption.  Corruption can play an integral role in a nation-state’s regulatory 
structure and style.  Therefore, it should be included among variables when assessing waste 
trade. 
 
 
CORRUPTION AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) posits that two levels of corruption exist, high and low levels.41  
Low-level corruption occurs when bribes to public officials have no impact on the governing 
agency’s budget.  High-level corruption materializes when bureaucrats’ acceptance of bribes 
alters legislative demands and an agency’s appropriations budget.  Wilson and Damania (2005) 
characterize corruption as either grand or petty corruption.  42  An example of grand/ high level 
corruption is firms contributing to politicians so that the policy makers create regulations, such 
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as tax incentives or environmental regulations, in the industry’s favor.  This type of corruption is 
likely to occur in developed nations.  Contrarily, petty level corruption is prone to exist in less 
advanced countries and can appear as bribes to political figures who have the authority to grant 
firms ‘legal’ permits to either transport or dump illicit hazardous waste.  Albeit, the type of 
corruption might differ between developed and developing countries, a growing body of 
literature demonstrate a connection between corruption and environmental policy in both rich 
and poorer nations. 
Damania, Fredriksson, and List (2003) test linkages between trade policy, corruption, 
and environmental policy using a mix of developed and developing countries.  Their findings 
identify an interaction between environmental policy and corruption.  A lower amount of 
corruption relates to more stringent environmental policies.  Interestingly, an increase in the 
demand for environmental policy is also conditional on the level of corruption.43  Fredriksson 
and Svensson (2003) contribute to the debate of policy formation by studying political 
instability’s (corruption’s) effect on environmental policy formation in developed and developing 
nations.  The results highlight that the stringency of environmental regulations is conditional on 
the amount of corruption; more corruption yields less stringent environmental policies.44 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION  
Growing environmental concern spurs an ongoing fiery debate, in both the scholarly and 
mainstream realms, on the nexus between globalization and its effect on the environment.  
Particularly, increased international free trade is criticized for not only causing disparities 
between advanced and non-advanced economies but also damaging the global environment.  
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Environmentalists contend that the rapid growth and exorbitant volume of electronic waste can 
have grave consequences on human health and the vitality of the ecosystem.  The Bali 
Declaration on Waste Management for Human Health and Livelihood “affirmed at the political 
level that waste, if not managed in a safe and environmentally sound manner, may have serious 
consequences for the environment, human health and sustainable livelihood.”45  These 
concerns led to global environmental governance initiatives such as the United Nations 
Environment Programme, OECD Environment Directorate Environment Policy Committee and 
the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs were established.  Leaders in the organizations 
recognize that consequences of environmental damage transcend state borders and thus 
require a global solution.   
Neoliberal international institutionalists argue that the primary purpose of an international 
environmental agreement (IEA), an intergovernmental document legally binding nation-states, is 
to prevent or manage human impact on natural resources.46  Additionally, environmental 
agreements seek to reduce negative externalities on the environment caused by states, firms 
and citizens.47  To accomplish these goals, IEAs are usually composed of two public policy 
approaches, policy intervention and policy regulation.  Public policy regulation includes setting 
minimum standards for harmful quantities or establishing liability parameters for those who 
violate these standards.  Conversely, policy intervention encompasses incentives for industry to 
reduce hazardous waste production.48   
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BASEL CONVENTION 
The Basel Convention, the international environmental treaty on hazardous waste, 
addresses transboundary movement of hazardous waste and its disposal.49  The Convention 
uses a combination of intervention and regulation to accomplish its overall objective of 
protecting human health and the environment from the effects of toxic waste disposal. 
The overarching objective of the treaty focuses on three principle aims.  First, it seeks to 
be a resource of information on sound toxic waste management practices for governments that 
dispose of hazardous waste.  This is accomplished in two ways.  First, the convention publishes 
protocols and provides training on sound waste management practices.  The inaugural protocol 
was published in 1994.  More recently, in 2011, the Convention established a Partnership for 
Action on Computing Equipment (PACE) that provides guidance on the end of life management 
of computing equipment.  In 2015, the Convention established technical guidelines for the 
transboundary movement and disposal of electric and electronic waste.  Secondly, the 
Convention supports its aim of being a resource to waste importers by establishing Regional 
Training Centers (BCRCs) that teach advanced waste disposal technology practices and better 
manage toxic waste disposal techniques, specifically to less developed countries.   
The second goal of the Basel Convention is to minimize the volume of waste trade, 
specifically to less developed countries.  In 1995, the convention adopted the Ban Amendment 
(Annex VII) which prohibits OECD countries from sending recyclable and non-recyclable waste 
to non-OECD countries.  The Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage, formed 
in 1999, regulates civil liability due to damage that occurs during transboundary movement of 
hazardous waste, including illegal movements.  The protocol focuses on holding exporters 
accountable for providing remuneration to importing countries that experience toxic waste 
damage. 
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The third initiative of the Basel Convention is to monitor the transboundary movement of 
waste.  The convention established a verification process in which importing nation-states are 
responsible for reporting import volume, the number of facilities with capacity and formal 
consent to receive hazardous waste.  The Promoting Implementation and Compliance 
Committee within the Basel Convention, implemented in 2002, was established to assist nations 
to create a tracking system that enable nations to comply with the measures set forth in the 
convention.  In the same year, the Strategic Plan for Implementation of Basel Convention was 
established solely to assist less developed nations with implementing the parameters and 
obligations set forth in the convention. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Critics of IEAs conjecture that because there is not a supranational governing body to 
force nation-states to comply with IEAs they have minimal influence on national regulations and 
have a nominal impact on protecting human health and the environment from harmful effects of 
waste trade.50  Additionally, without a global authoritative body, countries are left to self-
enforcement and self-reporting which can lead to corruption and weak compliance.51  
Consequently, IEAs are only successful to the extent to which governments are committed to 
cooperative efforts.52  Jing (2014) argues that international e-waste regulations have a 
‘jurisdictional mismatch’ where international regulations do not have authority over national 
signatories.   
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The Basel Convention has several structural weaknesses that minimize its efficacy in 
monitoring and controlling the transboundary movement of toxic waste and waste disposal. The 
principal motivation for the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) agreement was to “assist developing 
countries that might have limited regulatory capacity or difficulty controlling imports to implement 
their own domestic environmental and public health policies.”53  Under this structure, countries 
self-report the number of available disposal facilities.  However, the convention does not 
establish a method for countries to access information on the number of adequate disposal 
outlets an importing country possesses.54  This framework makes it difficult for exporters to 
determine whether the importer truly has capacity to dispose of waste properly.  Consequently, 
not having independent third party verification makes the system vulnerable to abuse by corrupt 
officials.55  
Additionally, the effectiveness of the Compliance Committee is constrained.  Because 
the Convention is an agreement between states, its provisions do not directly bind non-state 
actors such as private companies.  Consequently, the convention does not have the authority to 
fine parties, states nor private actors, which violate the agreement.  “The state, therefore, acts 
as an intermediary by passing appropriate domestic laws which implement the Convention at a 
national level to regulate private actors.”56  The effectiveness of the Protocol on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage is also limited.  It lacks the ability to force exporting nations to 
compensate importing nations that have suffered severe environmental and health 
consequences from hazardous waste caused by the exporting country.57   
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Krueger (1999) claims that the Ban Amendment, which prohibits hazardous waste 
exportation from rich countries to poor countries, is the Basel Convention’s greatest 
achievement.58  However, other scholars argue that the Basel Convention may now be 
obsolete.  Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) contend that the Basel Convention has had virtually 
no impact on waste flow patterns nor has it altered waste trade volume.  Therefore, the 
regulation is unnecessary.59  In 2011, at the 10th annual Conference of Parties meeting, the 
convention affirmed, “that wastes should not be considered merely an unwanted and costly by-
product of modern society, but can be recognized as a potentially valuable resource.”60  Lucier 
and Gareau (2015) state that the treaty’s shift to viewing waste as a lucrative commodity 
undermines the legitimacy and the original intent of protecting poor countries from rich countries 
dumping waste on poor states.  The authors further contend that the revision will cause “certain 
industries to dismantle some environmental regulations while at the same time promoting the 
increase of other regulations enabling the importation of hazardous waste in less developed 
countries.”61  This change makes the ban amendment irrelevant.  However, findings by 
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) and Lepawsky (2014, 2015) disprove the notion that waste flows 
from rich countries to poor ones.  Nonetheless, they agree that the Basel Amendment is 
ineffective in prohibiting waste importation by poor countries.  These studies demonstrate that 
waste trade occurs within regions and between similar country economy types, developed 
countries tend to trade with other developed countries and developing nations trade with other 
developing nations.   
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To some extent, waste importation by poorer countries would not be as grave of a 
concern if the convention was successful in transferring technology to less developed countries.  
Unfortunately, the Convention has failed to establish a regular funding mechanism for 
technology centers which has limited technology and knowledge transfer to countries in need.62   
 
 
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION 
Many studies explain waste trade importation with the race to the bottom theory or 
pollution haven hypothesis.  They consider the nexus between economic benefits and 
regulations.  Clapp (1994) asserts that developing nations in need of revenue lower their 
environmental standards despite their inability to properly dispose of hazardous waste.  These 
states are willing to assume risk because the economic benefit outweighs the grave 
environmental and health concerns.63  Albers (2015) conjectures, “recent developments show 
that entire production processes, which are very waste- intensive, are moved to developing 
countries with less stringent laws.”64  Lucier and Gareau (2015) contend that the shift of e-waste 
from a toxic resource to an economic commodity induces nation-states to create regulations that 
appear environmentally friendly but actually promote economic interests.  The authors further 
assert that lax environmental regulations promote competition for firms to build new facilities in 
developing countries.65  These studies suggest that regulations are structured to exacerbate 
economic gains. 
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Jing (2014) suggests that e-waste regulation is afflicted with the ‘tragedy of the 
regulatory commons’66, a situation in which ineffective overregulation abounds.  Exorbitant 
regulation causes government structures to become decentralized67 which can lead to more 
waste importation.  Lucier and Gareau assert that changes in the regulatory structure can 
exacerbate waste trade to less advanced economies.68  However, Jing argues that conjectures 
that although decentralization at the domestic level initially appears to counteract international 
environmental initiatives “[it] is a better approach to effectively promoting human and 
environmental health.”69  He further contends that shifting regulation from an international 
approach to a national decentralized structure enables government actors and private actors 
who have more authority and ability to ensure waste is disposed of properly while 
simultaneously pursuing profit.  Contrarily, Marcoux and Urpelainen (2012) argue that some 
developing countries are not entirely opposed to international regulations.  In fact, those 
supporting the Basel Convention have gained benefits from regulatory capacity building.   
“International treaties could coordinate training programs, fund demonstration projects, 
collect and administer information, orchestrate activities in the private sector, and create 
scientific research programs. Second, the treaty could contain provisions that indirectly 
mitigate the national regulatory problem.”70 
 
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) states that most waste 
management firms are not large transnational corporations seeking to take advantage of lower 
environmental standards in developing countries.  Rather they are small to mid- size enterprises 
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“that lack the interest, the capital, and the legal and regulatory expertise necessary to establish 
overseas affiliates.”71  
There are substantially divergent perspectives on how economic and political variables 
impact environmental regulations and ultimately hazardous waste import volume.  
Consequently, future studies should continue to research how variables within these factors 
affect import waste volume.   
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON WASTE TRADE  
Existing waste trade studies are incomplete in two ways.  First, studies tend to use one 
theory to explain what drives a country to import waste and dismiss the importance of other 
factors.  Secondly, by using a single approach research omit key variables that are pertinent to 
explaining the phenomenon.  
The domestic institutional approach theory insists that tenets of traditional neoclassical 
economy theory, revenue maximization, cost benefit analysis, and comparative advantage, are 
difficult to calculate and do not sufficiently explain waste trade.72  Undeniably, obtaining landfill 
costs is challenging which makes calculating economic gains at a national level an ambitious 
task.  However, qualitatively assessing the regulatory structure of a nation-state is equally 
difficult.  Therefore, it is insufficient to use the ease or difficulty to access data as a primary 
reason to exclude variables when analyzing waste trade practices.   
In agreement with O’Neill, comparative advantage theory is not sufficient in explaining 
why a country imports waste.  However, I differ in the reason why comparative advantage is 
insufficient to explaining waste importation practices.  A significant problem with comparative 
advantage is that there are discrepancies in what constitutes a comparative advantage.  
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Comparative advantage can be defined by labor, capital, environmental stringency, disposal 
capacity.  O’Neill restricts comparative advantage to disposal capacity.73  She argues that 
proponents of the comparative advantage believe that increased disposal capacity leads to 
more waste importation.  Although she recognizes that the regulatory framework of a nation 
influences waste importation practices, she fails to consider the regulatory structure as a 
comparative advantage.  This is a major drawback because the basis of the race to the bottom 
theory and the pollution haven hypothesis is that lax environmental regulations, a result of the 
regulatory structure, are a comparative advantage.  
Another problem with using comparative advantage in evaluating waste trade is that it is 
difficult to pinpoint what amount of labor/capital or how lax a regulation needs to be for a nation 
to be considered as having a comparative advantage.  These benchmarks are to some extent 
arbitrary.   
There are a few studies that recognize the relationship between economic, political and 
environmental factors.  However, they tend to use the race to the bottom theory to explain waste 
importation practices.  In doing so, the studies focus on how these factors influence waste 
importation to developing countries.  This is problematic because developed countries also 
import hazardous waste.   There is an increase in both environmental awareness and 
hazardous waste import volume in both developed and developing countries.  Therefore, 
research studies should consider the new growth theory and environmental political theory in 
explaining what drives waste importation.  These theories recognize the government’s (political) 
influence on economic and environmental factors.  
A weakness in waste trade studies is the omission of critical variables.  Both the 
neoclassical economic and the domestic institutional approach do not consider international 
environmental agreements, polity and corruption despite the known linkages between 
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government type, economic development, corruption, and regulation (freedom to trade and 
environmental).  Utilizing the domestic institutional approach as the sole method when analyzing 
waste trade fails to capture a state’s pursuit of capital accumulation that characterizes the 
regulation of the global hazardous waste trade.74  Along similar lines, the neoclassical economic 
approach mildly considers regulations that impact waste importation.  
The domestic institutional approach argues that IEAs lack ‘authority or influence’ on 
national regulations, domestic environmental performance and is therefore inconsequential to 
understanding waste trade patterns.  However, I have not found many studies that test the 
number of IEAs ratified relative to domestic regulations and environmental performance to 
substantiate the claim that IEAs have no or minimal effect on citizens’ health and the 
environment.  Prior studies focus on specific components of environmental concerns such as 
pollution, land use or energy consumption. 75  This is in large part due to the lack of an 
environmental performance index.  However, the Environmental Performance Index (a 
development of the Environmental Sustainability Index) established in 2001 provides 
researchers a comprehensive database scaling the extent to which countries protect human 
health and the environment from hazardous substances.  Consequently, scholars are better 
able to assess the relationship between the number of IEAs ratified and actual environmental 
performance. 
Furthermore, generally, it is assumed that democratic countries are more likely to 
participate in international treaties and are also more prone to protect the environment than less 
democratic nations.  Empirical results demonstrate a positive relationship between democracy 
and state commitment to compliance with environmental treaties.76  These findings demonstrate 
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how political variables (factor) moderate in the relationship between the environmental factor 
and electronic waste trade.  Therefore, polity should be included in waste trade studies.   
Another shortcoming in waste trade literature is the exclusion of innovation and 
technology.  These variables are critical for a few reasons.  First, innovation is firmly recognized 
as a central driver of economic growth and development.77  Long-term economic growth is not 
only contingent on the endowment of a country’s production factors it also in its improvement in 
production technologies.78  Additionally, innovation and technology are connected to regulations 
and economic benefits.  A substantial amount of innovation in e-waste disposal and recycling 
occurs between private and public partnership, however, government officials at both the 
national and local levels seek to control a certain percent of the market for governmental 
revenue.  Consequently, local and municipal governments can make the provision of waste 
management services as barriers for private firms to enter the market.79  Nonetheless, scholars 
argue that regulations promote innovation which leads to higher efficiency while reducing 
harmful environmental consequences.80   
A review of waste trade literature reveals an undeniable link between trade (openness), 
economic development, the political framework and environmental regulations.  Montgomery 
(1992) conjectures that state behavior to importing waste is based on economics, domestic 
politics, foreign policy, and even environmental protection laws.81  Ederington and Minier (2003) 
contend that governments can manipulate trade volume, the functionality of industries and 
industry structure by altering domestic policies such as environmental standards and subsidies 
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and taxes.82  Nonetheless, few existing waste trade studies offer a comprehensive lens through 
which waste importation for developed and developing countries can be analyzed.  A more 
thorough approach is needed to understand how variables impact a state’s proclivity to import 
hazardous waste.  Future studies should include economic, domestic political structure and 
international environmental variables to determine how these factors influence import waste 
volume. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN: FINDERS KEEPERS…LOSERS WEEPERS 
 
The rapid emergence of waste trade has resulted in a proliferation of studies debating 
the nuances of the phenomenon.  Researchers use quantitative, qualitative and modeling and 
simulation methodologies to explain what influences a state’s propensity to import waste.  The 
following sections outline the methodological tradeoffs between the approaches, highlight 
research designs of waste trade studies and discuss their limitations.  The final part establishes 
this study’s methodology, operationalization of constructs and variables and discusses its 
restrictions.  
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES  
Qualitative research is “useful for generating hypotheses, identifying key variables and 
building theories because they allow researchers to tease out causal mechanisms.”1  However, 
qualitative methodology is not without shortcomings.  Qualitative research has a small sample 
size which makes it weak for theory testing.  Furthermore, the case selection can be biased in 
that it is likely that authors include cases that illustrate the outcome the researcher seeks to 
support.2  “For qualitative researchers, a theory is usually only one critical observation away 
from being falsified.”3  Lastly, some of the causal methodology used in qualitative work is difficult 
to translate into quantitative and modeling research efforts.4 
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Alternatively, quantitative studies have a larger sample size which makes them more 
robust in theory testing.  Whereas qualitative studies outline causal factors, statistical methods 
aid in identifying which factors are substantively and statistically significant.  However, arguably, 
a drawback to statistical research is that its focus on the “effects-of-causes” demonstrates a 
causal correlation5 and is not necessarily an indication of causality.  Instead the coefficient of 
the independent variable indicates the magnitude of change the dependent variable 
experiences due to a change in the independent variable.   
Modeling and simulation is an increasingly applied approach to explaining international 
relations phenomena.  Modeling and simulation allows the examination of many strategies in a 
complicated setting and permits dynamic adjustment.6  Computational models have advantages 
in that they force precision in concepts and allow “focused realism-the representation of 
complex structures and processes without losing analytic focus.”7  These traits provide flexibility 
with the unknowns in theories. 
Nonetheless, a significant difficulty in using modeling and simulation to explain global 
developments is the complexity of the international system.8  The international system is 
composed of many actors with varying policies.  Consequently, accurately (re)creating events in 
models can be challenging and/or biased.  For example, in modeling a researcher rather than 
actors create the rules in the model.  There is the possibility that the modeler might create rules 
that the actual actors might not construct nor follow.  Therefore, although complex adaptive 
simulations are promising they [can be] incomplete.9 
                                               
5 Mahoney and Goertz,  230. 
 
6 Paul E. Johnson, "Simulation Modeling in Political Science," The American Behavioral Scientist 42, no. 10 (1999). 
 
7 Charles S. Taber and Richard J. Timpone, "Beyond Simplicity: Focused Realism and Computational Modeling in International 
Relations," Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 1 (1996): 42. 
 
8 Neil E. Harrison, Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm, Suny Series in Global Politics (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2006), Book. 
 
9 David C. Earnest and James N. Rosenau, "Signifying Nothing? What Complex Systems Theory Can and Cannot Tell Us About 
Global Politics," in Complexity in World Politics : Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm, ed. Neil E. Harrison, Suny Series in 
Global Politics. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).  
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QUALITATIVE WASTE TRADE STUDIES 
O’Neill’s (2000) study provides an institutional framework comprised of two 
determinants, regulatory structure and regulatory style that should be evaluated when assessing 
how a nation’s domestic framework influences its waste importation practices.10  O’Neill 
evaluates the regulatory structure of 5 OECD nations, Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan 
and Australia, relative to their net import volume to test her hypothesis that the more 
decentralized, closed and flexible a country is, the more likely it is to import waste.11 
This research illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of case-oriented work.  The 
sample appears unbiased in that the results illustrate that not all the countries align with her 
hypotheses that the more decentralized, closed and flexible a country is the more likely it is to 
import waste. Japan is as an outlier because its regulatory structure indicates that it should be a 
large importer of waste yet it is not.12  This can be attributed to Japan’s focus on its waste 
management laws.  Because of the densely populated urban areas and the short lifespan of 
disposal sites, Japan created laws to minimize waste production and promote recycling.13  
Nevertheless, the study’s sample size is too small and thus her findings cannot be 
generalized to a more diverse and larger set of countries.  To combat the anticipated critique 
that the framework is applicable only to her sample, she contends that “the qualitative model of 
environmental regulation can be applied, with minimal adaption, across countries.”14  Albeit, the 
regulatory structure is straightforward, the model is far from being easily applicable to other 
countries, especially to developing countries.  The primary obstacle is that information is not 
easily accessible.  For example, the approach considers the structure of the waste management 
                                               
 
10 A more detailed analysis of O’Neill’s framework is presented in Chapter 2.  
 
11 O'Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation, 57-64. 
 
12 Ibid., 8. 
 
13 Jennifer-Ann Hoeveler, "International Approaches to Dealing with Electronic Waste," New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 
13 (2009): 155-56. 
 
14 O'Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation, 2. 
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industry, the extent to which it is privately or publicly owned and its degree of competitiveness.15  
This information can be challenging to acquire for developing countries that are high net 
importers of hazardous waste such as India and the Philippines.  Additionally, converting the 
qualitative measures into quantitative scores is equally challenging.16  It is difficult for instance to 
decide at what point the waste management industry is considered competitive.  Also, the 
process of converting the measures into scores (coding) would be quite laborious for such a 
large dataset.  Although the construction of a comprehensive index (database) would enable a 
systematic comparison and analysis across a larger number of observations, the 
aforementioned complexities make it difficult to apply the regulatory framework to a broader 
context.  Consequently, the author’s position that the domestic institutional approach is the best 
method that explains what conditions promote waste importation is not well supported.   
Despite these shortcomings, a significant strength of the research is that it offers a 
thorough analysis of the political economy of hazardous waste trade.  In doing so, it evaluates 
the role of business, state and society in waste importation practices.  This is especially 
valuable because other theories evaluating waste trade do not consider the involvement various 
actors have in not only creating environmental regulations but also the extent to which the 
actors interact when creating policies that impact waste trade. 
Clapp (2001) offers a qualitive work on waste trade that focuses on developing 
countries.  She conjectures that waste importation is intricately linked to economic factors and 
that globalization facilitates an environment in which regulations are exploited and manipulated 
for economic benefits.  Clapp further contends that countries riddled in international debt 
purposely adjusted trade policies (liberalized trade).  More so, these adjustments were made 
                                               
15 Ibid., 56. 
 
16Difficulties of translating qualitative information into quantitative measures is discussed in O'Neill et al.,  456. 
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under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s as a quid pro 
quo for the rescheduling of debt by donor countries and banks.17 
To reinforce her assertion that developing countries with weak political and economic 
environments are often preyed on, Clapp cites events that occurred in the 1980s and early 
1990s when hazardous waste was markedly received by poorer countries.  She describes the 
infamous 1986 Khian Sea case in which a cargo ship carrying nearly 14,000 tons of toxic fly-ash 
set sail from the United States scoured the world- the Caribbean, Africa, Europe, the Middle 
East and East Asia, seeking a port that would accept the waste.  Facing defeat, after 27 months 
the ash mysteriously disappeared.  Clapp outlines the 1988 Guinea- Bissau incident in which 
the country was offered 4 times its GNP (nearly twice as much as its external debt) if it agreed 
to accept 15 million tons of waste.  She continues with an example from 1991 in which a 
Somalian health minister was supposedly bribed to accept 500,000 metric tons of waste.18   
A weakness of the study is that it fails to demonstrate that debt laden countries alter or 
maintain lax trade and environmental regulations to preserve toxic waste importing practices as 
an avenue to economic gains.  Additionally, most examples of hazardous waste trade are 
limited to occurrences before the ratification and adoption of the 1989 Basel Convention 
ratification and the 1995 Basel Ban Amendment.  These milestones are key initiatives enacted 
to prohibit rich countries from ‘dumping’ on poor countries.  Therefore, instances in which 
hazardous waste trade flowed from rich to poor countries after these measures would better 
support her assertions that advanced economy sends waste to countries burdened with debt.   
 
                                               
17 Jennifer Clapp, Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), 10-11. 
 
18 Ibid., 35-37. 
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QUANTITATIVE WASTE TRADE STUDIES  
Waste trade scholars generally agree that waste trade is impacted by factors that are 
measured by more than one variable.  In that the economic state of a country is measured not 
only but GDP but also by GDP/capita.  However, when evaluated waste trade patterns, most 
quantitative waste trade studies use linear multiple regression models which focuses on how the 
individual variable affects waste import volume.  For example, Baggs’s (2009) study includes 
economic variables, gross domestic product, and trade openness, to assess hazardous waste 
import volume.  The results of the study indicate that the coefficient of GDP for importing nations 
is positive and significant.  The coefficient for trade openness is also positive and significant.19  
Because the coefficients of both variables are positive and significant we can infer that the 
economic factor has a positive significant relationship on waste import volume.  However, if 
GDP and trade openness yielded opposite results, a negative coefficient for one variable and a 
positive coefficient for the other variable, we would not have insight to how the economic factor 
impacts import waste volume.  Therefore, linear regression is beneficial in identifying specific 
variables’ impact and influence on the dependent variable20, but fails to pinpoint how a group of 
similar variables (a factor) affect waste import volume. 
Additionally, leading waste trade studies employ a gravity model (a linear approach) to 
test waste trade dynamics.  This approach considers country level traits such as the average 
wealth of a country and distance between trading partners to explain the determinants of 
interaction between trading partners.  Baggs (2009) uses standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
gravity model to examine mostly economic determinants that influence international hazardous 
waste trade patterns.  Kellenberg (2012) also examines trade patterns using the gravity 
technique but focuses on whether differences in environmental regulations play a role between 
                                               
19 Jen Baggs, "International Trade in Hazardous Waste," Review of International Economics 17, no. 1 (2009): 7-8, 11. 
 
20 Mahoney and Goertz,  235.  
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waste trading partners.21  Higashida and Managi’s (2014) research utilizes the gravity model to 
explore factors that affect trade of recyclable waste of both exporting and importing countries. 
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) uses the gravity model to test the effects of ratification of the 
Basel Convention on international waste shipments between trading partners.  Although studies 
using the gravity model approach are effective in providing insight to the relationship 
(correlation) of variables between trading partners, which is paramount in identifying if a waste 
haven effect is occurring between trading partners,22  it does not typically substantiate what 
variables have a large effect on waste importation.   
Another shortcoming of quantitative studies is that, to the best of my knowledge, existing 
research fails to evaluate all three factors, political, economic and environmental, that affect 
waste importation.  Baggs (2009) considers economic variables to assess international waste 
trade but does not consider political determinates.  To her credit, she acknowledges that a 
limitation of her study is that it does not include measures of regulatory stringency which is 
critical to evaluate international waste trade.23  To remedy this, Kellenberg (2012) constructs an 
environmental regulatory index.  His study includes economic variables, GDP/capita as a proxy 
for recycling productivity and as a control variable.24  However, the study does not focus on the 
nexus between the stringency of environmental regulations and the wealth of a country.  
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) tests the effects of the Basel Convention and include GDP but 
do not include domestic regulatory parameters. It would be beneficial to assess the relationship 
between the Basel Convention and domestic environmental policies.    
 
                                               
21 Kellenberg. 
 
22 Literature outlining theoretical debates on flow of waste based on economic size of a country is outlined in Chapter 1. 
   
23 Baggs,  8.  
 
24 Kellenberg,  74. 
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MODELING AND SIMULATION WASTE TRADE STUDIES  
Game theory, a form of modeling, is an alternative method to examine what induces 
states to import electronic waste.  A game theoretic approach is advantageous in evaluating 
waste trade because it assesses the behavior of multiple stakeholders.  It also is effective in that 
it illustrates behavior by considering the likelihood that an event/decision will occur.  Regarding 
waste trade literature, the method accounts for how each actor is affected by the key factors, 
economic, domestic regulations and international agreements, of waste trade.  
Cassing and Kuhn (2003) creates a multistage game to analyze international trade of 
hazardous waste when the market is oligopolistic and when both importing and exporting 
countries utilize national environmental policies to attach taxes to waste trade.  Kaushal and 
Nema (2013) presents a non-cooperative game of multi-stakeholders (government, 
manufacturer, recycler and consumer) in electronic waste management.  The premise of the 
study is that e-waste management is better understood by analyzing incentives and cost factors 
of each stakeholder.25   
A difficulty in using game theory is ensuring that the assigned behavioral probabilities 
and payoffs mirror reality.  These calculations consider the cost-benefit and regulatory restraints 
in the system and requires an in-depth knowledge of each player.  The number of players 
involved in waste trade combined with the detailed knowledge of players required make it 
difficult to estimate accurate payoffs.  Additionally, the cost-benefit of importing waste is country 
specific and thus a general probability cannot be easily applied to a generic model.  These 
limitations prohibit the game theoretic approach from being the best suited methodology in 
explaining what factors have the most effect on import waste volume.  
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) and Lepawsky (2014) utilize computer network analysis 
to illustrate the geography of global electronic waste trade.  The graphical analysis is 
                                               
25 Rajendra Kumar Kaushal and Arvind K. Nema, "Strategic Analysis of Computer Waste Management Options: Game-Theoretic 
Approach," Journal of Environmental Engineering 139, no. 2 (2013). 
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advantageous in illustrating waste trade flows.  However, the network model cannot tell the 
purpose for which trade occurs.26  In turn, it does not provide insight to what factors effect import 
waste volume.  
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF WASTE TRADE STUDIES   
The methodologies used in existing waste trade literature share similar challenges. 
Researchers agree that a state’s participation in waste trade, particularly to import waste, is 
based on economic incentives, domestic regulations and environmental initiatives.  However, 
the qualitative and quantitative literature explains waste trade from a narrowly constructed 
framework which yields conflicting results.   
Qualitative and game theory approaches suffer from small sample sizes.  These 
methodologies tend to utilize a case based approach which cannot necessarily be applied to the 
extensive number of players in international waste. 
Modeling and simulation studies present a model with variables, economic, and 
international environmental and domestic regulations, that states evaluate in the decision-
making process on whether to import waste.  Nonetheless, the weight of each factor is not 
included in the model.  Consequently, each factor is weighted the same.  However, those who 
believe that developing countries import hazardous waste despite the environmental 
consequences for economic benefits are likely to argue that the economic factor should be 
weighted more than the environmental factor.  Because some modeling and simulation research 
do not make a distinction of weight among the factors, the results are not necessarily applicable 
to explaining waste trade importation practices.   
                                               
26 Josh Lepawsky, "The Changing Geography of Global Trade in Electronic Discards: Time to Rethink the E-Waste Problem," The 
Geographical Journal  (2014): 3. 
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Limited time series is a weakness that all three methodologies share.  Baggs’ 
quantitative assessment of waste trade includes data over a three-year period.  Kellenberg 
(2012) evaluates one year of waste trade.  Lepawsky and McNabb’s (2010) computational 
model explores a four-year timeframe.  Qualitative studies tend to not examine import volume 
over time.  Instead, they focus on substantial events.  Modeling and simulation studies do not 
necessarily focus on a time nor a significant incident, rather they aim to create a model that can 
be applied when specific conditions exist. 
The most profound issue with current waste trade studies is their focus on ‘significance’ 
– to the exclusion of magnitude.  Qualitative research typically uses case studies to argue which 
factors are most significant (important) whereas quantitative studies focus on testing for 
statistical significance.  The issue is that “statistical significance does not answer a scientific 
quantitative question.  It is a philosophical, qualitative test.  It does not ask how much.  It asks 
whether an effect exists.”27  In other words, existing waste trade studies whose results focus on 
statistical significance are asking whether economics, environmental parameters or political 
variables impact hazardous waste import volume.  Statistical significance also indicates how 
confident we are that a country’s economic health, regulatory structure and environmental 
initiatives impact import waste volume.  Essentially, testing for statistical significance is not as 
important because, for the most part, scholars agree and are confident that the aforementioned 
factors are significant to waste import volume.  Therefore, the more interesting question is, how 
much effect each factor has on hazardous waste import volume.  From a pragmatic perspective, 
which factor has the largest impact on import volume? 
 
  
                                               
27 Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, Cult of Statistical Significance [Electronic Resource] How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, 
and Lives, ed. Steve Ziliak, Economics, Cognition, and Society (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2010), 4-5. 
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METHODOLOGY  
This study utilizes partial least squares-structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) to 
examine the impact (effect size) that political, economic and environmental factors have on 
electronic waste import volume.  PLS-SEM is an effective method of analysis for this study in 
several ways.  First, its structure allows the researcher to evaluate the effect of variables that 
are not directly observable (latent variables) on the dependent variable.  This is especially 
useful in analyzing waste trade theories that cite economic, political and environmental factors 
as drivers of waste importation.  Additionally, a key feature of SEM is its ability to easily 
differentiate effect sizes for groups.  This is especially advantageous in being able to discern if 
the factors’ impact on waste import volume differ between developed and developing countries. 
Furthermore, SEM allows statistical testing while accounting for causal assumptions.  
Like ordinary least squares (OLS), SEM allows a researcher to identify the significance of 
variables.  In OLS the importance of an independent variable is based on its effect on the 
dependent variable.  However, SEM includes the relationship between independent variables 
and latent variables.  Therefore, the significance of a variable is based on its effect on the factor.  
This provides the researcher insight to which variables are most important to the factor.  This 
study uses the bootstrapping approach to test for statistical significance.  As recommended in 
Hair et al., no sign changes were selected and the Bias-Corrected and Accelerated (BCa) 
Bootstrap28 was employed because “it has reasonable computation requirements and produces 
comparably narrow confidence intervals.”29  Following general convention, the significance is 
tested using a two-tailed test and .05 represents the level of statistical significance.  
PLS-SEM was chosen over CB-SEM (covariance-based structural equation modeling) 
for several reasons.  First, PLS-SEM is better suited in testing formative models.  Formative 
models assume that the independent variables make up the construct and that variation in the 
                                               
28 Per Hair et al. BCa bootstrap confidence interval adjusts for biases and skewness in the bootstrap distribution, 156.  
 
29 Joseph F. Hair, A Primer on Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (Pls-Sem) (2017), 159. 
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independent variables cause variation in the construct (x1Y1).30  The direction of the arrows 
from the independent variable to the construct is an indication of the causal (predictive) 
relationship in that direction.  This study assumes that the independent variables make up the 
construct and is therefore a formative model.   
Secondly, PLS-SEM employs an OLS based approach (predictive) which is “the 
preferred method when the focus of research is for theory development and explanation of 
variance (prediction of the constructs).”31  Similar to traditional OLS regression, PLS-SEM 
provides an R2 value.  The R2 provides insight to how well the factors explain waste import 
volume.   
Additionally, in comparison to CB-SEM, PLS-SEM works more efficiently with smaller 
sample sizes.  It achieves high levels of statistical power with small sample sizes and does not 
have identification issues.32  Lastly, the method is robust with handling missing values if the 
missing values are below a reasonable level.33  Per Hair et al., this study uses 5% or less values 
missing per indicator as a reasonable limit.34  The mean value treatment option is used to 
handle missing values.   
This research project tests for interaction between factors.  A two-stage approach is 
used to estimate the moderating effect between factors which the preferred method when 
testing moderating effects in formative models.35  
 
                                               
30 Tim Coltman et al., "Formative Versus Reflective Measurement Models: Two Applications of Formative Measurement," Journal of 
Business Research 61 (2008): 1252. 
 
31 Joseph F. Hair et al., A Primer on Partial Least Squares Structural Equations Modeling (Pls-Sem), ed. Joseph F. Hair (Los 
Angeles: Los Angeles : SAGE, 2014), 14. 
 
32 Ibid., 16-17. 
 
33 Jörg Henseler, Christian Ringle, and Marko Sarstedt, "Using Partial Least Squares Path Modeling in Advertising Research: Basic 
Concepts and Recent Issues," in Handbook of Research on International Advertising, ed. Shintaro Okazaki (Cheltenham, 
Gloucestershire: Cheltenham, Gloucestershire : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 262. 
 
34 Hair et al., 51. 
 
35 Jorg Henseler and Georg Fassott, "Testing Moderating Effects in Pls Path Models: An Illustration of Available Procedures " in 
Handbook of Partial Least Squares : Concepts, Methods and Applications, ed. Vincenzo Esposito Vinzi, et al. (Berlin: Springer, 
2010), 724. 
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PROPOSED MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
A review of the literature identified the variables and theoretical linkage among variables 
which were used in the proposed model Table 3A.  Based on the literature, it is presumed that 
economic, political and environmental factors impact electronic waste import volume.  It is 
hypothesized that each factor has a small, medium or large effect, respectively ≤ .10, ≈.30 or ≥ 
.5036, on the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Theoretical model and hypotheses represented as a nomological network 
 
 
                                               
 
36 Diana Suhr, "The Basics of Structural Equation Modeling," University of North Colorado  (2006): 5. 
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From the theoretical framework, the study underscores five primary hypotheses: 
H1a: The economic factor has a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume. 
H2a: The political factor has a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume. 
H3a: The environmental factor has a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume. 
H4a: The effect of the economic factor on electronic waste import volume depends on the 
political factor such that when the political factor is smaller, the effect of the economic factor is 
stronger.  
H5a: The effect of the environmental factor on electronic waste import volume depends on the 
political factor such that when the political factor is larger, the effect of the environmental factor 
is stronger.  
Development theory posits that less developed and developed countries’ political 
economic systems are fundamentally different which lead to differences in their participation in 
the global economy.37  Therefore this study includes alternative hypotheses related to a factor’s 
effect on electronic waste volume within developed and developing countries. 
 
H1b: Economic factor has a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume in developed 
countries. 
H1c: Economic factor has a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume in 
developing countries. 
H2b: The political factor has a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume in 
developed countries. 
H2c: The political factor has a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume in 
developing countries. 
                                               
37 Gilpin, 307-11. 
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H3b: The environmental factor has a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume in 
developed countries. 
H3c: The environmental factor has a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume in 
developing countries. 
 
Hypotheses 1a-c identify the impact the economic factor has on electronic waste import 
volume.  Tenets from the neoclassical economic growth perspective posit that countries trade 
goods it has a comparative advantage in.  Arguably, more advanced countries have a 
comparative advantage to import waste because it has the capital needed to invest in 
machinery to maximize efficiency in mining e-waste.  Contrarily, developing countries also have 
an economic comparative advantage to import waste.  Disposal fees, labor costs and corporate 
taxes are often lower in developing countries which can promote a waste haven effect.  Clapp 
asserts that waste importation interconnects with a country’s economic position.38  Empirical 
analysis of waste trade studies demonstrate that economic variables play a positive role in both 
developed and developing countries waste importation practices.  Therefore, I expect that the 
economic factor will have a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume in both 
developed and developing countries.  
Hypotheses 2a-c highlight the impact the political environment has on electronic waste 
import volume.  The domestic institutional approach asserts that the domestic political structure 
is the primary factor that drives waste import volume because the domestic state determines 
trade and environmental policies that government and private actors are bound to.  Following 
this logic, the political factor impacts import volume regardless of political structure differences 
between developed and developing countries.  Therefore, I expect the political factor to have a 
                                               
38 Clapp, Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries, 18. 
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medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume in both developed and developing 
countries.   
Hypotheses 3a-c measure the impact of environmental policies on electronic waste 
import volume.  The neoliberal international institutionalist approach argues that multilateral 
environmental treaties will help mitigate the negative environmental consequences of trade. 
Therefore, the more environmental treaties a country signs the more environmentally strict it is.  
Following this logic, it is expected that environmental agreements (a proxy for environmental 
stringency) will have a large effect on imported electronic waste volume.  However, the number 
of environmental agreements a country participates in is not necessarily an indication of 
environmental stringency.39  A country can ratify an agreement and not be complicit with its 
regulations.  Empirical studies by de Zeeuw (2008, 2015), Kellenberg (2012, 2014), Lepawsky 
(2015), Lucier and Gareau (2015) and Khan (2016) illustrate that environmental treaties have 
been rather ineffective in governing waste trade.  Consequently, it can be expected that the 
environmental factor will have a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume in both 
developed and developing countries. 
Hypotheses 4a-5c measure the economic and environmental factors’ relationship with 
electronic waste import volume when the political factor intervenes in the relationship.  This 
assumption is based on the new growth theory and environmental political theory conjecture 
that the government (the political factor) influences the relationship between the economic and 
environmental factors and trade volume.  When the political factor moderates on the relationship 
between the economy and electronic waste import volume, I expect the economic factor will 
have a positive and stronger effect on volume when the political factor is lower as compared to 
when the political factor is higher.   
                                               
39 Damania, Fredriksson, and List. 
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When the political factor moderates on the relationship between the environmental factor 
and electronic waste import volume, I expect the effect of the environmental factor will have a 
negative and stronger effect on volume when the political factor is larger as compared to when 
the political factor is smaller. 
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Table 3.1 Hypotheses with Expected and Actual Factor Effects      
    
 
Expected Effect Size  
Hypothesis  Combined Developed  Developing  
H1: Economic factor impact on electronic waste import 
volume large/+ large/+  large/+ 
       
H2: Political factor impact on electronic waste import volume medium/+  medium/+  medium/+  
       H3: Environmental factor impact on electronic waste import 
volume  small/ - small/ - small/ - 
       H4: The effect of the economic factor on electronic waste 
import volume depends on the political factor  +  + + 
       H5: The effect of the environmental factor on electronic 
waste import volume depends on the political factor  - - - 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-) 
 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF FACTORS AND VARIABLES 
This study is comprised of 12 independent variables that load onto 3 independent 
exogenous (latent) factors, economic, political and environmental.  The dependent variable 
(endogenous factor) is electronic waste import volume (Figure 3.2).  A table outlining the 
operationalization of factors and variables is outlined in Table 5A. 
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Fig. 3.2 Structural Equation Model  
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Electronic waste import volume (kilogram) is represented by the United Nations (UN) 
commodity code 854810.  The commodity is defined as electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; including sound recorders and reproducers, televisions, and parts and 
accessories of such articles.  It also consists of waste and scrap of primary cells, “primary 
batteries and electric accumulators; spent primary cells, spent primary batteries and spent 
electric accumulators.”40 
                                               
40 United Nations. 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
Economic Factor  
An abundance of literature suggests that economic globalization induces waste trade.  
The economic determinants used in this study are gross domestic product (GDP), gross 
domestic product per capita (GDP/capita), percent of exported goods and services and total tax 
rate.  This study asserts that the status of economic development of a nation is largely 
determined by these variables.  Consequently, they provide insight as to whether the economic 
factor impacts e-waste import volume.  
GDP is the value of goods and services produced plus taxes and minus subsidies not 
included in the value of the products.41  GDP measures the scale (size) of a country’s economy.  
The literature indicates that economy size plays a significant role in waste importation.  Larger 
economies are more likely to be capital abundant (rich countries).  These countries are able to 
procure machinery needed to optimize mineral extraction. Contrarily, poorer countries are likely 
to import waste as a means to increase state revenue and create a sustainable industry.  
Although, the manner in which GDP impacts the economic factor difffers between the economy 
types it is a key component of the economy.  Therefore, the expected sign of the estimated 
coefficient for GDP on the economic factor is positive in both developed and developing 
countries.  
Similarly, GDP/capita, a measure of the overall wealth of a country, is equally important 
when assessing economic development.  GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population.  Some studies operationalize GDP/capita is as a proxy for environmental 
stringency.42  These scholars contend that as citizens’ incomes increase they become more 
                                               
41 The  World Bank, "World Development Indicators " Accessed June 2016, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. 
 
42 Derek K. Kellenberg, "An Empirical Investigation of the Pollution Haven Effect with Strategic Environment and Trade Policy," 
Journal of International Economics 78 (2009). Baggs; Higashida and Managi. 
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environmentally conscious.  In turn, environmental regulations become stricter.  It is important to 
note that this causal relationship is more likely to occur in developed countries as opposed to 
developing countries because the individual income gain in a developing countries is less likely 
to be large enough (and widely distributed among citizens) to impact environmental regulations.  
Despite this, GDP/capita is still critical to the economic factor in developing countries.  
GDP/capita in developing countries is substantially lower than developed countries.  A low 
GDP/capita can motivate countries to import waste to create employment opportunties and 
increase citizens’ income.  Although GDP/capita functions differently in the country types, the 
expected sign of the estimated coefficient for GDP/capita is positive in developed and 
developing countries.  Equally, I do not expect the level of importance to differ substantially 
between the country types.  
The percent of exported goods and services represents the value of all goods and other 
market services provided to the rest of the world.  Although developed countries tend to have 
larger economies with a greater share of world trade the extent to which a country can 
participate in the global economy impacts its economic status .  It is expected that the coefficient 
for percent of exported goods and services is positive on the economic factor in developed and 
developing countries.   
Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by a 
business in the second year of operation, expressed as a share of commercial profit.43  The tax 
rate impacts the number of business operating in the region.  Some sholars contend that 
developing countries tend to have lower tax rates in an attempt to attract foreign direct 
investment.  The lower tax rate is perceived as being advantageous to the nation’s economic 
status.  Contrarily, the tax rate of operating a business in developed countries is higher which 
can adversely impact the economic health of the nation.  These differences might yield different  
effect sizes of tax rate on the economic factor between the country types.  However, because  
                                               
43 World Economic Forum, "The Global Competitiveness Report " Accessed June 2016, https://www.weforum.org/reports. 
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business taxes are a significant component to assessing the overall health of a national 
economy the total tax rate will have a positive effect on the economic factor in both developed 
and developing countries.  
 
 
Political Factor  
Studies suggest that an interconnection between regulatory policies, corruption levels, 
and government type impacts economic growth. 44  Therefore, the political factor encompasses, 
perceived level of corruption, government type, measures of innovation policies and policies 
related to the freedom to trade. 
The Polity Index, measures the extent to which a government is authoritarian versus 
democratic.  Polity data is sourced from the Polity IV Project Index.  The polity score ranges 
from -10 to +10.  A score closer to -10 represents a completely authoritarian government and a 
score +10 indicates a completely democratic nation.45  Government type is critical to the political 
factor because it influences the policy making process, the type of policies constructed and its 
overall compliance to the policies.  It is expected that polity will have a positive effect on the 
political factor in both developed and developing countries.  
This study includes a corruption score which measures the level of perceived 
governmental corruption.  Corruption data is retrieved from the Corruption Perceptions Index.  
The scale ranges from 0–100, a score closer to 100 is most favorable and indicates little 
perceived corruption.46  Corruption impacts the stringency of regulatory policies created as well 
                                               
44 A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lusztig, "Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth," International 
Political Science Review 27, no. 2 (2006). 
 
45 Center for Systemic Peace, "Polity Iv Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions," Accessed June 2016, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
 
46 Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index," Accessed June 2016, 
https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 
 
168 The Heritage Foundation, "Index of Economic Freedom " Accessed June 2016, http://www.heritage.org/index/explore. 
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as influences the extent to which rules and regulations are adhered to.  Recall that high level 
corruption, bribes that impact legislation, can occur in both developed and less developed 
countries.  Therefore, it is expected that corruption will have a positive effect on the political 
factor in both country types.  However, I expect the effect size of corruption to be substantially 
different in developed versus developing countries.  I attribute this to the differences in the 
overall perceived level of corruption in both country types.  Developed countries are generally 
viewed as having less corruption than developing countries in large part because lower level 
corruption such as bribes for permits tend to be absent.  Whereas, in some developing countries 
bribes can be considered a ‘normal cost of doing business’. 
This study uses the Index of Economic Freedom rating of freedom to trade.  The index 
quantifies the extent of tariff and non-tariff barrier policies that affect imports and exports of 
goods and services.  The scale ranges from 0-100 in which a score closer to 100 represents the 
most freedom to trade.47  A nation’s ability to freely trade is reflective of its political economic 
policies.  It is expected that the estimated coefficient for freedom to trade will have a positive 
effect on the political factor in both developed and developing countries.  A popular assumption 
is that democratic states tend to be more open to trade.  Building on this logic, I expect the 
effect size of the freedom to trade to differ substantially between developed and developing 
countries.  
Innovation policies affect the cost of waste management.  The study includes the 
innovation score from the Global Competitive Index that measures the extent to which policies 
promote research and development.  The scale ranges from 0-100 with scores closer to 100 
representing a stronger existence of policies that support research and development.  The 
importance of innovation policies “is no longer the prerogative of high-income countries alone.”48  
Therefore, it is expected that the coefficient for innovation will be positive on the political factor 
                                               
 
48 Cornell University,  v. 
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in both developed and developing countries.  However, the size of the impact should vary 
between country types. I expect innovation to have a higher impact on the political factor in 
developed countries compared to developing countries.   
 
 
Environmental Factor 
One of the most significant issues to emerge in the global political economy is the effect 
of trade on the environment.  States and institutions, such as the WTO, created international 
environmental treaties and inserted environmental standards and protocols in global trade 
agreements.  The European Commission created robust regulations to ensure international 
waste trade “is managed in an environmentally sustainable way, and prevents shipments from 
affecting human health.”49  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes 
standards that promote environmentally sustainable development.  This study conjectures that 
environmental regulation at the domestic and international levels impact waste trade and thus 
should be included waste trade studies.  This research encompasses the number of 
environmental treaties a state has ratified, its environmental protection score and its ratification 
of the Basel convention and Basel Ban Amendment.   
The number of environmental treaties is accessed from the Socioeconomic Data and 
Application Center dataset.  They represent the absolute number of multilateral environmental 
treaties a country has agreed to.  It is expected that the estimated coefficient for environmental 
treaties will be positive on the environmental factor for both developed and developing 
countries.  
Environmental regulatory stringency plays a crucial role in state behavior in hazardous 
waste trade.  This study uses the environmental protection index (EPI) score as proxy to 
                                               
49 European Commission, "Waste Shipment," Accessed March 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-
eu/waste-shipment/. 
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measuring regulatory stringency.50  Proponents of the race to the bottom theory and pollution 
haven hypothesis contend that lax environmental regulations in developing countries induce 
them to import hazardous waste.  Empirical results from Kellenberg’s (2009) study supports this 
theory.51  However, descriptive data illustrates that developed nations import the majority of 
electronic waste.  Because developed nations tend to have stricter environmental laws 
compared to developing nation, yet still import waste I surmise that environmental regulations 
will have a positive effect on the environmental factor in both developing and developed 
countries. 
The Basel Convention and the Basel Amendment are key variables of the environmental 
factor.  The focus of the treaties is to safeguard developing countries from importing hazardous 
waste from developed countries.  Ratification and/or acceptance of the treaties are sourced 
from the Basel Convention database.  The countries are coded dichotomously as either ratified 
the agreement or not (1= ratify 0=not ratify).  The provisions do not limit developing countries 
from importing hazardous waste from other developing countries.  In addition, in 2008 the Basel 
Convention shifted its perspective of e-waste from trash to treasure.  Therefore, I expect that the 
two initiatives will have a negative effect on the environmental factor in developing countries.  A 
developed countries willingness to ratify the Basel Convention and Ban Amendment treaty is an 
indication of its commitment to environmentally sound trading practice.  However, the treaties do 
not address importing by developed nations. Therefore, I expect the treaties to have a negative 
effect on the environmental factor in developed countries.  
 
  
                                               
50  Baggs (2009) and Kellenberg (2012) mention that an environmental regulatory index does not exist.  Green Growth (2015) 
suggests that the environmental sustainability index/environmental protection index score can be used as a proxy for environmental 
regulatory stringency. 
 
51 Kellenberg. 
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Table 3.2 Expected Outer Weights  
     
  
Expected Outer Weights  
Factor  Variable Combined  Developed  Developing  
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  
GDP  + + + 
GDP /capita (US $) + + + 
Export of Goods and Services  + + + 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 
Polity  + + + 
Corruption + + + 
Freedom to Trade + + + 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties + + + 
Basel Convention  - - - 
Basel Ban Amendment  - - - 
 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
This study includes if a country is landlocked, population and population density as 
measures of control.  The data is sourced from the World Bank and the Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy.  I expect that population and population density are likely to 
have a negative small impact on electronic waste import volume because some developing 
countries, particularly those in Africa and Asia, import waste despite being densely populated.  
Population density is also less likely to impact waste disposal in advanced countries because 
these countries generally have stricter environmental regulations prohibiting disposal in densely 
populated areas. 
A country’s proximity to a coast is also considered to influence waste import volume.  
Landlocked countries tend to experience higher transportation costs while countries with at least 
one coastal border are likely to have lower transportation fees.  In reviewing e-waste trade data, 
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the largest importers of electronic waste are coastal countries.  Therefore, landlocked variable 
will have a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume.   
 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
This study evaluates economic, political and environmental factors’ impact on electronic 
waste import volume of 130 countries, 36 developed and 94 developing from 1998-2014.52  757 
country-years are assessed, 286 developed countries and 471 less developed countries.  The 
number of countries reporting importing electronic waste varies by year.  Table 7A displays the 
sample size by year.  In 1998 approximately 60 countries reported importing electronic waste.  
By 2014, the number of importers increased 61%. 
Data used in this research is compiled from multiple sources. A table outlining the 
source of the variables is outlined in Table 5A.   Acquiring data for each variable for the desired 
period among the many different datasets proved challenging.  The Environmental Protection 
Index is evaluated every two years whereas other index studies are conducted every year. Also, 
the timeframe of availability of data between the sources vary.  Availability of economic country 
level data is available beginning in the 1960s.  However, innovation policy analysis is a recent 
phenomenon and data is available beginning in 2006.  
Inconsistent data and data integrity are concerning when analyzing waste trade both 
over time and within one year.  Some nations record the value of imported waste without the 
volume and vice versa.  This leads to missing values which impacts the sample size.  In turn, a 
researcher’s ability to accurately assess electronic waste trade is hindered.  Additionally, some 
countries data is questionable.  For example, from 1996 to 2012 China reported importing an 
average of 444, 289 kg per year of electronic waste.  However, it has not reported receiving 
volume since 2012.  It is unlikely that China has stopped importing electronic waste. More so, it 
                                               
52 The list of countries used in the study is outlined in table 6A. 
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is reasonable to assume that the country is either no longer reporting inbound shipments of 
electronic waste or is using alternative commodity codes (i.e. copper waste and scrap- 740400, 
nickel waste and scrap-750300 or aluminum waste and scrap- 760200).  
 
 
LIMITATIONS 
This research strays from other waste trade studies by not employing traditional ordinary 
least squares (OLS).  OLS measures independent variables’ direct effect on a dependent 
variable.  In contrast, PLS-SEM measures the direct effect of a factor on the dependent 
variable.  Consequently, this study does not evaluate the effect independent variables have on 
electronic waste import volume.   
Another limitation of the study is that in using formative modeling my model does not 
account for outside variables that also might impact the factor.  This is because formative 
modeling assumes perfect measurement between the independent variable and the factor.  
Therefore, my model only considers the variables in the model impact on the factor.  Despite 
this, my study includes the variables that literature indicates are most critical.  Table 3A outlines 
relevant literature associated with each variable. 
Along similar lines, variables that do not align on the political, economic and 
environmental factors are not considered.  For example, studies seeking to provide insight to 
the relationship between trading partners (testing the pollution haven hypothesis or race to the 
bottom theory) tend to use the gravity model which takes considers distance and borders.  
These variables are omitted from my study because I am not exploring trade patterns nor 
evaluating characteristics relative to trading partners.  
Other studies incorporate a country’s membership in free trade agreements to test the 
effect size trade agreements have on waste import volume.  In lieu of this, I use the freedom to 
trade variable as a proxy for the absolute number of trade agreements.  It is reasonable to 
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assume that the more trade freedom a country has the more likely it is to have a higher number 
of trade agreements.   
Disposal capacity is considered a determinant a state evaluates when evaluating 
whether to import waste.  Some studies use the number of landfills as a proxy for disposal 
capacity.  This study does not include this measure because I believe it is not a suitable 
measure for disposal capacity and it does not directly impact a country’s import volume.  First, 
using the number of landfills is problematic because it assumes that waste will be disposed of in 
landfills.  Electronic waste can also be incinerated.  Additionally, not all electronic waste will be 
discarded in a disposal facility (landfill nor incinerator).  Electronic waste can be recycled for 
valuable components, repurposed and then re-exported.  Therefore, the number of disposal 
facilities can be irrelevant because the importing country might not be the final destination of the 
waste. 
Furthermore, utilizing the number of facilities (landfills or incinerators) as a proxy for 
available capacity is flawed because it is not an adequate representation of available disposal 
capacity.  A country can have many facilities with minimal available capacity.  Alternatively, a 
country can have fewer disposal facilities with a large amount of disposal capacity.  Considering 
capacity can be irrelevant all together in examining what influences states to import waste. 
Nations can decide to import waste despite knowing existing inefficiencies and inadequacies in 
waste management.  They choose to improperly manage and dispose of electronic waste.  This 
is evidenced by countries such as India, Bangladesh and Nigeria that are ‘known’ for lax waste 
disposal practices.  
Additionally, capacity challenges have not stopped developed countries from importing 
electronic waste.  OECD countries are experiencing capacity challenges as they are not able to 
construct new facilities due to social and economic constraints.53  The United States Trade 
                                               
53 O'Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation, 188. 
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Commission echoes this sentiment in that it conjectures that high capital costs of landfills may 
affect the ability to provide waste management services.54  Nonetheless, advanced countries 
continue to import waste.  Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the number of operating 
facilities in the study.   
Components of the cost benefit analysis, such as disposal fees, local taxes and 
employee wages, are not included in the study.  I recognize that these variables are key 
components of a cost-benefit analysis and that it is reasonable to consider profitability as a key 
driver to import waste.  However, I contend that taxes and wages these variables are 
operational expenses that impact profitability at a granular level and therefore are better suited 
for studies that seek to explore the cost-benefit of importing waste at the micro (city) and meso 
(state) levels.  Therefore, because this study focuses on determinants at the international level, 
these variables are omitted. 
Baggs (2009) explains that “the use of available average or aggregate tariffs by country 
as proxies for tariffs specifically for hazardous waste is conceptually difficult since imported 
hazardous waste is often of negative value, making an ad valorem import tariff of dubious 
applicability.”55  This study uses the total tax rate and freedom to trade score per country in lieu 
of tariffs for hazardous and or recyclable waste at the local level.  The total tax rate illustrates 
the rate a company pays in taxes to the state.  The freedom to trade score considers trade 
barriers such as tariff rates. 
Clapp (2001) contends that international debt is a key driver for states to import waste.56  
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) examined the association between each country’s net trade 
balance, debt service ratio and public debt as a percentage of GDP.  Their findings illustrated 
that no significant relationship exists between net trade balance and debt service ratio nor 
                                               
54 United States International Trade Commission,  xv.  
 
55 Baggs,  8. 
 
56 Clapp, Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries, 11. 
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between net trade balance and public debt as a percentage of GDP.  Therefore, central 
government debt is not included in the study.  Additionally, in reviewing data approximately 67% 
of observations reported having no central government debt.57 
It is important to note that although the variables in the political factor do not mirror the 
structure outlined in O’Neill’s domestic institutional approach, I include variables that relate to 
tenets in her framework.  For example, the EPI score, a proxy for environmental regulatory 
stringency, corresponds to the extent of regulatory stringency outlined in the regulatory structure 
in the domestic institutional approach. 
                                               
57 Statistic calculated from World Bank data 1998-2014.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS – OVERALL MODEL: NOT A LOAD OF RUBBISH 
 
This chapter seeks to analyze the impact the economic, political and environmental 
factors have on electronic waste import volume.  The analysis evaluates three models; the   
combined model includes both developed and developing countries, the developed model 
focuses on developed nations and the developing model assesses developing nations.  To have 
a robust analysis, panel data spanning years 1998 to 2014 was evaluated.  757 country-years 
are in in the combined model, 286 in the developed model and 471 in the developing model. 
Each model consists of 3 constructs with 9 independent variables. 1  Because data for all the 
variables is not available until approximately 2002, this model does not include innovation 
environmental protection index scores and tax rates data.2  Tables 4.1and 4.2 outline the 
indicators’ descriptive statistics and correlation values.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics   
     Indicator  Mean Median Min Max Standard Deviation 
Volume (tons) 8,544.23 73.02 0.00 566,820.61 35,831.25 
GDP (USD millions) 511,802.55 81,026.30 349.46 17,393,103.00 1,613,808.38 
GDP/capita 15,825.49 6,524.86 111.53 116,612.88 19,563.90 
% Exports 50.97 37.84 0.00 3,264.50 128.65 
Polity 2.71 8.00 -99.00 10.00 17.52 
Corruption  -0.27 4.10 -99.00 10.00 22.80 
Trade Freedom 71.74 77.70 -99.00 95.00 24.21 
Enviro Treaties 3.04 3.00 0.00 9.00 1.75 
Basel Entry 0.93 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.26 
Ban Amend 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Population (millions) 50.44 10.96 0.09 1,295.29 154.01 
Population Density 334.15 81.30 -99.00 21,595.35 1,640.74 
                                               
1 The term indicator will be used interchangeably with the term variable. 
 
2 These variables will be assessed in the post Basel shift model discussed in Chapter 5.  
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COMBINED MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues 
exist.  Table 4.3 reports the VIF values for all the indicators.  All values are between .20 and 
5, hence collinearity is not an issue.3  
 
 
Table 4.3 Outer VIF - Combined Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.01 
Ban Amend 1.03 
Basel Entry 1.03 
Corruption 1.11 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP ($) 1.10 
GDP/Capita 1.11 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.02 
Population Density  1.00 
Population 1.00 
Trade Freedom 1.14 
Treaties 1.01 
 
 
  
                                               
3 Hair, 143. 
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Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
The outer weight value expresses a variable’s level of relative importance, or its relative 
contribution, to forming the factor.  The higher the value, the more important the indicator is to 
the factor.4  The significance of a variable, an indication of whether the variable significantly 
contributes to its corresponding construct, is determined by the p-value of the outer weight.  An 
indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05.  An indicator is of absolute 
importance if the p-value of the outer weight is not significant, greater than .05, but its outer 
loading is above .50.5  
Table 4.4 outlines the weight (importance) and significance of the indicators.  The 
percent of exports of goods and services is the most relevant variable to the economic factor, 
.931.  The gross domestic product indicator is of medium importance with .383.  GDP/capita is 
the least important indicator to the economic factor, .031.  Interestingly, none of the economic 
indicators are significant, they all have p-values higher than .05, to the economic factor.  More 
so, only the percent of goods and services exported is important (it is not significant but its outer 
loading is higher than .50). 
Polity, the extent to which a government is democratic, is the most important indicator to 
the political factor, outer weight .67.  The freedom to trade is of medium importance with outer 
weight of .417.  Corruption is the least important indicator to the political factor, .386.  Notably, 
all political variables are statistically significant to the factor.  
The number of environmental treaties is the most critical indicator to the environmental 
factor with an outer weight of .936, and is significant.  The Ban Amendment is of medium 
importance with an outer weight of .354. However, it is not significant nor is it of absolute 
importance to the factor.  Although, the ratification of the Basel Convention is the least important 
indicator, -.300, it is significant.   
                                               
4 Ibid., 146. 
5 Absolute importance is the information an indicator provides without considering the other indicators. Ibid., 148. 
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Table 4.4 Variable Results - Combined Model  
     
Factor  Variable 
Outer Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  .383 
(.36) 
1.54 0.12 No  
GDP /capita (US $) .031 
(.21) 
0.18 0.86 No  
% Export Goods and Services  .931 
(.92) 
1.88 0.06 No  
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  0.67 
(.79) 
12.49 0.00 Yes  
Corruption 0.386 
(.49) 
5.08 0.00 Yes  
Freedom to Trade 0.417 
(.75) 
3.64 0.00 Yes  
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties 0.936 
(.91) 
9.19 0.00 Yes  
Basel Convention  -0.300 
(-.19) 
2.62 0.01 Yes  
Basel Ban Amendment  0.354 
(.27) 
1.62 0.11 No  
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues 
exist.  Table 4.5 reports the VIF values for all the factors.6  All values are between .20 and 5, 
hence collinearity is not an issue.7  
 
 
Table 4.5 Inner VIF - Combined Model  
   VIF 
Economic 1.96 
Environmental  1.08 
Landlock 1.03 
Pol -> Econ 2.02 
Pol -> Enviro 1.27 
Political 1.18 
Population Density  1.37 
Population 1.03 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients8  
Table 4.6 reports the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients.  
Estimated coefficients closer to +1 represent strong positive relationship.9  The economic factor 
has a medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume and is statistically significant.  A 
one-unit change in the economic factor increases waste importation .39 standard deviations, 
13,795 tons10, when all other factors are held constant.   
                                               
6 The terms factor and construct will be used interchangeably. 
 
7 Hair, 143. 
 
8 A robustness check was conducted with Mexico and South Korea as outliers.  When dummy variables for Mexico and South 
Koreas are set as control variables the results are similar.  This illustrates that Mexico and South Korea’s volume do not alter the 
factors’ effect on electronic waste import volume.    
  
9 Hair, 195. 
 
10 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
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The political factor’s effect on import volume is miniscule.  When the political factor 
changes by one-unit, electronic waste importation rises .062 standard deviations, 2,293 tons, 
when all other factors are held constant.  
The environmental factor is significant but also has virtually no effect on import volume.11  
A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases electronic waste importation .075 
standard deviations, 2,616 tons, when all other factors are held constant.   
 
 
Table 4.6 Structural Path Results - Combined Model  
    
Paths Path  Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  0.39 2.26 0.02 Yes 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  0.05 0.37 0.71 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.06 2.19 0.03 Yes 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -.012 0.55 0.58 No  
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -.073 3.59 0.00 Yes  
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
11 Path coefficients may be significant but their effect size can be small.  This usually occurs with large sample sizes. 
Hair, 197. 
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The model tests for the economic and environmental factors’ effect when the political 
factor moderates on the relationship between the factors and e-waste import volume.  Figure 
4.1 explains the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of the political factor. 
Regardless of the political factor’s value, the political factor does not impact the relationship 
between the economic factor and electronic waste import volume (the slopes above, below and 
at the mean political values are the same).  This is likely because combining country types 
obscures the effect as evidenced by richer effects when country types are modeled separately.  
Nevertheless, in all 3 cases, as the economic factor gets larger, import volume increases.   
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Combined  
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Figure 4.2 explains the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of the 
political factor.  The estimates illustrate that the relationship between the environmental factor 
and volume is slightly stronger when the political factor’s value is higher (a steeper slope when 
the political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).  Conversely, the environmental 
factor has a weaker effect on volume when the political factor values are smaller (a less steep 
slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation below the mean).  In all 3 cases, as the 
environmental factor gets larger, e-waste import volume decreases.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Combined  
 
  
 
 
 
 
82
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2 for the combined model is .189.  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain 19% of electronic waste importation volume when both developed and developing 
countries are evaluated in the same model.  
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size of the construct, f2, was tested to determine whether a construct has a 
substantive impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model. f2 values less than 
.02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the 
dependent variable.12  The economic factor will have nearly a medium sized effect on electronic 
waste import volume if excluded from the model.  The absence of the other factors will have 
virtually no effect on volume.  
 
 
Table 4.7 f2 - Combined Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.09 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.00 
Pol -> Econ 0.00 
Pol -> Enviro 0.00 
Political 0.00 
Population Density  0.00 
Population 0.00 
                                               
12 Ibid., 201. 
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Fig. 4.3 Structural Equation Model - Combined Model 
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DEVELOPED MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity Issues 
Table 4.8 reports the VIF values for all the indicators.  All values are between .20 and 5, 
hence collinearity is not an issue.  
 
 
Table 4.8 Outer VIF - Developed Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.18 
Ban Amend 1.06 
Basel Entry 1.12 
Corruption 1.36 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP ($) 1.19 
GDP/Capita 1.09 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.00 
Population Density  1.00 
Population 1.00 
Trade Freedom 1.36 
Treaties 1.06 
 
 
Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 4.9 illustrates the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developed 
model.  Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most important variable, .908 to the economic 
factor.  GDP/capita and the amount of exports as a percent of GDP are relatively equally 
important with -.248 and -.218 values.  None of the economic indicators are significant.  
However, GDP is of absolute importance (outer loading = .93).  
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Polity is the most critical indicator, .959, to the political factor and is the only significant 
indicator in the model.  Corruption is of medium importance to the political factor, .352.  
Freedom to trade is the least influential in the political factor.     
The Ban Amendment is the most pertinent indicator to the environmental factor, .686.  
Ratification of the Basel Treaty is nearly as important with a .517 indicator weight.  
Environmental treaties are the least essential indicator to the factor, .186.  It is worth noting that 
none of the environmental variables are significant.  However, the Ban Amendment and Basel 
Treaty are of absolute importance.   
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Table 4.9 Variable Results - Developed Model  
Factor  Variable 
Outer Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  
GDP  
0.908 
(.93) 
1.33 0.18 No 
GDP /capita (US $) 
-.248 
(-.13) 
0.80 0.42 No 
% Export Goods and Services 
-.218 
(-.55) 
0.94 0.35 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 
Polity  
.959 
(.95) 
3.08 0.00 Yes 
Corruption 
.352 
(.23) 
0.78 0.43 No 
Freedom to Trade 
-.254 
(.03) 
0.47 0.64 No 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties 
.186 
(.35) 
0.56 0.58 No 
Basel Convention  
.517 
(.72) 
1.48 0.14 No 
Basel Ban Amendment  
.686 
(.82) 
1.36 0.18 No 
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues 
among the factors exist.  Table 4.10 reports the VIF values for all the factors.  The economic 
and population factors exhibit collinearity.  However, the economic construct is not deleted 
from the model because literature indicates that it is essential to evaluate waste trade.  The 
collinearity issue is resolved when population is omitted from the model, the VIF value for 
the economic factor is 3.14.  Nonetheless, because population is a control variable it is not 
necessary to exclude it from the model. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Inner VIF - Developed Model  
   VIF 
Economic 10.12 
Environmental  1.96 
Landlock 1.14 
Pol -> Econ 9.71 
Pol -> Enviro 2.85 
Political 12.20 
Population Density  1.78 
Population 10.20 
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Assessment of path coefficients13  
Table 4.11 displays the factors’ path coefficients, impact size, on electronic waste import 
volume.  Notably, none of the factors are statistically significant.  The economic factor’s effect is 
between small and medium.  When the economic factor increases by one unit, e-waste volume 
decreases .16 standard deviations, or -5,624 tons14, holding all other factors constant.  
The political and environmental factors have an inconsequential effect on import volume.  
When the political factor changes by one unit, e-waste volume decreases .06 standard 
deviations, 2,214 tons, when all other factors are held constant.  A one-unit change in the 
environmental factor decreases waste importation .04 standard deviations, 1,336 tons, when all 
other factors are held constant.  
 
 
Table 4.11 Structural Path Results- Developed Model  
    
Paths Path Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  -.16 0.89 0.38 No 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  -0.26 0.75 0.45 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  -.063 0.35 0.73 No 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.06 0.49 0.62 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.04 0.44 0.66 No 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
  
                                               
13 A robustness check was conducted on import volume per capita as the dependent variable.  The results are similar to the output 
in the study with the dependent variable as volume in tons. 
 
14 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.  
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It is assumed that the political factor moderates the relationship between the economic 
and environmental factors and e-waste import volume.  Figure 4.4 explains the effect size of the 
economic factor based on the value of the political factor.  The estimates show that the 
relationship between the economic factor and volume is stronger when the political factor value 
is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).  
Conversely, the economic factor has a weaker effect on volume when the political factor values 
are low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation below the 
mean).   When the political value is high, as the economic factor gets larger volume 
decreases.15  Alternatively, when the political factor is low as the economic factor gets larger 
volume increases.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developed 
 
 
                                               
15 Downward slope of the line.  
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Figure 4.5 explains the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of the 
political factor.  The environmental factor’s effect on volume is stronger when the value of the 
political factor is high (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above the 
mean).  However, the value of the political factor changes the direction of the volume.  When 
the political value is low, as the environmental factor gets larger, import e-waste volume 
increases.  Alternatively, when the political factor is high, volume decreases as the 
environmental factor gets larger.  This result suggests that countries with high political scores 
are likely to have political structures that reinforce environmental initiatives.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developed 
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2   for the developed model is .044.  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain approximately 4% of electronic waste importation volume in developed countries.   
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Effect size of f2 
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive 
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.  None of the factors will 
substantially affect electronic waste import volume if they are excluded from the model.  
 
 
Table 4.12 f2 - Developed Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.00 
Environmental  0.00 
Landlock 0.01 
Pol -> Econ 0.00 
Pol -> Enviro 0.00 
Political 0.00 
Population Density  0.00 
Population 0.01 
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Fig. 4.6 Structural Equation Model - Developed Model 
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DEVELOPING MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity  
The VIFs for the path coefficients are below 5, indicating that no collinearity issues 
among the indicators exist.  
 
 
Table 4.13 Outer VIF - Developing Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.02 
Ban Amend 1.02 
Basel Entry 1.01 
Corruption 1.06 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP ($) 1.03 
GDP/Capita 1.02 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.06 
Population Density  1.00 
Population 1.00 
Trade Freedom 1.11 
Treaties 1.01 
 
 
Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 4.14 outlines the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developing 
model.  The percent of exports is the most critical indicator to the economic factor, .515.  GDP is 
of medium importance, .479.  GDP/capita is the least important variable, -.038.  Interestingly, 
none of the economic indicators are significant.  However, the percent of exports and GDP are 
of absolute importance to the economic factor.   
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Alternatively, all variables on the political factor are statistically significant.  The freedom 
to trade is the most profound indicator, .839.  Polity is of importance with an outer weight of 
.616.  Corruption is of concern but is the least critical variable, .344. 
The environmental indicators are all statistically significant to the environmental factor. 
The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is the most relevant indicator, 
.781.  The Ban Amendment is also important, .512.  Ratifying the Basel Treaty is the least 
important indicator -.359. 
 
 
Table 4.14 Variable Results - Developing Model  
     
Factor  Variable 
Outer Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  .479 
(.57) 
1.50 0.13 No 
GDP /capita (US $) -.038 
(.07) 
1.01 0.32 No 
% Export Goods and 
Services  
.515 
(.73) 
1.95 0.05 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  .616 
(.74) 
5.57 0.00 Yes 
Corruption .344 
(.48) 
3.10 0.00 Yes 
Freedom to Trade .839 
(.72) 
2.82 0.01 Yes 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties .781 
(.81) 
16.59 0.00 Yes 
Basel Convention  -.359 
(-.28) 
5.80 0.00 Yes 
Basel Ban Amendment  .512 
(.53) 
7.41 0.00 Yes 
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The inner VIFs were assessed to determine if collinearity exists.  Collinearity issues exist 
for the economic and political economic factor, the values are above 5.  The collinearity issue is 
resolved when the political economic factor is excluded from the model, the economic VIF 
becomes 1.12 
 
 
Table 4.15 Inner VIF - Developing Model  
   VIF 
Economic 5.95 
Environmental  1.07 
Landlock 1.08 
Pol -> Econ 5.92 
Pol -> Enviro 1.08 
Political 1.81 
Population Density  1.05 
Population 1.63 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients16  
Surprisingly, the economic factor has a small to medium effect on electronic waste 
import volume.  Equally, unexpected is that the economic factor is not statistically significant.  
When the economic factor increases by one-unit, electronic waste import volume increases .17 
standard deviations, 5,914 tons17, holding all other factors constant.  
The political factor has nearly a medium sized effect on volume.  A one-unit change in 
the political factor increases volume .21 standard deviations, 7,562 tons.  The environment has 
a small effect on electronic waste import volume and is statistically significant.  When the 
                                               
16 A robustness check was conducted on import volume per capita as the dependent variable.  The results are similar to the output 
in the study with the dependent variable as volume in tons.  
  
17 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
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environmental factor increases one unit, waste importation decreases .09 standard deviations, 
3,297 tons, holding all other factors constant. 
 
 
Table 4.16 Structural Path Results - Developing Model  
    
Paths Path  Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  0.17 0.77 0.44 No 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  0.90 2.26 0.02 Yes 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.21 1.98 0.05 Yes 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -.028 1.24 0.22 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -.092 3.65 0.00 Yes 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
The model evaluates the economic and environmental factors’ effect on electronic waste 
volume under the assumption that the political factor impacts the relationship between the 
factors and e-waste volume.  Figure 4.7 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor 
based on the value of the political factor.   The relationship between the economic factor and 
volume is equally strong when the political factor value is low and high (the slope of the line is 
steep when the political value is 1 standard deviation above and below the mean).  However, 
the value of the political factor changes the direction of import volume (the slopes of the lines 
are opposite).  When the political value is low, as the economic factor gets larger, volume 
decreases.  This effect can possibly be attributed to less democratic nations (authoritarian 
regimes) that are not as open to trade and are not large participants in the global economy.  
Conversely, when the political factor value is high, as the economic factor gets larger, import 
volume increases. 
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Fig. 4.7 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developing  
 
 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is stronger 
when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 
standard deviation above the mean).  Alternatively, the environmental factor has a weaker effect 
when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard 
deviation below the mean).   
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Fig. 4.8 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developing  
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2   for the developing model is .384.  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain 38% of electronic waste importation volume in developing countries. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive 
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.18  The political economy and the 
political factor will have a small effect on volume if they are deleted from the model.  All other 
factors will have no effect on electronic waste import volume if absent from the model.  
  
                                               
18 f2 values less than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the dependent variable. 
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Table 4.17 f2 - Developing Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.01 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.00 
Pol -> Econ 0.06 
Pol -> Enviro 0.00 
Political 0.04 
Population Density  0.00 
Population 0.00 
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Fig. 4.9 Structural Equation Model - Developing Model 
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OVERALL FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT 
The economic, political and environmental factors better explain electronic waste import 
volume practices in developing countries, (38%) as compared to the combined model (19%) 
and developed countries (4%).  Although developed and developing countries import volume 
are both best explained by the new endogenous growth theory which claims that the policies 
influence the economy and trade practices, the findings illustrate that economic, political and 
environmental factors behave differently in developed and developing countries.  These varied 
results support tenets of development theory that contend that differences in the political 
economic structure between advanced and less advanced countries impact each nation’s global 
trade practices and levels of development.19 
Table 4.18 outlines the hypotheses, the factors’ significance and expected/actual effect 
sizes.  In all models, the study hypothesizes that the economic factor is the dominant driver in 
influencing waste importation.  In doing so, it is suspected that the economic nationalist theory 
best explains waste motivates states to import hazardous electronic waste.  The results indicate 
that the economic factor has the largest effect when country types are modeled jointly.  
However, the economic factor is not as powerful as literature suggests.  It has a medium sized 
effect on volume in the combined model and a small to medium effect in developed and 
developing countries.  Additionally, the economic factor’s small increase on e-waste volume in 
developing states belie proponents of the pollution/waste haven hypothesis that contend a poor 
economic status drives a country to increase a substantial amount of waste. 
The economic factor results also do not align with literature that claims capital 
abundance increases waste importation.20  The economic factor decreases e-waste import 
                                               
19 Gilpin, 307-11. 
 
20 Discussed in Baggs (2009).   
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volume in developed countries.  Notably, the economic factor is only significant when country 
types are modeled together. 
It is expected that the political factor will have a medium effect and increase volume in all 
models.  The political factor has a small effect on volume in both the combined and developed 
models.  In developing countries, the political factor has a medium sized effect on e-waste 
import volume.  The findings suggest that the domestic institutionalist theory is more applicable 
to developing countries as compared to developed countries.  More so, the varied effect size of 
the political factor when country types are evaluated independently indicate that is better to 
assesses country types independently to determine whether the domestic institutionalist theory 
explains electronic waste import behavior.21 
The purpose of environmental policies and initiatives is to decrease hazardous activities.  
Therefore, in all the models, it is hypothesized that the environmental factor slightly decreases 
e-waste import volume.  This hypothesis is accurate in all the models.  However, the impact is 
extremely small that the environmental factor has very little effect on e-waste import volume in 
all model types.  This can be attributed to states signing environmental treaties but not 
complying with them.22  This outcome provides limited support to liberal international 
institutionalist that conjecture international environmental agreements minimize hazardous 
waste trade. 
The study hypothesizes that when the political factor moderates the relationship 
between the economic factor and import volume, the economic factor will have a positive effect 
on volume.  More so, it assumes that the economic effect will be stronger when the political 
values are low.  The study yields mixed results.  In the combined model, the political factor has 
no impact on the relationship between the economic factor and e-waste import volume.  This 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
21 Institutionalist approach argues that the domestic political structure is the most impactful factor that affects waste trade.  
 
22 Claire Brunel and Arik Levinson, "Measuring the Stringency of Environmental Regulations," Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy 10, no. 1 (2016): 50. 
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result is likely to occur because combining the country types obscures the effects.  The political 
factor affects the relationship between the economic factor and volume when country types are 
modeled separately.  In developed countries, the economic factor has a stronger effect on 
volume when the value of the political factor is low.  Conversely, in developing countries, the 
economic factor’s impact on volume is strong regardless of the value of the political factor.  
Thus, in less democratic states that exhibit less freedom to trade, the economic factor plays a 
stronger role, while in states with more freedoms, the economic factor plays a more muted role 
in shaping e-waste import trade volumes. Notably, the factor is significant only in developing 
countries.23 
The study expects that when the political factor moderates on the relationship between 
the environment and e-waste import volume, the environmental factor will have a negative effect 
on volume.  It also expects that the environmental factor will have a larger effect on volume 
when the value of the political factor is high.  This hypothesis is realized in all the models.   
Consequently, the findings refute the race to the bottom theory that conjectures that state’s 
political structure, especially developing nations, create lax environmental regulations to legally 
increase toxic waste import volume.  It is also worth mentioning that the results are not 
significant in all models.  
 
 
                                               
23 P values for each factor per model are indicated in Tables 4.6, 4.11, and 4.16. 
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) ASSESSMENT  
Table 4.19 displays the expected and actual outer weights (loadings) of the indicators 
onto the factor.  Relative importance is determined by the value of the outer weight.  The higher 
the value the more important the variable.  Table 4.20 outlines the variables’ significance and 
importance.  An indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05 and is 
absolutely important if it’s outer weight p-value is non-significant, greater than .05, but its outer 
loading is above .50. 
GDP is expected to be important to the economic factor in all models.  The findings 
indicate that GDP is of medium relative importance in the combined and developing models. 
GDP is of high relative importance in developed countries.  Although, GDP is not significant in 
any model it is absolutely important when country types are evaluated independently.   
Contrary to expectation, GDP/capita loads negatively on the economic factor when 
country types are modeled separately.  Additionally, GDP/capita is not important to the 
economic factor in any of the models.  These results are surprising because a substantial 
amount of waste trade literature emphasize and utilize GDP/capita as one of the most important 
indicators in assessing the economy of a country.  Therefore, GDP/capita being irrelevant 
contradicts studies that suggest capital abundance plays a role in the economics of waste trade.   
Additionally, current literature focuses on GDP the primary indicator of economy size.  
Many studies neglect the importance of the percent of goods and services exported.  The 
results indicate that the percent of goods and services exported is a much more critical variable 
to the economy than literature suggests.  It is the most relevant factor and of absolute 
importance in both the combined and developing models.  It is worth mentioning that none of 
the economic variables are significant in any model.   
The freedom to trade variable is expected to load positively on the political factor.  
Freedom to trade is the most important variable in the combined and developing countries 
model.  However, it is not important in developed countries.  This is surprising because although 
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developed countries are likely to have a diverse and larger portfolio of exported goods and 
services one would expect the percent of goods and services to be of importance to the 
economic factor regardless of the amount of exportation. 
Polity, government type, is expected to load positively on the political factor in all 
models.  This expectation is realized in all models.  Additionally, polity is significant in all 
models.  However, interestingly, polity matters more in developed countries as compared to 
developing countries. 
As expected, corruption loads positively on the political factor in all the models.  
Interestingly, corruption is of the same level of importance in developed and developing 
countries.  In some ways this is unexpected because it is a widely accepted belief that less 
advanced countries political system is prone to more corruption as compared to developed 
countries; consequently, one would assume corruption would be more important to the political 
factor in developing countries.     
It is hypothesized that the environmental treaty indicator is important variable to the 
environmental factor.  It is the most relevant variable in the combined and developing countries 
models.  It is not as important in developed countries.  This is odd because it is reasonable to 
assume that advanced nations have more concern and focus on maintaining environmental 
integrity. 
Some literature suggests that the Basel Convention and Basel Ban Amendment are 
ineffective in managing waste trade.  Therefore, it is expected that the ratification of will be 
negative (of low importance) on the environmental factor in all the models.  The results indicate 
varied importance among the models.  The Basel Convention and Ban Amendment are 
important to developed countries.  In fact, they are not only of moderate relative importance to 
the factor they are also of absolute importance.  Additionally, the Ban Amendment is nearly as 
important in developing countries as it is in advanced nations.  However, the Basel Convention 
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is irrelevant to the environmental factor when the country types are combined and in developing 
countries. 
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Table 4.20 Variable Importance Comparison  
     Factor  Variable Combined  Developed  Developing  
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP    Absolutely Important  
Absolutely 
Important  
GDP /capita (US $)   Absolutely Important    
Export of Goods and Services  Absolutely Important    
Absolutely 
Important  
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  Significant Absolutely Important  Significant 
Corruption Significant  Significant 
Freedom to Trade Significant Significant  Significant 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties Significant  Significant 
Basel Convention  Significant Absolutely Important  Significant 
Basel Ban Amendment    Absolutely Important  Significant 
Significant: p-value < .05 
  Absolutely Important: p-value > .05 and outer loading weight is > .50 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRE- & POST BASEL SHIFT: FROM TRASH TO TREASURE  
 
Arguably the surplus of electronic goods and their valuable components exacerbated 
global electronic waste trade and created a profitable industry.  In 2008 the Basel Convention 
recognized the benefits of waste and altered its view on hazardous waste from it being a value 
less by-product to seeing it as a resource.1  The convention asserts, “the extraction of valuable 
secondary raw material from wastes can create green business opportunities and decent jobs 
for millions of often young people throughout the developing world, thus playing a part in 
eradicating poverty.”2  Some scholars contend that Basel’s shift on waste promotes nation-
states to alter their environmental and trade policies to increase waste import volume. 3  This 
analysis evaluates the economic, political and environmental factors impact on electronic waste 
import volume before and after Basel revised its view. 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Table 5.1 outlines the five primary hypotheses.  The hypotheses are based on current 
literature and prior empirical studies assessing factors that impact electronic waste import 
volume.4  Electronic waste trade is governed by both international and domestic regulations.  
However, following the domestic institutionalist theory, I posit that domestic factors have a 
greater impact on electronic waste import volume than international initiatives.  Therefore, Basel 
shifting its view on waste does not alter the effect size of factors that impact electronic waste 
import  
                                               
1 Basel Convention, "Our Sustainable Future: The Role of the Basel Convention," 3. 
 
2 Basel Convention,  3. 
 
3 Lucier and Gareau. 
 
4 Results from Chapter 4. 
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Hypotheses 1a-c identify the impact the economic factor has on electronic waste import 
volume.  Building on previous empirical results5, in all models, I expect the economic factor has 
a positive, medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume pre and post shift. 
Hypotheses 2a-c highlight the impact the political environment has on electronic waste 
import volume.  Prior studies indicate that the government does not have a strong relationshiop 
with e-waste volume.6  Therefore, the political factor is expected to have a positive small effect 
in the combined model pre and post the shift.  It is also hypothesized that the political factor has 
a small effect in developed countries pre and post the Basel shift.  However, volume is expected 
to decrease pre-shift and increase post shift.  I hypothesize that the political factor in developing 
countries has a positive, medium sized effect on e-waste volume pre-Basel shift and a positive, 
small effect post shift.    
Hypotheses 3a-c measure the impact of environmental policies on electronic waste 
import volume.  The purpose of environmental policies and initiatives is to protect humans, 
animals and the environment from harmful effects.  This study conjectures that despite Basel’s 
shift, these efforts are effective in managing electronic waste trade practices.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on e-waste import 
volume pre and post Basel shift in all the models.  
Hypotheses 4a-c identify the economic factor’s relationship with electronic waste import 
volume when the political factor intervenes in the relationship.  It is expected that the political 
economic factor increases import volume in both country types when the political factor 
moderates on the relationship between the economic factor and volume, in all models pre and 
post shift.  This is a reasonable assumption because developed countries’ regulatory structure 
can support e-waste importation because they possess the capital necessary to procure 
machinery to safely recycle and repurpose e-waste components.  Alternatively, developing 
                                               
5 Results from Chapter 4. 
 
6 Ibid.  
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countries’ regulations promote import volume because they lack sufficient capital and view 
importing e-waste as a source of revenue 
Hypotheses 5a-c assumes that environmental initiatives are effective in managing 
waste.  Additionally, it assumes that a nation’s political structure supports these endeavors.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that import volume decreases when the political factor moderates 
on the relationship between the environmental factor and e-waste volume, in all models pre and 
post shift.   
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PRE BASEL SHIFT  
The pre-Basel shift analysis, from 1996 to 2006, evaluates 372 country-years of 
developed and developing countries, 152 and 220 respectively.  Tables 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the 
variables’ descriptive statistics and correlation values before Basel shifted its view on waste.  
 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics - Pre Basel Shift  
     
Indicator Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Volume (tons) 5,204.89 44.35 0.00 115,352.79 12,710.96 
GDP (USD millions) 445,831.83 67,561.29 717.53 13,855,888.00 1,432,437.22 
GDP/capita 12,688.33 5,065.34 111.53 88,680.24 15,241.43 
% Exports 42.88 36.88 0.00 216.34 29.18 
Polity 4.05 8.00 -99.00 10.00 14.30 
Corruption  -4.50 4.00 -99.00 10.00 30.06 
Trade Freedom 66.93 73.00 -99.00 90.00 24.92 
Enviro Treaties 2.77 3.00 0.00 7.00 1.65 
Basel Entry 0.91 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 
Ban Amend 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 
Population (millions) 55.05 10.59 0.27 1,280.40 170.85 
Population Density 339.47 80.33 -99.00 21,595.35 1,767.01 
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COMBINED MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity  
Table 5.4 reports the variance inflation factor (VIF) values for all the indicators.  All 
values are between .20 and 5, hence collinearity is not an issue.7  
 
 
Table 5.4 Outer VIF - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.22 
BanAmend 1.04 
BaselEntry 1.03 
Corruption 1.13 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP 1.29 
GDP/Capita 1.34 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.01 
PopDens 1.00 
Population 1.00 
Trade Freedom 1.13 
Treaties 1.01 
 
 
Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
The outer weight value expresses a variable’s level of relative importance, or its relative 
contribution, to forming the factor.  The higher the value, the more important the indicator is to 
the factor.8  The significance of a variable, an indication of whether the variable significantly 
contributes to the its corresponding construct, is determined by the p-value of the outer weight.  
                                               
7 Hair, 143. 
 
8 Ibid., 146. 
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An indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05.  An indicator is absolutely 
important if it’s outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, but its outer loading is 
above .50.9   
Table 5.5 outlines the weight (importance) and significance of the indicators.  In the 
combined model, all the economic variables are statistically significant.  The gross domestic 
product is the most critical variable to the economic factor, .897.  GDP/capita is important, .679.  
The percent of exports of goods and services is the least important indicator to the economic 
factor, -.234. 
Polity, the extent to which a government is democratic, is the most important indicator to 
the political factor, outer weight .625.  The freedom to trade is of medium importance with an 
outer weight of .418.  Corruption is also of medium importance to the political factor, outer 
weight .470.  All political variables are statistically significant.   
The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is the most critical 
indicator to the environmental factor with an outer weight of .998.  Environmental treaties is the 
only significant variable to the environmental factor.  The Ban Amendment is of low importance 
with an outer weight of .095.  Ratification of the Basel Convention is essentially irrelevant, -.188.  
Neither the Basel Convention nor the Basel Ban Amendment are significant nor of absolute 
importance.  
  
                                               
9 Absolute importance is the information an indicator provides without considering the other indicators. Ibid., 148. 
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Table 5.5 Variable Results - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model  
     
Factor  Variable 
Outer 
Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
 p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  .670 (.897) 4.48 0.00 Yes  
GDP /capita (US $) .508 (.679) 2.82 0.00 Yes  
% Export Goods and Services  -.234 (-.232) 1.95 0.05 Yes  
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  .625 (.691) 11.25 0.00 Yes  
Corruption .470 (.655) 5.34 0.00 Yes  
Freedom to Trade .418 (.623) 3.50 0.00 Yes  
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties .998 (.981) 7.13 0.00 Yes  
Basel Convention  -.188 (-.120) 1.04 0.30 No 
Basel Ban Amendment  .095 (.009) 0.45 0.65 No 
 
     
      
      
 
STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues 
among the factors exist.  Table 5.6 reports the VIF values for all the factors.  All values are 
within .20 and 5, hence indicating that collinearity issues do not exist. 
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Table 5.6 Inner VIF - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model  
   VIF 
Economic 2.48 
Environmental  1.27 
Landlock 1.09 
Pol -> Econ 2.18 
Pol -> Enviro 1.84 
Political 1.59 
Pop Density  1.97 
Population 1.06 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients  
Table 5.7 outlines the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients 
(factors).  Estimated coefficients closer to +1 represent a strong positive relationship. 10  The 
economic factor has the largest effect on electronic waste import volume.    A one-unit change 
in the economic factor increases e-waste import volume .172 standard deviations, 2,186 tons11, 
when all the other factors are held constant.  The political factor has a small impact on volume.  
A one-unit change in the political factor increases import volume .115 standard deviations, 
1,462 tons.  The environmental factor yields a small decrease in e-waste import volume.  When 
the environmental factor changes by one-unit, volume decreases .122 standard deviations, 
1,551 tons. 
  
                                               
10 Ibid., 195. 
 
11 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
119 
Table 5.7 Structural Path Results - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model  
    
Paths Path Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  0.172 2.06 0.04 Yes 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  -0.019 0.19 0.85 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.115 2.29 0.02 Yes 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.018 0.44 0.66 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.122 3.38 0.00 Yes 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
The model evaluates the economic and environmental factors’ effect on electronic waste 
volume under the assumption that the political factor impacts the relationship between the 
factors and e-waste import volume.  Figure 5.1 demonstrates the effect size of the economic 
factor based on the value of the political factor.  The relationship between the economic factor 
and volume is relatively the same regardless of the value of the political factor (all slopes of the 
lines are similar).  This is an indication that the political structure does not impact the 
relationship between the economic factor and electronic waste import volume.  Notably, in all 3 
cases, import volume increases (upward slope of the lines) as the economic factor gets larger.  
This suggests that nations with varying political structures value importing electronic waste. 
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Fig. 5.1 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -   
Pre Shift Combined 
 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of the 
political factor.  Combining the country types does not produce significant differences between 
levels of political values.  When the value of the political factor is high, the relationship between 
the environment and import volume is slightly higher as compared to when the political value is 
lower.  In all 3 cases, as the environmental factor gets larger, import volume decreases.  This is 
an indication that regardless of a country’s openness to trade the political factor does not thwart 
the environmental factor’s purpose in decreasing electronic waste import volume.  However, it is 
important to note that merging the country types might disguise the political factor’s influence as 
evidenced by more fruitful effects when country types are modeled separately. 
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Fig. 5.2 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -   
Pre Shift Combined 
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
Economic, political and environmental factors explain roughly 10% of electronic waste 
importation volume when both developed and developing countries are evaluated in the same 
model. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size of the construct, f2, was tested to determine whether a construct has a 
substantive impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model. 12  f2 values less 
than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the 
dependent variable.  None of the factors will have a statistical effect on e-waste import volume if 
they are excluded. 
                                               
12 Hair, 201. 
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Table 5.8 f2 - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.01 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.01 
Pol -> Econ 0.00 
Pol -> Enviro 0.00 
Political 0.01 
Population Density  0.00 
Population 0.00 
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Fig. 5.3 Structural Equation Model –  Pre Basel Shift Combined Model  
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DEVELOPED MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity Issues 
Table 5.9 reports the VIF values for all the indicators.  All values are less than 5, hence 
collinearity is not an issue.  
 
 
Table 5.9 Outer VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.20 
BanAmend 1.04 
BaselEntry 1.10 
Corruption 1.52 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP 1.25 
GDP/Capita 1.13 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.01 
PopDens 1.00 
Population 1.00 
Trade Freedom 1.54 
Treaties 1.06 
 
 
Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 5.10 illustrates the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developed 
model.  Gross domestic product is the most important variable to the economic factor and is of 
absolute importance, .808.13  GDP/capita is of little importance, .059.  The percent of exports of 
goods and services is nearly irrelevant to the economic factor in developed countries, -.361.  
None of the economic variables are statistically significant.  
                                               
13 Outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, and its outer loading is above .50 
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Polity is the most important indicator to the political factor and is statistically significant, 
outer weight .946.  Corruption is of medium important to the political factor with outer weight, 
.366.  The freedom to trade is the least important variable to the political factor, -.087.  
Corruption and freedom to trade are not statistically significant nor of absolute importance.   
Ratification of the Basel Convention is the only significant variable and the most critical 
to the environmental factor.  The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is 
slightly important to the environmental factor, outer weight .296.  Although it is not a significant 
variable it is of absolute importance.  The Ban Amendment is the least important indicator 
importance with an outer weight of -.154.  
 
 
Table 5.10 Variable Results - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model  
     
Factor  Variable Outer Weights 
 (Outer Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
 p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  0.808 
(.943) 
1.89 0.06 No 
GDP /capita (US $) .059 
(.208) 
0.24 0.81 No 
% Export Goods and Services  -.361 
(-.623) 
1.10 0.27 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  .946 
(.947) 
2.96 0.00 Yes 
Corruption .366 
(.337) 
0.46 0.65 No 
Freedom to Trade -.087 
(.214) 
0.10 0.92 No 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties .296 
(.512) 
0.94 0.35 No 
Basel Convention  .901 
(.944) 
3.29 0.00 Yes 
Basel Ban Amendment  -.154 
(.014) 
0.41 0.68 No 
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The VIFs for the economic and population factors have values above 5, indicating that 
collinearity issues exist.  The collinearity issue is resolved when population is omitted from the 
model.14  However, it is not necessary to delete population because it is a control factor.  The 
economic factor is not eliminated because literature indicates that it is essential to the model.  
 
 
Table 5.11 Inner VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model  
   VIF 
Economic 11.18 
Environmental  3.67 
Landlock 1.35 
Pol -> Econ 2.97 
Pol -> Enviro 2.47 
Political 3.44 
Pop Density  2.36 
Population 13.03 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients  
The economic factor has a small to medium effect on volume.  When the economic 
factor changes by one unit, e-waste import volume increases .173 standard deviations, 2,088 
tons15, holding all other factors constant.  The political factor has a small effect on e-waste 
volume.  When the political factor changes one unit, volume increases .088 standard deviations, 
1,062 tons.  The environmental factor has the largest effect on electronic waste import volume.  
A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases volume .214 standard deviations, 
2,583 tons.  It is critical to note that none of the factors are significant.  
                                               
14 The VIF for the economic factor is 3.57 when the population factor is excluded from the model.  
 
15 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
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Table 5.12 Structural Path Results - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model  
    
Paths Path  Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  -0.173 0.64 0.52 No 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  -0.098 0.21 0.83 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.088 0.26 0.79 No 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.029 0.05 0.96 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.214 1.02 0.31 No 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
The model assumes that the political factor influences the relationship between the 
economic and environmental factors.  Figure 5.4 illustrates the effect size of the economic factor 
based on the value of the political factor.  The economic factor is stronger when the value of the 
political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above 
the mean).  In all three cases, as the economic factor gets larger, volume decreases.  This 
result suggests that the influence of the political factor decreases import volume despite the 
economic benefits of importing electronic waste. 
  
 
 
 
 
128 
 
Fig. 5.4 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -  Pre Shift Developed 
 
 
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is slightly 
stronger when the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard 
deviation above the mean).  Conversely, when the political value is low, the environmental 
factor has a weaker effect on electronic waste import volume.  In all three cases, electronic 
waste import volume decreases as the environmental factor gets larger.  This suggests that the 
political structure does not hinder environmental initiatives to reduce hazardous waste import 
volume.   
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Fig. 5.5 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -   
Pre Shift Developed 
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2 for the developed model is .114.16  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain roughly 11% of electronic waste importation volume in developed countries. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size, f2, of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive 
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.17  If landlock were deleted from 
the model it would have a small effect on volume.  None of the other factors will statistically 
affect the model if they were excluded waste volume if they were omitted.  
   
                                               
16 The R2 does not change when population is omitted from the model to correct collinearity issues.  
 
17 f2 values less than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the dependent variable.  
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Table 5.13 f2 - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.00 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.03 
Pol -> Econ 0.00 
Pol -> Enviro 0.00 
Political 0.00 
Population Density  0.01 
Population 0.00 
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Fig. 5.6 Structural Equation Model - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model 
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DEVELOPING MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity  
The VIFs for the path coefficients are between .20 and 5, indicating that no collinearity 
issues exist.  
 
 
Table 5.14 Outer VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.15 
BanAmend 1.02 
BaselEntry 1.02 
Corruption 1.05 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP 1.07 
GDP/Capita 1.10 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.01 
PopDens 1.00 
Population 1.00 
Trade Freedom 1.04 
Treaties 1.01 
 
 
Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 5.15 outlines the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developing 
model.   The gross domestic product is the most critical variable to the economic factor relevant, 
outer weight 1.00.  GDP/capita is of little importance, .06.  Both GDP and GDP/capita are 
statistically significant.  The percent of exports of goods and services is also relatively 
unimportant to the economic factor, .048.   
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All variables on the political factor are significant.  Polity, the extent to which a 
government is democratic, is the most important indicator, .631.  Corruption and freedom to 
trade are moderately important, outer weight .453 and .495.   
The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is the most critical 
indicator to the environmental factor with an outer weight of .822, and is the only significant 
variable.  The Ban Amendment is of medium importance with an outer weight of .449 and is of 
absolute importance.18  Ratification of the Basel Convention is the least important indicator, -
.407. 
 
 
Table 5.15 Variable Results - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model  
     
Factor  Variable 
Outer Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
 p value < 
.05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  1.00 
(.996) 
4.48 0.00 Yes 
GDP /capita (US $) .069 
(.157) 
2.82 0.00 Yes 
% Export Goods and 
Services  
.048 
(-.145) 
1.95 0.05 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  .631 
(.681) 
11.25 0.00 Yes 
Corruption .453 
(.617) 
5.34 0.00 Yes 
Freedom to Trade .495 
(.588) 
3.50 0.00 Yes 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties .822 
(.822) 
7.13 0.00 Yes 
Basel Convention  -.407 
(-.300) 
1.04 0.30 No 
Basel Ban Amendment  .449 
(.450) 
0.45 0.65 No 
  
                                               
18  Outer loading rounds to .50. 
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The inner VIFs were assessed to determine if collinearity exists among the factors.   
None of the factor exhibit collinearity issues.19 
 
 
Table 5.16 Inner VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model  
   VIF 
Economic 2.80 
Environmental  1.14 
Landlock 1.22 
Pol -> Econ 1.77 
Pol -> Enviro 1.12 
Political 1.37 
Pop Density  1.14 
Population 3.76 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients  
Table 5.17 reports the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients.  The 
economic factor has a large significant effect on e-waste volume.  When the economic factor 
changes by one unit, e-waste import volume increases .559 standard deviations, 7,140 tons20, 
holding all other factors constant.  The political factor has a significant small to medium sized 
effect on volume.  A one-unit change in the political factor increases e-waste import volume .185 
standard deviations, 2,363 tons.  Alternatively, the environmental factor has a small negative 
effect on volume.  A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases volume .10 
standard deviations, 1,277 tons.  Although the effect is small, the environmental factor is 
significant. 
                                               
19 No collinearity issues exist if VIF value is between .20 and 5.  
 
20 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
 
 
 
 
135 
Table 5.17 Structural Path Results - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model  
    
Paths Path  Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  0.559 2.64 0.01 Yes 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  0.472 2.74 0.01 Yes 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.185 2.15 0.03 Yes 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.056 1.62 0.11 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.100 2.61 0.01 Yes 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor on electronic waste 
import volume based on the value of the political factor.  Import volume increases in all 3 cases 
as the economic factor gets stronger.  However, the relationship between the economic factor 
and volume is stronger when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the 
political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).  Alternatively, the economic factor has a 
weaker effect when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 
standard deviation below the mean).  These effects suggest that countries that are more 
democratic and more open to trade take advantage of its neoliberal/free market structure and 
import e-waste. 
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Fig. 5.7 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -  Pre Shift Developing 
 
 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor on e-waste import 
volume based on the value of the political factor.  The environmental factor has a stronger 
relationship when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political 
value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).  Alternatively, the environmental factor has 
relatively no effect on import volume when the political value is low (no slope when the political 
value is 1 standard deviation below the mean).  Accordingly, when the political value is low, as 
the environmental factor gets larger, volume does not increase nor decrease.  Alternatively, 
when the political value is high, waste import volume decreases.  Hence, it is likely that these 
countries are more democratic, want to participate in the global economy and consequently 
adhere to international environmental agreements.   
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Fig. 5.8 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -   
Pre Shift Developing 
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2  for the developing model is .38.  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain approximately 38% of electronic waste importation volume in developing countries. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size, f2, of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive 
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.21  Excluding the economic and 
political economic factors from the model would have a medium effect on e-waste import 
volume.  Omitting the political factor would have a small effect on volume.  Precluding the 
political factor would have a small to medium effect on volume.  Deleting all other variables from 
the model would not impact e-waste volume. 
  
                                               
21 f2 values less than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the dependent variable.  
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Table 5.18 f2 - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.18 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.00 
Pol -> Econ 0.13 
Pol -> Enviro 0.01 
Political 0.04 
Population Density  0.00 
Population 0.01 
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Fig. 5.9 Structural Equation Model - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model 
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PRE BASEL SHIFT FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT 
The pre Basel shift analysis indicates that economic, political and environmental factors 
better explain electronic waste import volume in developing countries, (38%) as compared to 
developed countries (11%) and combined country types (10%). 
Table 5.19 outlines the hypotheses with expected and actual effect sizes and the 
significance of each factor for the models.  The results indicate that the primary driver of e-
waste varies between country types.  The economic factor is the primary influencer to e-waste 
volume in developing countries and when country types are evaluated together.  Therefore, the 
economic nationalist theory best explains waste importation in these models.  Alternatively, e-
waste volume in developed countries is driven by the environmental factor.  Consequently, the 
neoliberal international institutionalism best explains waste importation practices in developed 
countries.  Notably, none of the factors are significant in the developed model.  Conversely, 
nearly of all the factors have a significant effect on e-waste volume in developing countries.22 
The economic factor is expected to moderately increase e-waste import volume in both 
the developed and developing model.  This is true in developed countries.  However, the 
economic factor has a large effect on e-waste import volume in developing countries.  This 
suggests that the economic factor is a key driver to e-waste importation in developing countries 
and not as powerful in developed countries.  This also illustrates that the economic nationalist 
theory’s assertion that trade practices are determined by economic variables, is more so 
applicable to developing countries as compared to developed nations. 
The environmental factor is hypothesized to have a small, negative effect in developed 
and developing countries.  This is realized in the developing model.  Alternatively, the 
environmental factor has a larger effect in the combined and developed models than what is 
                                               
22 P values for each factor per model are indicated in Tables 5.7, 5.12 and 5.17.  
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hypothesized.  More so, in all models the environmental factor reduces hazardous waste import 
volume.  Hence, the results provide support for the liberal institutionalist theory, the notion that 
international environmental agreements are effective in managing global hazardous waste 
concerns. 
The political factor is expected to have a small negative effect on e-waste volume in 
developed countries and a medium positive effect in developing countries.  Surprisingly, the 
political factor has a small effect in developed countries and a medium sized effect in 
developing countries.  The political factor is not the primary driver of electronic waste import 
volume in neither developed nor developing countries.  These results demonstrate that the 
institutional approach, the assertion that the political factor is the most influential factor to waste 
trade, is not true in any of the models.  However, the direction and size of the effect are 
compelling.  The political factor increases e-waste import volume in both developed and 
developing countries.  This suggests that nations import waste regardless of the political 
structure.  Therefore, the notion that developed states regulatory structure is stricter than 
developing countries which leads to reduced waste import volume is not supported. 
In all the models, it is hypothesized that volume decreases when the political factor 
moderates on the relationship between the environmental factor and volume.  It is also expected 
that the environmental factor will have a stronger effect on volume when the political factor is 
larger.  This holds true in all models.  This effect in developing countries rebuts proponents of 
the race to the bottom theory who conjecture that the government in developing countries lax 
environmental regulations to import more electronic waste.  When the political factor moderates 
on the relationship between the economic factor and e-waste volume, it is expected that the 
economic factor will have a positive and stronger effect on volume when the political factor is 
lower, in all model types.  The hypothesis is rejected in the developed model.  The economic 
factor has a stronger relationship with e-waste import volume when the political values are high.  
Additionally, volume decreases as the economic factor gets larger.  The hypothesis is partially 
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accepted in the combined and developing model.  In the combined model that political factor 
does not impact the relationship between the economic factor and volume.  However, 
regardless of the political value import volume increases as the economic factor gets larger.  
Alternatively, in the developing model, the economic factor has a stronger effect when the 
political factor is low.  Nonetheless, volume increases as the economic factor gets larger at all 
political levels.  Furthermore, the political economy effect size is small in developed countries 
and is nearly large in developing countries.  These results suggest that developing countries e-
waste trade practices are guided by economic and regulatory policies.  Therefore, the new 
endogenous growth theory is more applicable to developing nations. 
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) Assessment  
Table 5.20 displays the expected and actual outer weights (loadings) of the indicators 
onto the factor.  Table 5.21 outlines the variables’ significance and importance.  Relative 
importance is determined by the value of the outer weight.  Then higher the value, the more 
important the indicator.  An indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05 and 
is important if it’s outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, but its outer loading is 
above .50.   Most variables load positively on the factor as is expected. 
In all the models, as expected, GDP is the most relevant indicator to the economic 
construct.  It is significant in the combined model and developing countries and of absolute 
importance in developed countries.  GDP/capita is moderately important to the economic factor 
in the combined model.  Oddly, it is of very little concern in both the developed and developing 
countries.  The relative importance (the outer weight), is low.  Additionally, it is neither significant 
nor of absolute importance in either country type models.  This result is unexpected in that 
literature suggests that capital abundance plays a critical role in the economy and contributes to 
a country’s decision to import hazardous waste.  
Contrary to expectation, the percent of export of goods and services loads negatively on 
the economic factor in the combined and developed model.  This suggests that the amount of 
goods and services is not relatively important to the economy.  This is surprising because it is 
reasonable to assume that the size and health of the economy, especially in developed nations, 
is somewhat predicated on the extent of goods and services exported. 
Polity is the most relevant indicator to the political structure in all models.  It is 
moderately important in the combined model and in developing countries.  Polity is highly 
important in developed countries.  This is somewhat surprising because, considering developing 
nations have a larger range of political structures, one would expect the extent of polity would 
matter more in developing countries as compared to developed nations. 
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Although corruption is relatively low in advanced nations, it is still expected to be of 
concern to the political structure.  Additionally, corruption is expected to be moderately 
important in developing countries as well.  Notably, the indicator is significant in the combined 
and developing models. 
Freedom to trade is the most critical variable to the political construct in the combined 
and developing models.  Consequently, it is significant in these models.  Freedom to trade is of 
low relative importance in developed countries.  This is surprising because it is reasonable to 
assume that regulations that promote freedom to trade is critical to all types of political 
structures. 
Environmental treaties are expected to be load positively on the environmental factor in 
all models.  This hold true in all cases.  Environmental treaties are the most important indicator 
in the combined and developing models and has a high relative value.23  Alternatively, 
environmental treaties are not as important in developed countries.  However, they are of 
absolute importance. 
The Basel Convention was created to manage global hazardous waste trade.  
Therefore, it is expected that it is important to the environmental factor in all models.  The 
convention is relatively unimportant in the combined and developing models.  This is sensible 
because literature suggests that countries are likely to disregard the treaty.  Alternatively, the 
Basel Convention is important in developed countries.  Despite the differing relative importance, 
the Basel Convention is significant in both developed and developing models. 
The Basel Ban Amendment prohibits developed countries from exporting hazardous 
waste to developing countries.  Therefore, it is expected that the indicator will be important to 
the environmental factor in all models.  Surprisingly, the amendment is of little relative 
importance in the combined model.  It is essentially unimportant in developed nations.  
                                               
23 An indicator can be the most important to a factor because it has the highest outer weight out of all the indicators but it can be of 
low relative importance because the value of the outer weight is low.  
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However, it is moderately important and of absolute importance to the environmental factor in 
developing countries.   
Although the importance of the environmental indicators varies between models, these 
results support liberal international institutionalist theory that conjecture international 
environmental agreements are relevant to managing the effects of global waste trade on the 
environment. 
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Table 5.21 Assessment of Variable Significance and Importance - Pre Basel Shift  
     Factor  Variable Combined  Developed  Developing  
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  Significant  Absolutely Important  Significant  
GDP /capita (US $) Significant   Significant  
Export of Goods and Services  Significant      
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  Significant  Significant  Significant  
Corruption Significant   Significant  
Freedom to Trade Significant    Significant  
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties Significant  Absolutely Important  Significant  
Basel Convention    Significant    
Basel Ban Amendment      Absolutely Important  
Significant: p-value < .05 
  Absolutely Important: p-value > .05 and outer loading weight is > .50 
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POST BASEL SHIFT  
The post-Basel shift analysis, from 2008 to 2014, assesses 388 country-years 
developed and developing states, 134 and 251 respectively.  In the early 2000s as globalization 
expanded, additional variables became important to the political economy.  Innovation, tax rates 
and environmental protection became critically important to a nation’s economic growth and 
trade practices.  Therefore, the post Basel shift takes these variables into account.  Tables 5.22 
and 5.23 outline the descriptive statistics and correlation values. 
 
 
Table 5.22 Descriptive Statistics - Post Basel Shift 
     
Indicator Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Volume (tons) 11,770.81 89.20 0.00 566,820.61 48,446.95 
GDP (USD millions) 575,545.69 98,266.31 349.46 17,393,103.00 1,769,167.69 
GDP/capita 18,856.71 12,556.32 12,556.32 12,556.32 12,556.32 
% Exports 58.78 39.34 0.00 3,264.50 177.75 
Tax Rate  38.06 39.30 -99.00 117.40 23.19 
Polity 1.41 8.00 -99.00 10.00 20.07 
Corruption  3.81 4.30 -99.00 9.30 10.74 
Trade Freedom 76.38 82.00 -99.00 95.00 22.55 
Innovation  -0.62 3.69 -99.00 5.80 21.16 
Enviro Treaties 3.30 3.00 0.00 9.00 1.81 
Basel Entry 0.94 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 
Ban Amend 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Environmental Protection  55.64 62.90 -99.00 95.50 36.13 
Population (millions) 45.98 11.13 0.09 1,295.29 135.63 
Population Density 329.01 82.42 2.66 18,000.88 1,508.72 
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COMBINED MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity  
Table 5.24 reports the VIF values for all the indicators.  All values are between .20 and 
5, hence collinearity is not an issue.  
 
 
Table 5.24 Outer VIF - Post Basel Shift Combined Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.00 
BanAmend 1.08 
BaselEntry 1.03 
Corruption 1.19 
EPI 1.09 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP 1.11 
GDP/Capita 1.09 
Innovation 1.42 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.10 
PopDens 1.00 
Population 1.00 
Tax Rate 1.02 
Trade Freedom 1.31 
Treaties 1.04 
 
 
Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 5.25 outlines the weight (importance) and significance of the indicators.  The 
percent of exports of goods and services is most critical variable to the economic factor, outer 
weight .931.  GDP is moderately important, .340.  Tax rate is slightly important to the economic 
factor, .132. GDP/capita is of least importance, .015.  Percent of export of goods and services is 
 
 
 
 
152 
the only significant variable.  Notably none of the other variables are significant nor of absolute 
importance.24   
Polity and innovation are significant to the political factor.  Polity is the most essential 
variable, .800.  Innovation and corruption on slightly important, .289 and .212 respectively.  
Freedom to trade is the least important indicator with outer weight value .068.  However, it is of 
absolute importance. 
The number of treaties, ratification of the Ban Amendment and the environmental 
protection score are significant to the environmental factor.  The number of treaties is the most 
critical variable, .761.  The Ban Amendment is moderately important, .605.  EPI and ratification 
of the Basel Entry are not critical to the environmental factor, -.345 and -.219 respectively. 
  
                                               
24 An indicator is absolutely important if it’s outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, but its outer loading is above .50. 
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Table 5.25 Variable Results - Post Basel Shift Combined Model  
      
 
Facto
r  Variable 
Outer Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  
p 
Value  
Significance 
p value < 
.05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  GDP  
.340 
(.343) 1.35 0.18 No 
GDP /capita (US $) .015 (.144) 0.10 0.92 No 
% Export Goods and 
Services  
.931 
(.923) 2.00 0.05 Yes 
Tax Rate  .132 (.167) 1.13 0.26 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 Polity  
.800 
(.897) 12.92 0.00 Yes 
Corruption .212 (.365) 1.73 0.08 No 
Freedom to Trade .068 (.454) 0.28 0.78 No 
Innovation  .289 (.601) 2.15 0.03 Yes 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 Environmental Treaties .761 
(.773) 
3.09 0.00 Yes 
Basel Convention  -.219 
(-.123) 
1.86 0.06 No 
Basel Ban Amendment  .605 
(.434) 
2.91 0.00 Yes 
Environmental Protection -.345 
(-.353) 
2.00 0.05 Yes 
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues exist.  
Table 5.26 reports the VIF values for all the factors.  All values are between .20 and 5, hence 
collinearity is not an issue.  
 
 
Table 5.26 Inner VIF - Post Basel Shift Combined Model  
   VIF 
Economic 1.99 
Environmental  1.04 
Landlock 1.03 
Pol -> Econ 2.27 
Pol -> Enviro 1.19 
Political 1.67 
Pop Density  1.05 
Population 1.05 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients  
Table 5.27 reports the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients.25  
The economic factor has a medium significant effect on e-waste volume.  A one-unit change in 
the economic factor increases import volume .371 standard deviations, 17,974 tons.26  The 
political factor has little effect on volume and is insignificant.  When the political factor changes  
one unit, volume increases .094 standard deviations, 4,554 tons.  The environmental factor has 
a small significant effect on volume.  A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases 
import volume .108 standard deviations, 5,232 tons 
 
                                               
25 Estimated coefficients closer to +1 represent strong positive relationship. 
 
26 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
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Table 5.27 Structural Path Results - Post Basel Shift Combined Model  
    
Paths Path Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  0.371 2.03 0.04 Yes 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  0.127 1.06 0.29 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.094 3.64 0.00 Yes 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.045 1.90 0.06 No  
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.108 2.19 0.03 Yes  
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
The model assumes the environmental and economic factors’ effect on volume is 
influenced by the political factor.  This model tests this interaction.  Figure 5.10 demonstrates 
the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of the political factor.  The relationship 
between the economic factor and volume is stronger when the value of the political factor is 
higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).  
Alternatively, the economic factor has a weaker effect when the political factor is low (a less 
steep slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation below the mean).  In all cases, as 
the economic factor gets larger, import volume increases.  This is an indication that regardless 
of the political structure, nations take advantage of the global economy of electronic waste 
trade. 
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Fig. 5.10 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Post Shift Combined   
 
 
Figure 5.11 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is stronger 
when the value of the political factor is higher. (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 
standard deviation above the mean).  Alternatively, the environmental factor has a weaker effect 
when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard 
deviation below the mean).  In all 3 cases, as the environmental factor gets higher, import 
volume decreases.  This is an indication that the political structure does not thwart the efficacy 
of environmental initiatives. 
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Fig. 5.11 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -   
Post Shift Combined   
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2 for the combined model is .211.  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain approximately 21% of electronic waste importation volume when both developed and 
developing countries are evaluated in the same model. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size of the construct was tested to determine whether a construct has a 
substantive impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.27  The economic 
factor has a medium effect on volume if it was excluded from the model.  All other factors have 
virtually no effect.28 
  
                                               
27 Hair, 201. 
 
28 Guidelines for f2 values:  <.02 = no effect, ~.02 = small, ~.15 = medium effect, ~.35 = large effect  
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Table 5.28 f2 - Post Basel Shift Combined Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.09 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.00 
Pol -> Econ 0.00 
Pol -> Enviro 0.00 
Political 0.01 
Pop Density  0.00 
Population 0.00 
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Fig. 5.12 Structural Equation Model –  Post Basel Shift Combined Model  
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DEVELOPED MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity Issues 
Table 5.29 reports the VIF values for all the indicators.  All values are between .20 and 
5, hence collinearity is not an issue.  
 
 
Table 5.29 Outer VIF - Post Basel Shift Developed Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.38 
BanAmend 1.18 
BaselEntry 1.19 
Corruption 1.52 
EPI 1.10 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP 1.16 
GDP/Capita 1.04 
Innovation 1.52 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.04 
PopDens 1.00 
Population 1.00 
Tax Rate 1.22 
Trade Freedom 1.03 
Treaties 1.11 
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Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 5.30 illustrates the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developed 
model.  None of the economic variables are significant.  However, GDP/capita and the percent 
of exports are of absolute importance to the economic factor.  GDP/capita is the most relevant 
variable, .705 followed by the percent of exports, .309.  The tax rate is not important to the 
economic factor, -.005.  Additionally, GDP has very little importance to the economic factor, -
.570. 
Innovation is the most critical variable, .994.  Polity is slightly important to the political 
factor, .154.  Freedom to trade and corruption are not important, -.217 and -.951.  None of the 
political variables are significant.  Furthermore, only innovation is of absolute importance. 
The Basel Ban Amendment and the environmental protection score are significant to the 
environmental factor.  The Ban Amendment is the most critical indicator to the environmental 
factor, 1.02.  The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is moderately 
important to the environmental factor, .239.  EPI, is not important to the environmental factor, -
.051.  Ratification of the Basel Convention is the least relevant variable, -.181. 
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Table 5.30 Variable Results - Post Basel Shift Developed Model  
     
Factor  Variable Outer Weights 
 (Outer Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  
GDP  -.570 
(-.597) 
1.09 0.28 No 
GDP /capita (US $) .705 
(.678) 
1.41 0.16 No 
% Export Goods and Services  .309 
(.585) 
1.18 0.24 No 
Tax Rate  .005 
(-.240) 
0.02 0.99 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 
Polity  .154 
(-.327) 
0.97 0.33 No 
Corruption -.951 
(-.430) 
1.22 0.22 No 
Freedom to Trade -.217 
(.309) 
0.48 0.63 No 
Innovation  -.994 
(.476) 
1.19 0.23 No 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 
Environmental Treaties .239 
(.244) 
1.00 0.32 No 
Basel Convention  -.181 
(.197) 
0.61 0.54 No 
Basel Ban Amendment  1.02 
(.964) 
2.90 0.00 Yes  
Environmental Protection -.051 
(.157) 
0.15 0.88 Yes  
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The VIFs for the path coefficients are between .20 and 5, indicating that no collinearity 
issues among the factors.  
 
 
Table 5.31 Inner VIF - Post Basel Shift Developed Model  
   VIF 
Economic 2.62 
Environmental  1.14 
Landlock 1.33 
Pol -> Econ 2.40 
Pol -> Enviro 1.71 
Political 2.67 
Pop Density  1.23 
Population 3.53 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients  
The effect of the factors is outlined in Table 5.32.  Notably, none of the direct effects are 
significant.  The economic factor has the smallest effect on electronic waste import volume.   
When the economic factor changes by one unit, e-waste volume decreases .017 standard 
deviations, 830 tons29, holding all other factors constant.  The environmental factor and political 
factor have near a medium sized effect on import volume.  A one- unit change in the 
environmental factor decreases e-waste importation by .288 standard deviations, 14,070 tons, 
when all other factors are held constant.  When the political factor changes by one unit, e-waste 
volume decreases .232 standard deviations, 11,334 tons, when all other factors are held 
constant. 
 
                                               
29 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
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Table 5.32 Structural Path Results - Post Basel Shift Developed Model  
    
Paths Path Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  -0.017 0.13 0.89 No 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  -0.028 0.19 0.85 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.255 0.90 0.37 No 
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.232 0.80 0.43 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.288 1.81 0.07 No 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
Figure 5.13 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The relationship between the economic factor and volume is nearly the 
same when the value of the political factor is high and low (slope is the same when the political 
value is 1 standard deviation above and below the mean).  This is an indication that the political 
factor does not influence the relationship between the economy and import volume. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
165 
 
 
Fig. 5.13 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -  Post Shift Developed 
 
 
Figure 5.14 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is stronger 
when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 
standard deviation above the mean).  Alternatively, the environmental factor has a weaker effect 
when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard 
deviation below the mean).  At every political value, as the environmental factor gets larger, 
electronic waste import volume decreases.  This suggests that all political structures support 
environmental initiatives that seek reduce the negative consequences from importing hazardous 
electronic waste. 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
Fig. 5.14 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -  Post Shift Developed 
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2 for the developed model is .242.  Economic, political and environmental factors 
explain 24% of electronic waste importation volume in developed countries. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive 
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.30  The environmental factor will 
have a nearly a medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume if it is excluded from the 
model.  The political and political environmental factors will have a small effect on electronic 
waste import volume if they are omitted from the analysis.  All other factors will have no effect 
on volume if they are absent from the model. 
 
                                               
30 Guidelines for f2 values:  <.02 = no effect, ~.02 = small, ~.15 = medium effect, ~.35 = large effect  
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Table 5.33 f2 - Post Basel Shift Developed Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.00 
Environmental  0.10 
Landlock 0.01 
Pol -> Econ 0.00 
Pol -> Enviro 0.06 
Political 0.03 
Pop Density  0.01 
Population 0.00 
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Fig. 5.15 Structural Equation Model - Post Basel Shift Developed Model 
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DEVELOPING MODEL  
 
MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT   
Collinearity  
The VIFs for the path coefficients are between .20 and 5, indicating that there are no 
collinearity issues among the indicators.  
 
 
Table 5.34 Outer VIF - Post Basel Shift Developing Model  
   VIF 
% Exports 1.02 
BanAmend 1.03 
BaselEntry 1.01 
Corruption 1.17 
EPI 1.03 
Economic * Political 1.00 
Environmental  * Political 1.00 
GDP 1.09 
GDP/Capita 1.06 
Innovation 1.48 
Landlock 1.00 
Polity 1.24 
PopDens 1.00 
Population 1.00 
Tax Rate 1.09 
Trade Freedom 1.40 
Treaties 1.01 
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Significance and Relevance of the Indicators  
Table 5.35 outlines the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developing 
model.  The percent of goods and services exported is the only significant variable and is the 
most critical variable to the economic factor, .838.  GDP is moderately important, .448 and is of 
absolute importance.  Tax rate is essentially irrelevant, -.001.  GDP/capita is also not important 
to the economic factor, -.037.  
All of the political indicators are significant to the factor.  Polity is the most relevant 
variable, .734.  Freedom to trade is moderately important, .310.  Innovation is of absolute 
importance to the political factor.31  Corruption is the least critical variable to the political factor, 
.066. 
Environmental treaties and ratifying the Basel Ban Amendment are significant indicators 
to the environmental factor.  The number of treaties a country participates in the most important 
variable, .721.  The Ban Amendment is of moderate importance, .598. Although participating in 
the Basel Convention is significant it is not important to the environmental factor, -.218.  
Additionally, the environmental protection score is of little contribution to the environmental 
factor, -.255.  
  
                                               
31 The variable is not significant but its outer loading is above .50 which makes it of absolute importance.  
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Table 5.35 Variable Results - Post Basel Shift Developing Model  
     
Factor  Variable 
Outer Weights 
 (Outer 
Loadings) t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  
GDP  .448 
(.558) 
1.32 0.19 No 
GDP /capita (US $) -.037 
(.050) 
0.76 0.44 No 
% Export Goods and 
Services  
.838 
(.897) 
1.94 0.05 Yes 
Tax Rate  .001 
(.130) 
0.03 0.97 No 
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 
Polity  .734 
(.519) 
4.94 0.00 Yes 
Corruption .066 
(.223) 
0.42 0.68 No 
Freedom to Trade .310 
(.684) 
0.89 0.37 No 
Innovation  .174 
(.598) 
0.90 0.37 No 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 Environmental Treaties 
.721 
(.768) 
4.33 0.00 Yes 
Basel Convention  -.218 
(-.211) 
2.09 0.04 Yes 
Basel Ban Amendment  .598 
(.569) 
3.46 0.00 Yes 
Environmental Protection -.255 
(-.238) 
1.09 0.27 No 
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses) 
Collinearity  
The inner VIFs were assessed to determine if collinearity exists.  Collinearity issues are 
present in the economic and political economic factor.  This issue is resolved when the political 
economic factor is omitted from the model.32 
 
 
Table 5.36 Inner VIF - Post Basel Shift Developing Model  
   VIF 
Economic 7.05 
Environmental  1.05 
Landlock 1.07 
Pol -> Econ 8.66 
Pol -> Enviro 1.20 
Political 3.78 
Pop Density  1.04 
Population 1.16 
 
 
Assessment of path coefficients  
Notably none of the factors are significant.  The economic and environmental factors 
have a small effect.  When the economic factor changes by one unit, e-waste volume increases 
.105 standard deviations, 4,992 tons33, holding all other factors constant.  A one- unit change in 
the environmental factor decreases volume .095 standard deviations, 4,517 tons.  The political 
factor has a medium size effect on e-waste import volume.  When the political factor changes by 
one unit, e-waste volume increases .372 standard deviations, 17,688 tons. 
  
                                               
32 Inner VIF for economic factor becomes 1.05. 
 
33 Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model.  Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient. 
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Table 5.37 Structural Path Results - Post Basel Shift Developing Model  
    
Paths Path  Coefficients  t Value  p Value  
Significance 
p value < .05 
Economic --> Import Volume  0.105 0.30 0.76 No 
          
Political Economy --> Import Volume  1.343 1.69 0.09 No 
          
Political --> Import Volume  0.372 1.15 0.25 No  
          
Political Environment --> Import Volume -0.070 1.49 0.14 No 
          
Environment --> Import Volume  -0.095 1.79 0.07 No 
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50    positive = (+)     negative = (-)  
 
 
Figure 5.16 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The relationship between the economic factor and volume is equally strong 
when the value of the political factor is high and low (a steep slope when the political value is 1 
standard deviation above and below the mean).  This is an indication that the economic factor’s 
effect on volume is strong in both more democratic developing countries as well as in 
authoritarian developing nations.  However, the extent of e-waste import volume varies based 
on the political value.  Volume decreases as the economic factor gets larger countries with 
lower political values.  This is likely because these countries have less freedom to trade and 
innovation which limit their competitiveness in the global market.  Conversely, nations with a 
higher political value (more democratic, more openness to trade and regulations that promote 
innovation) take advantage of the global economy. 
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Fig. 5.16 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -  Post Shift Developing  
 
 
Figure 5.17 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of 
the political factor.  The environmental factor has a strong relationship with import volume when 
the political value is high (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above 
the mean).  Furthermore, volume decreases, as the environmental factor gets larger.  Hence, 
this is an indication that although these countries are likely to have more variables that promote 
an increase e-waste importation (more openness to trade, higher investment in technology and 
innovation) they do not do so.  This result indicates that environmental initiatives are not 
outweighed by political variables.  Conversely, the environmental factor has no effect on volume 
among countries with a low political value (no slope). 
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Fig. 5.17 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor -  Post Shift Developing  
 
 
Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 
The R2   for the developing model is .394.  Approximately 39% of electronic waste 
importation volume in developing countries can be explained by economic, political and 
environmental factors. 
 
Effect size of f2 
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive 
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.34  Excluding the political 
economic and political factors from the model will have a small to medium impact on e-waste 
import volume, all other factors will have no effect on electronic waste import volume if they are 
absent from the model. 
  
                                               
34 Guidelines for f2 values:  <.02 = no effect, ~.02 = small, ~.15 = medium effect, ~.35 = large effect 
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Table 5.38 f2 - Post Basel Shift Developing Model  
   Import Volume 
Economic 0.00 
Environmental  0.01 
Landlock 0.00 
Pol -> Econ 0.07 
Pol -> Enviro 0.01 
Political 0.06 
Pop Density  0.00 
Population 0.01 
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Fig. 5.18 Structural Equation Model - Post Basel Shift Developing Model 
  
 
 
 
 
178 
POST BASEL SHIFT FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT 
The results of the study indicate that economic, political and environmental factors better 
explain electronic waste import volume practices when country types are modeled 
independently, 24% in developed and approximately 39% in developing countries, versus 21% 
when country types are modeled jointly. 
Table 5.39 outlines the factors’ significance and expected/actual effect sizes within each 
model. The findings indicate that developed and developing countries import volume are driven 
by different factors.  E-waste import volume in developed countries is almost equally influenced 
by the political and environmental factors.  Therefore, environmental political theory best 
explains effects on waste importation practices in developed countries.  Conversely, the political 
economic factor is the most impactful factor in developing countries.  Accordingly, the new 
endogenous growth theory explains waste trade in developing countries. 
The economic factor is expected to have a medium positive effect on volume in all 
models.  This hypothesis is realized in the combined model.  Additionally, in the combined 
model, the economic factor has the largest impact on e-waste volume.  However, when country 
types are evaluated individually the economic factor has a small, negative effect on volume in 
developed countries and a small positive effect on volume in developing nations.  Consequently, 
this study demonstrates that the economic nationalist perspective, the belief that the state of a 
nation’s economy, is most applicable when country types are modeled together. Also, the small 
effect size of the economic factor in the individual country models illustrate that the economic 
factor is not as important as literature surmises.  This finding is especially important to 
proponents of the North to South Theory and Pollution/Waste Haven hypotheses who 
conjecture that less developed countries are mainly motivated to import waste because of 
economic reasons. 
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It is hypothesized that the political factor will have a small positive effect on import 
volume in all models.  When the country types are modeled together, the political factor slightly 
increases volume.  However, when developed and developing countries are assessed 
individually the political factor has a medium sized effect on import volume.  Although the 
political factor is not the primary driver of waste in either country types, its effect size is larger 
than hypothesized.  This gives some support to the domestic institutionalist position that the 
political and regulatory structure of a nation is an important factor to hazardous waste import 
volume. 
This analysis assumes that environmental initiatives are effective in reducing hazardous 
e-waste import volume.  Therefore, the environmental factor is expected to have a small 
negative effect on e-waste import volume in all models.  The results indicate that this is true. 
The environmental factor slightly decreases e-waste import volume in all the models. This 
outcome provides evidence that international environmental agreements are effective in 
reducing e-waste import volume.  The results are particularly important for developing nations 
because literature suggests that developing nations are more likely to suffer from environmental 
hazards.  It is worth mentioning that the environmental factor is significant only when country 
types are modeled jointly. 
It is expected that volume will increase when the political factor moderates on the 
relationship between the economic factor and volume.  The hypothesis is partially realized when 
country types are modeled together.  Volume increases as the economic factor gets larger.  
However, the hypothesis is rejected in both developed and developing nations.  Interestingly, in 
developed countries, the political economic factor’s effect size is inconsequential (has virtually 
no effect) and is not significant on e-waste import volume.  Additionally, volume remains 
relatively flat at all political values (no slope of line).35  In developing nations, the relationship 
                                               
35 Refer to developed countries’ post Basel shift economic interaction plots. 
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between the economic factor and e-waste import volume is strong when the political factor is 
high and low.  However, contrary to the hypothesis volume decreases when the political factor is 
low.  Despite this effect, the political economic factor is the most impactful factor in developing 
countries.  This suggests that the new economic growth explains electronic waste importation 
practices in developing countries. 
The analysis also tests the interaction between the domestic political factor’s influence 
on the relationship between the environmental factor and e-waste import volume.  The 
assumption is that the political structure will not hinder environmental initiatives.  Therefore, in 
all models, it is hypothesized that e-waste volume will decrease when the political factor 
moderates on the relationship between the environmental factor and e-waste volume. This 
holds true in all models.  As the environmental factor gets larger electronic waste import volume 
decreases. 36  This finding is important because it refutes the race to the bottom and waste 
haven hypothesis that conjecture states, in particular developing countries, create lax 
regulations to import electronic waste. 
 
                                               
36 Refer to combined model and developing countries’ post Basel shift environmental interaction plots.   
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) ASSESSMENT  
Table 5.40 displays the expected and actual outer weights (loadings) of the indicators 
onto the factor.  Relative importance is determined by the value of the outer weight.  Table 5.41 
outlines the variables’ significance and importance.  An indicator is significant if its outer weight 
p-value is less than .05 and is absolutely important if it’s outer weight p-value is non-significant, 
greater than .05, but its outer loading is above .50.    
GDP and GDP/capita function as expected in the combined model.  However, they do 
not load as expected when country types are evaluated separately.  In advanced countries, 
GDP loads negatively and GDP/capita loads positively.  Conversely, GDP is positive in 
developing countries and GDP/capita is negative.  These results support studies that illustrate 
capital abundance (individual wealth) and the size (wealth) of the economy are important 
variables to the economic factor.  However, they also reveal that the importance of these 
economic variables differs between country types. In developed nations, GDP/capita is the most 
important indicator to the factor and is absolutely important.  GDP is irrelevant in developed 
countries.  Alternatively, GDP is important in developing nations and GDP/capita is immaterial.  
Interestingly, GDP is not significant to the economic factor in the developing model.   
The percent of goods and services exported is positive in all models.  However, the 
relative importance differs.  When country types are modeled jointly and in developing countries, 
export matters substantially.  However, the percent of exports is not nearly as important in 
developed nations.  This finding provides additional evidence that the size of the economy 
matters more to the economic factor in developing countries than developed.  Notably, the 
percent of goods and services is significant in the combined and developed models. 
Scholars and practitioners argue that corporate tax rates impact trade and 
economic/industry development of the waste management industry.  Therefore, it is expected to 
be relatively important in all models.  The tax rate is slightly important to the economic factor in 
the combined model.  It is nearly irrelevant to the economic factor in developed and developing 
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nations.  This is especially interesting because literature suggests that tax rates are especially 
concerning to advanced nations because rates are generally higher in developed nations which 
prohibits economic growth.  More so, tax rate is not significant in any model. 
Polity is hypothesized to be important to the political factor in all the models.  This holds 
true.  Nonetheless the relative importance differs between country types.  Polity is highly 
important in the combined and developed model.  Accordingly, it is significant in these models. 
Polity is slightly important in the developed model.  Polity being of greater relevance in the 
developing model is to be expected considering the variation of political structures in developing 
nations. 
It is expected that corruption is of concern in all models.  However, corruption is 
immaterial to the political factor when country types are modeled independently.  Corruption 
loads negatively and is not important in developed nations.  It loads positively in developing 
nations but is essentially irrelevant.  It is not surprising that corruption is not as important in 
developed nations because some literature suggests that corruption is not as prevalent in 
developed nations as compared to developing nations.  However, because of corruption 
appears to be more prevalent in less developed nations it is surprising that corruption is not 
important to the political factor. 
Freedom to trade is expected to have a positive impact on the political factor.  Freedom 
to trade is of little importance when the country types are combined.  It is also not important to 
the political factor in developed nations.  Freedom to trade is moderately in developing nations. 
Innovation policies are assumed to be important to the political factor as it relates to e-
waste trade.  Innovation is moderately important in the combined model.  It is the most relevant 
indicator in the developed model. Innovation is also slightly important in developing countries.  
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This outcome supports literature that contends that developing countries are concerned about 
technological advancements that are necessary to compete in the global economy.37 
Environmental treaties is the most important indicator to the environmental factor in the 
combined and developing models.   Accordingly, they are significant in these models.  However, 
environmental treaties are of moderate importance in the developed model.  Interestingly, 
environmental treaties are more important in developing nations than the Basel Ban 
Amendment which was created to safeguard it against hazardous waste. 
Nonetheless, the Ban Amendment is important in all the models.  It is the most relevant 
to the environmental factor in developed nations.  Additionally, it is of high importance to the 
environmental factor in the combined and developing model.  Notably, the Basel Amendment is 
significant in all the models.  Alternatively, ratifying the Basel Convention is inconsequential in 
all models.  
The environmental protection score is expected to be of importance in all models.  
Oddly, it is not important in any of the models.   
  
                                               
37 Discussed in the Global Innovation Index (2015).  
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Table 5.41 Assessment of Variable Significance and Importance - Post Basel Shift  
     Factor  Variable Combined  Developed  Developing  
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
  
GDP     
Absolutely 
Important  
GDP /capita (US $)   Absolutely Important    
Export of Goods and Services  Significant  Absolutely Important  Significant 
Tax Rate        
P
O
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 
Polity  Significant   Significant 
Corruption      
Freedom to Trade    
Absolutely 
Important  
Innovation  Significant  Absolutely Important  
Absolutely 
Important  
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T 
 Environmental Treaties Significant   Significant 
Basel Convention     Significant 
Basel Ban Amendment  Significant  Significant  Significant 
Environmental Protection Index Significant  Significant    
Significant: p-value < .05 
  Absolutely Important: p-value > .05 and outer loading weight is > .50 
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PRE & POST BASEL SHIFT FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In 2008 Basel repositioned its view on waste from a value less by product to a profitable 
commodity.  This analysis tests whether this change altered nations’ economic, political and 
environmental factors impact on hazardous electronic waste import volume.  The study finds 
that there is a sizeable explanation change pre to post shift in the combined and developed 
models, approximately 10% to 21% and approximately 11% to 24%, respectively.  Hence, 
economic, political and environmental factors better explain electronic waste trade import 
practices post Basel shift.   
 
 
Table 5.42 R2 -  Pre and Post Basel Shift  
  
Model  Pre Basel Post Basel 
Combined  10.2 21.1 
Developed  11.4 24.2 
Developing  38 39.4 
 
 
STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT 
Table 5.43 displays the theories that best explain what drives waste import volume 
before and after Basel shifted its view on waste.  The economic nationalist theory, the notion 
that economic variables drive a nation’s propensity to import electronic waste, explains waste 
trade importation practices in the combined model before and after Basel shifted its view on 
waste.  The economic nationalist perspective theory explains waste import volume in the 
developing model waste import volume pre Basel shift.  However, post shift the new 
endogenous growth theory better explains waste import practices in developing countries.  
Lastly, tenets of neoliberal international institutionalism best explain waste import behavior in 
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developed countries pre Basel shift.  After the shift, developed countries’ import volume is best 
explained by environmental political theory. 
 
 
Table 5.43 Theory Explanation - Pre and Post Basel Shift   
  Model  Pre Basel Shift  Post  Basel Shift  
Combined  
Economic Nationalist/ 
Neoclassical Economic Theory  
Economic Nationalist/ 
Neoclassical Economic Theory  
      
Developed  
 Neoliberal International 
Institutionalism   Environmental Political Theory  
      
Developing  
Economic Nationalist/ 
Neoclassical Economic Theory  New Endogenous Growth Theory 
 
 
In developing countries, the primary influencer of electronic waste import volume 
changes from the economic factor pre Basel shift to the political economic factor after Basel 
changes its perspective on waste.  This change demonstrates that the political structure plays a 
larger role with e-waste import practices after the shift.  Additionally, the directionality of e-waste 
differs pre and post shift when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the 
economic factor and e-waste import volume.38  Before Basel altered its view on waste, all 
developing nations regardless of their political structure import more electronic waste as the 
economic factor gets larger.  Conversely, after the shift, waste import volume increases only in 
developing countries that are more democratic, are more open to trade and have higher levels 
of innovation.  Alternatively, countries that are less open to trade and less democratic (low 
political value) import volume decreases as the economic factor gets larger.  This suggests that 
Basel’s shift on waste did not alter the behavior of developing countries that already had the 
ability to participate in the global economy.  However, it is possible that Basel’s change shifted 
                                               
38 Refer to developing countries’ economic interaction plots. 
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volume to developing nations who are already competitive in the market thereby reducing less 
developed countries ability to import waste.  Therefore, regarding electronic waste trade, it is 
unlikely that Basel shifting its view induces a ‘race to the bottom’ in which states alter regulatory 
parameters to import electronic waste and maximize economic benefits.   
Basel altering its perspective on waste did not change the importation practices of 
developing countries when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the 
environment and e-waste import volume. 39  Notably, e-waste volume decreases more among 
countries with higher political values (more freedom to trade and more democratic).  
Nonetheless, import volume decreases in developing nations at all political levels (countries with 
more and less freedom to trade and more and less democratic) pre and post Basel shift.  
Hence, these results rebut literature that suggest the Basel shift causes a ‘race to the bottom’ 
among developing nations. 
In developed countries before Basel shifted its view on waste the environmental factor is 
the key driver on e-waste import volume.  Hence, liberal international institutionalism explains e-
waste trade practices.  The environmental factor continues to be the primary driver post Basel 
shift.  However, the political and political environmental factors become equally as strong.  This 
suggests that post Basel shift the government plays a larger role in electronic waste importation 
thus, e-waste trade practices are better explained by tenets of environmental political theory. 
This is not surprising because environmental awareness continues to be of growing concern 
among society and states.  Consequently, it is understandable that import volume decreases 
during pre and post Basel time periods at all political levels when the political factor moderates 
on the relationship between the environmental factor and volume. 40  Notably, volume 
experiences a sharper decline during the post Basel period when the political factor moderates 
on the relationship between the environmental factor and volume (a steeper slope of the line). 
                                               
39 Refer to developing countries’ environmental interaction plots.  
 
40 Refer to developed countries’ environmental interaction plots.  
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E-waste volume changes in developed countries when the political factor moderates on 
the relationship between the economic factor and volume after Basel shifted its view.41  Pre 
shift, when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the economic factor 
volume decreases at all political levels.  However, after the shift, volume remains relatively flat 
and does not affect e-waste import volume.  This suggests that post shift, developed countries 
do not create political economic regulations that induce electronic waste importation. 
The political factor increases volume pre and post Basel shift in both developed and 
developing countries.  However, in both country types, the factor becomes more important in e-
waste volume after Basel altered its view on waste.  This suggests that after the shift, the 
political structure plays a larger role in enabling nations to import electronic waste.  The growth 
in the importance of the political factor gives credence to scholars that the shift will cause 
countries to alter policies to increase import volume.  This change also gives merit to domestic 
institutionalist theory that contends a nation’s political structure determines the extent to which a 
county imports hazardous waste.  However, the domestic political structure is not as impactful 
as both groups argue. 
There are generally two arguments relating to the environmental factor.  Some scholars 
argue that despite the shift the increase in environmental awareness leads to international 
environmental agreements which will decrease hazardous waste import volume.  Another 
perspective is that this effect is more likely in developed countries as compared to developing 
nations because developing nations are not as environmentally conscious.  The results indicate 
that the environmental factor moderately reduces import volume in developed countries before 
and after the shift.  Additionally, the environmental factor causes a small decrease in electronic 
waste import volume before and after Basel changes in developing countries.  This outcome 
validates international institutionalist that argue outputs of international institutions, such as 
                                               
41 Refer to developed countries’ economic interaction plots.  
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international environmental agreements, are effective in minimizing negative consequences 
stemming from trade. 
  
 
 
 
 
192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) ASSESSMENT  
The findings illustrate that the importance of variables changed after Basel shifted its 
view on waste.  Table 5.45 outlines the actual outer weights of the variables pre and post the 
Basel shift. 
Prior to the shift, GDP is the most important variable to the economic factor in all the 
models.  However, after the repositioning GDP/capita is the most important indicator to the 
economic factor in developed countries and the percent of exports of goods and services 
becomes the most critical variable in the combined and developing models.  This change is 
understandable in that the percent of goods and services is a measure of a country’s level of 
participation in the global economy.  Therefore, it is likely that this variable is extremely 
important to developing countries that import waste as a means of participating in global trade.   
During the pre-shift period, polity is the most important variable to the political factor in 
all the models.  Polity remains the most critical variable after the shift in the combined and 
developing models.  Innovation becomes the most critical variable in the developed model after 
Basel changed its perspective on waste.  This change is not surprising in that enhancements in 
that richer countries are more likely to have the desire and capital to invest in technology and 
innovation to maximize profits.  It is worth noting that corruption and freedom to trade become 
less important after the shift. 
Environmental treaties is the most relevant indicator to the environmental factor in the 
combined and developing models pre and post Basel adjusting its view on waste.  The Basel 
Convention is the most critical factor in developed countries pre shift.  This changes in the post 
shift period.  The Ban Amendment becomes the most important variable.  This change is 
interesting because once Basel decided that waste is a resource it is unlikely that developed 
nations with equipment and capital that permits them to extract the valuable components from 
electronic waste will have a desire to export the commodity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: WASTE NOT…WANT NOT 
 
There are generally five theories that explain hazardous waste trade.  The economic 
nationalist perspective posits that economic variables promote a country to import waste.  The 
domestic institutionalist theory argues that the domestic political structure is the leading 
determinant of waste import volume.  The new endogenous growth theory asserts that a 
combination of regulations and economic variables influence waste import volume.  Neoliberal 
international institutionalism contends that international environmental initiatives influence waste 
volume.  Lastly, environmental political theory argues that environmental and political factors 
impact waste import volume.   
The overarching purposes of this study are first to identify factors that influence state 
behavior in waste importation and secondly to determine which factor has the largest effect on 
import volume.  In doing so, the project identifies which theory best explains what drives 
countries to import electronic waste. 
As to be expected, the results reveal that one theory does not explain waste import 
volume. In fact, different theories explain waste import volume when country types are modeled 
independently versus when modeled jointly.  The findings also illustrate that the impact of 
factors changes over time.  These changes represent the evolving nature of the political 
economy of hazardous electronic waste trade. 
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OVERALL MODEL 
The overall model assesses electronic waste import volume from 1998 – 2014.  The 
economic factor has the largest effect on electronic waste volume in the combined model.  
Therefore, the economic nationalist perspective best explains waste importation in the 
combined model.  Following this result, the economic status drives e-waste import volume.  
Alternatively, the political economic factor has the largest effect on import volume in developed 
and developing countries.  Consequently, the new growth theory best explains what drives 
waste importation in both developed and developing countries.  This suggests that the 
government’s impact on the economic factor plays a large role in hazardous waste import 
volume. 
Table 6.1 shows the hypotheses results for the overall model.1  Hypotheses 1a-c is that 
the economic factor has a large positive impact on electronic waste import volume.  These 
hypotheses are partially accepted in the combined and developing model.  Although the effect 
small is smaller than what is hypothesized, volume increases as expected.  The hypothesis is 
rejected in the developed model.  The economic factor has a medium sized effect and 
decreases volume. 
Hypotheses 2a-c state the political factor has a medium positive impact on electronic 
waste import volume.  The hypothesis is true in developing countries.  The hypothesis is 
partially accepted in the combined model.  In this model, the political factor has a small effect on 
e-waste import volume.  However, aligning with the hypothesis, the political factor increases 
volume.  The hypothesis is rejected in the developed model.  The effect of the political factor is 
smaller than what is hypothesized and e-waste import volume decreases. 
Hypotheses 3a-c posit that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on 
electronic waste import volume.  The hypotheses are accepted in all models.  
                                               
1 Refer to Chapter 4.  
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Hypotheses 4a-c assume expects the economic factor’s effect on e-waste import volume 
will be stronger when the political value is lower.  It also assumes that the economic factor 
increases volume.  The hypothesis is partially accepted in all the models.  In the combined 
model, as the economic factor gets larger, volume increases at all political values.  However, 
the economic effect size does not get change because of the political factor values.  In the 
developed model, the economic factor’s effect is stronger when the political value is low.  
However, e-waste import volume decreases.  In developing countries, the relationship between 
the economic factor and e-waste import volume is equally strong among politically high and low 
countries.  Additionally, import volume increases only among politically high leveled developing 
countries. 
Hypotheses 5a-c conjectures that the influence of the political factor causes the 
environmental factor to decrease volume.  It also expects that the environmental factor will have 
a stronger relationship on volume when the value of the political factor is higher.  The 
hypotheses are accepted in all the models.  Additionally, the political environmental factor 
decreases electronic waste volume in all models. 
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PRE & POST BASEL SHIFT  
The pre and post Basel shift analyses evaluate whether Basel shifting its view on waste 
from a value less by-product to a profitable commodity altered a factor’s effect on electronic 
waste import volume.  The pre Basel shift analysis evaluates electronic waste import data from 
1998 to 2006.  The post Basel analysis evaluates 2008 to 2014. 
In the combined model, the economic factor is the largest influencer pre and post Basel 
changing its position on waste.  Therefore, the economic nationalist theory, the assertion that 
economic variables drive a nation’s propensity to import electronic waste, explains electronic 
waste importation practices when country types are modeled jointly.  However, combining 
country types blends the effects of developed and developing countries.  Evaluating country 
types independently yields a more fruitful analysis. 
Neoliberal international institutionalism best explains waste import behavior in developed 
countries pre Basel shift.  However, after the shift, import volume in developed countries is 
almost equally explained by the neoliberal institutionalism, domestic institutionalism and 
environmental political theory.  The economic nationalist theory explains e-waste import volume 
pre Basel shift in developing countries.  However, post shift the new endogenous growth theory 
better explains waste import practices. 
Table 6.2 outlines the hypotheses results for the pre Basel shift model.2  Hypotheses 1a-
c is that the economic factor has a medium positive impact on electronic waste import volume.  
This hypothesis is accepted in the combined model and partially accepted in the developed and 
developing models.  The economic factor has a medium but negative positive effect on volume 
in developed countries.  It has a large positive effect in developing countries. 
Hypotheses 2a-c states the political factor has a small positive effect in the combined 
model, a small negative effect in developed countries and a medium positive effect in 
developing countries.  The hypothesis is accepted when country types are combined and in the 
                                               
2 Refer to Chapter 5.  
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developing model.  The hypothesis is partially accepted in developed countries.  The political 
factor has a small effect on electronic waste import volume but volume increases rather than 
decreases. 
Hypotheses 3a-c posit that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on 
electronic waste import volume.  The hypothesis is accepted in developing countries and 
partially accepted in the combined and developed models.  In the latter models, volume 
decreases but the effect size is larger than what is expected.   
Hypotheses 4a-c consider the economic factor’s effect size on electronic waste import 
volume when the political factor intervenes on the relationship.  It is hypothesized that that when 
the political factor intervenes, the relationship between the economic factor and volume is 
stronger when the political factor is lower.  Additionally, it is expected that the effect will increase 
volume.  The hypothesis is partially accepted in the combined and developing models. In the 
combined model, the political factor does not impact the relationship between the economic 
factor and import volume.  However, volume increases as suspected.  Alternatively, in 
developing countries, the economic factor does not have a stronger effect when the value of the 
political factor is low but waste volume increases. 
Hypotheses 5a-c evaluates the environmental factor’s influence on electronic waste 
import volume when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the environment 
and e-waste.  The hypotheses conjectures that this influence causes the environmental factor to 
have a negative effect on volume.  It also expects the environmental factor to have a larger 
effect on volume when the political factor is larger.  The hypotheses are accepted in all models. 
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Table 6.3 shows the hypotheses results for the post Basel shift model.3  Hypotheses 1a-
c is that the economic factor has a medium positive impact on electronic waste import volume.  
The hypothesis is accepted in the combined model and partially accepted in developing models.  
In developing nations, volume increases but the effect size is smaller than what is hypothesized.  
The hypothesis is rejected in developed countries; the effect size is small and the directional 
flow of waste is opposite to what is hypothesized. 
Hypotheses 2a-c states the political factor has a small positive effect in all models.  The 
hypothesis is accepted when country types are combined.  The hypothesis is accepted in the 
combined model.  The hypotheses are partially accepted when country types are model 
independently.  The political factor has a medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume 
and increases volume in both developed and developing countries. 
Hypotheses 3a-c posit that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on 
electronic waste import volume.  The hypothesis is accepted in the combined and developing 
models. It is partially accepted in the developed model.  The environmental factor has a larger 
effect than what is expected.   
Hypotheses 4a-c assume the political factor impacts the effect size of the economic 
factor’s influence on electronic waste import volume.  It is expected that the economic factor will 
have a stronger effect on volume when the political value is low.  It also posits that the influence 
yields a positive effect on volume.  The hypothesis is partially accepted in the combined model.  
Volume increases but the relationship is stronger when the value of the political factor is higher.  
The hypothesis is rejected in the developed and developing models.  In the developed model, 
the political factor does not influence the relationship between the economic factor and volume.  
Additionally, volume remains relatively flat.  In developing countries, the relationship between 
the economic factor and e-waste import volume is equally strong at all political levels.  
Furthermore, volume decreases when the political value is low. 
                                               
3 Refer to Chapter 5.  
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Hypotheses 5a-c expect the environmental factor’s impact on electronic waste import 
volume is stronger when the political factor is larger.  It is also expected that the effect will 
decrease electronic waste import volume.  The hypotheses are accepted in all the models.   
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FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study finds that developed and developing countries electronic waste import volume 
are driven by different factors.  Therefore, future studies should assess country types when 
attempting to understand waste trade practices.  While this project focused on factors that 
influence electronic waste importation.  An equally interesting project is to test relationship of the 
factors between trading partners. 
Furthermore, a large scale quantitative study such as this is useful for testing 
hypotheses about what factors have the most effect on electronic waste import volume, 
hypotheses which would be difficult or impossible to test using case study analysis.  However, 
future research should apply the Waste Trade Framework at the national level (individual 
country case study) to explore how the factors influence a single country’s decision to import 
electronic waste.  For example, a qualitative project can assess the economic and 
environmental policies that drive states to import waste.  This type of analysis provides a more 
granular view to the political economy of electronic waste importation.   
Moreover, the results of this project reveal that innovation and the amount of goods and 
services exported are more critical to the political and economic factors than what current 
literature suggests.  Future studies should not overlook these variables.  Also, in alignment with 
other studies on hazardous waste, the effect of capital abundance (GDP/capita) yields mixed 
results.  Although it would be difficult to obtain, capital/worker, specifically capital/worker in the 
waste recycling industry, is a better measure to assess the effect of capital abundance in 
electronic waste importation practices. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1A Top Electronic Waste Importers (in tons)  
Country  1996 1998 2000 2006 2010 2015 
Mexico 31,265 47,684 38,512 115,353 199,580 173,459 
Rep. of Korea 3,244 11,695 15,154 54,552 197,739 426,733 
Belgium 30,015 28,370 46,909 34,841 76,385 56,233 
Indonesia 387,544 372 67,901 3,993 312 502 
Sweden 36,114 33,813 37,796 31,668 30,220 
Canada 
 
39 106,875 68,177 
France 68,705 29,100 24,776 10,264 37,185 19,907 
Slovenia 20,653 14,006 24,199 26,937 37,878 34,742 
USA* 
 
14,190 30,326 37,420 40,384 
Germany 5,698 4,889 8,350 17,918 24,076 64,952 
Spain 7 3,184 21,731 3,745 33,964 49,224 
Czech Rep. 
 
1 6,865 39,334 42,304 
United Kingdom 15,616 12,613 15,208 17,960 25,011 13,173 
Poland 
  
14,245 19,013 16,014 
India 
  
5,135 4,256 44,157 
Netherlands 2,454 33 9,131 23,704 13,020 
Philippines 
 
5,347 27,119 4,028 5,035 
Austria 18,890 14,910 13,373 8,019 
Estonia 657 2,906 10,886 17,222 13,455 
Bulgaria 
  
2,574 5,638 22,796 
      Source: UNComtrade Database  
    
Notes:  
*Country is a top exporter and importer of electronic waste. 
Highest importers were chosen based on the highest average of the six- year period. 
Belgium and Luxembourg reported imported volume jointly in 1996 and 1998.  For this analysis, the volume was 
relocated to Belgium for these time periods because it traded substantially more waste in subsequent years.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
221 
Table 2A Export Volume of Highest Exporters (in tons) 
Country  1996 1998 2000 2006 2010 2015 
USA* 17,779 14,300 1,206,124 307,863 516,856 
France 1,899 33,030 40,197 96,493 113,029 104,440 
United Arab Emirates 
   
32,806 
Netherlands 10,542 29,935 751 27,915 50,861 72,387 
Canada* 
    
27,860 
Belgium* 42,638 22,629 21,543 30,154 21,855 
Japan 3 104 55 9,124 47,747 84,015 
Singapore 
    
22,546 
Hungary 115 19,615 18,954 22,568 31,995 23,166 
Germany* 14,360 25,921 19,856 23,254 13,515 16,189 
Denmark 228 21,501 27,196 19,635 24,661 19,541 
Switzerland 4,291 7,624 8,272 11,478 25,759 27,420 
Dominican Rep. 
  
867 27,726 12,063 
Norway 4,989 3,827 18,423 18,509 21,452 
Romania 10,681 22,585 7,210 4,818 15,119 
South Africa 
 
131 1 1,171 43,801 
Kuwait 
   
17,165 2,271 
Finland 12,133 447 11,592 16,509 16,463 
Chile 420 4,526 20,933 
Lithuania 4,035 5,937 1,733 16,395 12,247 
      Source: UNComtrade Database  
    
Notes: 
*Country is a top exporter and importer of electronic waste. 
Highest importers were chosen based on the highest average of the six- year period. 
Belgium and Luxembourg reported imported volume jointly in 1996 and 1998.  For this analysis, the volume was 
relocated to Belgium for these time periods because it traded substantially more waste in subsequent years.  
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Basel Convention Timeline1 
 
1989 Basel Convention opts to control the transboundary movement and disposal of 
toxic waste. 
1994 Technical guidelines published for environmentally sound waste management 
practices.  
1995 Ban Amendment (Annex VII) adopted.  Prohibits OECD countries from sending 
recyclable and non-recyclable waste from OECD countries to non-OECD 
countries.*  
1998 Annex VIII and IX enacted. Add more types of waste that is regulated by the 
convention. 
1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage formed to 
regulate civil liability due to damage that occurs during transboundary movement 
of hazardous waste, including illegal movement.*  
2002 Promoting Implementation and Compliance Committee established to assist 
nations to comply with the parameters and obligations set forth in the convention. 
 Strategic Plan for Implementation of Basel Convention established to assist 
less developed nations with implementing the Basel Convention through 2010. 
2003 Public-Private Partnership founded to create technical guidelines to manage 
end-of-life electronic devices and electronic waste.  Mobile Phone Partnership 
Initiative developed guidelines for end of life mobile phones through 2008.2  
2008 Basel Convention shifts view of waste from a costly by product to one of a 
valuable resource.3  
                                               
1 Basel Convention, "Milestones". 
 
2 "E-Waste Overview," Accessed June 2016, 
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/TechnicalAssistance/Partnerships/PACE/Overview/tabid/3243/Default.aspx. 
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2011 Partnership for Action on Computing Equipment (PACE) provides guidance 
document on the end of life management of computing equipment.4 
2015 Technical guidelines established for transboundary movement of electronic and 
electrical waste.5 
 
*Not entered into force as of January 1, 2011. 
Table 3A Waste Trade Framework: dimensionality and association between factors and indicators 
Num. Indicators  Relevant Literature  
   
1 GDP  
Antweiler et. al (2001), Clapp (2001), Bhagwati 
(2004), Baggs (2009), Lepawsky (2009), Higashida 
and Managi (2014) 
   
2 GDP /capita (US $) 
Montgomery (1992, 1995), Baggs (2009), 
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010), Kellenberg (2012), 
Estrada-Ayub & Kahhat (2014), Higashida and 
Managi (2014), Lucier and Gareau (2015) 
   3 Export of Goods and Services  Krasner (1976), Clapp (2001) 
   
4 Tax Rate  Levinson (1999a), Levinson (1999b), Cassing and Kuhn (2003), Kellenberg (2010) 
   
5 Polity  Sigman (1996), Levinson (1999), O'Neill (2000), Drury 2006, Li and Reuvenuy (2006), Fiorino (2011) 
   
6 Corruption 
Graeff (2003), G. Fredriksson (2003), Nwabuzor 
(2005), Wilson and Damania (2005), Drury (2006), 
Billger and Goel (2009), Pieroni and d’Agostino 
(2013) 
   
7 Innovation  
Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Hemmelskamp et. al 
(2000), Gilpin (2001), United Nations 
Environment Programme (2011), Ambec et.al 
(2013), USTIC (2013), Global Index Report (2015) 
   
8 Freedom to Trade 
Graeff (2003), Nwabuzor (2005), Baggs (2009), 
Billger and Goel (2009), Pieroni and d’Agostino 
(2013) 
   
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Basel Convention, "Our Sustainable Future: The Role of the Basel Convention," 3. 
 
4 Basel Convention, "E-Waste Overview". 
 
5 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, "Technical Guidelines on Transboundary Movements of Electrical and Electronic Waste," 
(Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP, Basel Convention, 2015). 
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9 Environmental Protection Index Fiorino (2011), Kellenberg (2012), Brunel and Levinson (2016), Green Growth (2015) 
   
10 Environmental Treaties 
Mitchell (2003), Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis (2002), 
Barrett (2005), Bernhagen (2008), Kellenberg and 
Levinson (2014) 
   
11 Basel Convention  
Wirth (2007), Andrews (2009), Baggs (2009), 
Kellenberg (2012, 2014, 2015), Jing (2014), Lucier 
and Gareau (2015), Khan (2016) 
   
12 Basel Ban Amendment  Andrews (2009), Baggs (2009), Kellenberg (2012, 2015), Jing (2014), Lucier and Gareau (2015) 
 
Note: Bolded literature focuses on electronic waste.  
Table 4A Overview of waste trade studies and methodologies 
Num.  Author Title Methodology  
1 O'Neill (2000) 
Waste trading among rich 
nations: building a new theory of 
environmental regulation 
Case Studies  
    
2 Clapp (2001) 
Toxic exports: the transfer of 
hazardous wastes from rich to 
poor countries 
Case Studies  
    
3 Cassing and Kuhn (2003) 
Strategic Environmental Policies 
When Waste Products Are 
Tradable 
Mathematical Proofs  
Game Theory  
    
4 van Beukering et. al (2006) 
Modelling and analysis of 
international recycling between 
developed and developing 
countries 
Mathematical proofs  
    
5 Baggs (2009) International Trade in Hazardous Waste  
Ordinary least squares gravity 
model 
1st Stage: Probit 
2nd Stage: Maximum likelihood 
    
6 Lepawsky (2009) Tracking e-scrap on the grey market 
Network Analysis Model 
Ordinary Least Squares 
    
7 Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) Mapping international flows of electronic waste Network Analysis Model  
    
8 Kellenberg (2010) Consumer Waste, Backhauling and Pollution Havens 
Mathematical proofs 
Econometric model 
    
9 Kellenberg (2012) Trading Waste 
Gravity model 
Poisson pseudo maximum 
likelihood 
    
10 Kaushal and Nema (2013) 
Strategic Analysis of Computer 
Waste Management Options: 
Game-Theoretic Approach 
Game Theory  
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11 Higashida and Managi (2014) 
Determinants of trade in 
recyclable wastes: evidence from 
commodity-based trade of waste 
and scrap 
Gravity model 
Poisson pseudo maximum 
likelihood 
    
12 Lepawsky (2014) 
The changing geography of 
global trade in electronic 
discards: time to rethink the e-
waste problem Network Analysis Model  
13 Wakolbinger et. al (2014) When and for whom would e-waste be a treasure trove?  Mathematical proofs 
Table 5A Waste Trade Framework  
 
Factor Indicator (Variable) Source Definition 
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
 
GDP World Bank 
The sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. 
GDP /capita 
(US $) World Bank 
The sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products.  GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. 
Export of 
Goods and 
Services  
(% of GDP) 
World Bank  
Exports of goods and services represent the value of 
all goods and other market services provided to the 
rest of the world. They include the value of 
merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, 
royalties, license fees, and other services, such as 
communication, construction, financial, information, 
business, personal, and government services. 
Total Tax Rate  
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 
Measures the amount of taxes and mandatory 
contributions payable by a business in the second 
year of operation, expressed as a share of 
commercial profit.  
PO
LI
TI
C
A
L 
 
Polity  Polity IV Project Index 
Measures government type.  Scale ranges from -10 
(completely authoritarian) to +10 (completely 
democratic). 
Corruption Corruption Perceptions Index 
Measures the level of perceived governmental 
corruption.  Scale ranges from 0–100 in which a 
score of 100 indicates very little perceived 
corruption. 
Innovation  
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 
Ranking of countries' innovation measures that 
promote research and development. 
Freedom to 
Trade 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
The extent of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect 
imports and exports of goods and services.  The 
scale ranges from 0 -100 in which a score of 100 is 
closest to the target and represents the most 
freedom to trade. 
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Table 5A Continued 
EN
VI
R
O
N
M
EN
TA
L 
 
EPI Environmental Protection Index  
Proxy for regulatory stringency. Measures the 
protection of human health from environmental 
harm.  The scale ranges from 0 -100 in which a 
score of 100 is closest to the target and represents 
excellent environmental performance. 
 Environmental  
Treaties 
Socioeconomic Data 
and Applications 
Center 
Absolute number of environmental agreements a 
country has ratified.  
Basel Convention  Basel Convention  
Dichotomous indicator of whether the Basel 
Convention has been ratified and/or entered into 
force.  
Basel Ban 
Amendment  Basel Convention  
Dichotomous indicator of whether the Ban 
Amendment of the Basel Convention has been 
ratified and/or entered into force.  
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Table 6A Countries in Study 
      
 
Country Developed 
 
Country Developed 
1 Albania 0 35 Estonia 1 
2 Algeria 0 36 Ethiopia 0 
3 Argentina 0 37 Fiji 0 
4 Australia 1 38 Finland 1 
5 Austria 1 39 France 1 
6 Azerbaijan 0 40 Georgia 0 
7 Bahrain 0 41 Germany 1 
8 Bangladesh 0 42 Ghana 0 
9 Belarus 0 43 Greece 1 
10 Belgium 1 44 Guatemala 0 
11 Benin 0 45 Guinea 0 
12 Bhutan 0 46 Guyana 0 
13 Bolivia 0 47 Honduras 0 
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 48 Hong Kong SAR, China 1 
15 Botswana 0 49 Hungary 0 
16 Brazil 0 50 Iceland 1 
17 Bulgaria 0 51 India 0 
18 Burundi 0 52 Indonesia 0 
19 Cambodia 0 53 Iran 0 
20 Cameroon 0 54 Ireland 1 
21 Canada 1 55 Israel 1 
22 Chile 0 56 Italy 1 
23 China 0 57 Jamaica 0 
24 Colombia 0 58 Japan 1 
25 Costa Rica 0 59 Jordan 0 
26 Croatia 0 60 Kazakhstan 0 
27 Cuba 0 61 Kenya 0 
28 Cyprus 1 62 Kuwait 0 
29 Czech Republic 1 63 Kyrgyzstan 0 
30 Denmark 1 64 Latvia 1 
31 Dominican Republic 0 65 Lesotho 0 
32 Ecuador 0 66 Lithuania 1 
33 Egypt 0 67 Luxembourg 1 
34 El Salvador 0 68 Macao SAR, China 1 
 
 Note: 1 is developed country.  0 is not developed country. 
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Table 6A Continued 
      
 
Country Developed 
 
Country Developed 
69 Macedonia 0 103 Singapore 1 
70 Madagascar 0 104 Slovakia 1 
71 Malawi 0 105 Slovenia 1 
72 Malaysia 0 106 South Africa 0 
73 Mali 0 107 South Korea 1 
74 Malta 1 108 Spain 1 
75 Mauritania 0 109 Sri Lanka 0 
76 Mauritius 0 110 Swaziland 0 
77 Mexico 0 111 Sweden 1 
78 Mongolia 0 112 Switzerland 1 
79 Morocco 0 113 Tanzania 0 
80 Mozambique 0 114 Thailand 0 
81 Namibia 0 115 Togo 0 
82 Nepal 0 116 Tonga 0 
83 Netherlands 1 117 Trinidad and Tobago 0 
84 New Zealand 1 118 Tunisia 0 
85 Nicaragua 0 119 Turkey 0 
86 Niger 0 120 Uganda 0 
87 Nigeria 0 121 Ukraine 0 
88 Norway 1 122 United Arab Emirates 0 
89 Oman 0 123 United Kingdom 1 
90 Pakistan 0 124 United States 1 
91 Panama 0 125 Uruguay 0 
92 Paraguay 0 126 Venezuela 0 
93 Peru 0 127 Vietnam 0 
94 Philippines 0 128 Yemen 0 
95 Poland 0 129 Zambia 0 
96 Portugal 1 130 Zimbabwe 0 
97 Qatar 0 
   98 Romania 0 
   99 Rwanda 0 
   100 Saudi Arabia 0 
   101 Senegal 0 
   102 Seychelles 0 
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Table 7A Sample Size  
   Year  n  Developed  Developing  
1998 54 25 29 
2000 70 31 39 
2002 75 30 45 
2004 83 35 48 
2006 90 31 59 
2008 102 35 67 
2010 104 35 69 
2012 95 33 62 
2014 84 31 53 
Total  757 286 471 
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Table 8A Weight Conversion  
   
 
Std Dev of Import Volume (Tons) 
Overall Pre Basel  Post Basel  
Combined  35,831 12,711 48,447 
Developed  35,150 12,070 48,853 
Developing  35,840 12,773 47,547 
   
    
 
Overall Weight Change (Tons) 
Combined  Developed  Developing  
Economic --> Import Volume  13,795 -5,624 5,914 
Political Economy --> Import Volume  1,935 -9,069 32,113 
Political --> Import Volume  2,293 -2,214 7,562 
Political Environment --> Import Volume -430 -2,004 -1,004 
Environment --> Import Volume  -2,616 -1,336 -3,297 
   
    
 
Pre Basel Weight Change (Tons) 
Combined  Developed  Developing  
Economic --> Import Volume  2,186 -2,088 7,140 
Political Economy --> Import Volume  -242 -1,183 6,029 
Political --> Import Volume  1,462 1,062 2,363 
Political Environment --> Import Volume -229 -350 -715 
Environment --> Import Volume  -1,551 -2,583 -1,277 
   
    
 
Post Basel Weight Change (Tons) 
Combined  Developed  Developing  
Economic --> Import Volume  17,974 -830 4,992 
Political Economy --> Import Volume  6,153 -1,368 63,856 
Political --> Import Volume  4,554 12,457 17,688 
Political Environment --> Import Volume -2,180 -11,334 -3,328 
Environment --> Import Volume  -5,232 -14,070 -4,517 
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